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1Abstract
This thesis investigates the effect of banking crises on real economic outcomes in three
independent chapters. In chapter one, I classify a large sample of banks according to the
geographic diversification of their international syndicated loan portfolio. Results show
that diversified banks maintain higher loan supply during banking crises in borrower
countries. The positive loan supply effects lead to higher investment and employment
growth for firms. Further distinguishing banks by nationality reveals a pecking order:
diversified domestic banks are the most stable source of funding, while foreign banks
with little diversification are the most fickle. In chapter two, I show that banks’ industry
specialization determines how banks transmit funding shocks during banking crises to
borrowers and how they spill over to non-crisis countries. Results show that banks
insulate their main industries from the banking crisis while they reduce lending most to
their non-main industries. Moreover, I provide evidence on spillover effects, as banks hit
by a banking crisis in one borrower country reduce lending to firms in non-crisis countries.
However, this contagion effect is significantly weaker for firms in banks’ main industries.
In chapter three, I examine the effects of government support for European banks, such as
recapitalizations on financial integration and firm outcomes. Results show that bailout
banks increase their home bias in lending by a quarter more than non-bailout banks.
In turn, the negative loan supply effect on foreign firms translates into lower sales and
employment growth. In the home market, government support distorts credit allocation
by shifting lending to larger, safer and less innovative firms. Moreover, I document that
politicians gain influence over banks by transferring control rights to the government as
part of the support scheme.
2 Abstract
Diese Dissertation untersucht die Auswirkungen von Bankenkrisen auf die Real-
wirtschaft in drei unabhängigen Kapiteln. Kapitel 1 klassifiziert die geografische Diversi-
fikation einer Großzahl von Banken, anhand deren international syndizierten Kreditport-
folios. Ergebnisse zeigen ein höheres Kreditangebot durch diversifizierte Banken während
Bankenkrisen die sich in Kreditnehmerländern ereignen. Dieses relativ stabilere Kredi-
tangebot führt zu höherem Investitions- und Beschäftigungswachstum von Unternehmen.
Eine weiterführende Unterteilung von Banken anhand derer Nationalität zeigt eine Rang-
folge auf: diversifizierte inländische Banken erweisen sich als die stabilste und ausländis-
che Banken mit geringer Diversifikation als die instabilste Finanzierungsquelle. In Kapitel
2 analysiere ich die Rolle der industriellen Spezialisierung von Banken in der Transmis-
sion von Finanzierungsshocks. Anhand der Ergebnisse schützen Banken Unternehmen
die Teil ihrer spezialisierten Industrien sind vor der Bankenkrise und reduzieren ihre
Kreditvergabe hingegen am stärksten an Industrien, in welchen sie weniger spezialisiert
sind. Darüber hinaus finde ich Evidenz für Übertragungseffekte durch reduzierte Kred-
itvergabe auch in Nicht-Krisenländern. Dieser Übertragungseffekt ist jedoch gedämpft
für Unternehmen aus spezialisierten Industrien. Kapitel 3 untersucht die Effekte von
Bankenrettungen in Europa auf die globalen Kreditströme. Gerettete Banken weisen
einen höheren Anstieg des Anteils an inländischen Unternehmen in der Kreditvergabe auf
als nicht-gerettete Banken. Das negative Kreditangebot für ausländische Unternehmen
führt zu einer Verringerung des Absatz- und Beschäftigungswachstums. Im inländischen
Markt hingegen führt die Bankenrettung zu einer Verzerrung der Kreditallokation, hin
zu größeren und weniger innovativen Unternehmen. Darüber hinaus dokumentiere ich
eine stärkere politische Einflussnahme, da Kontrollrechte im Zuge der Bankenrettung an
die Regierung übertragen werden.
3Introduction
The collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 has raised concerns about the threat of financial
instability to the greater economy. But does bank health affect economic outcomes at
firms? This question has sparked substantial interest by policy makers and academics,
while the public debate has been ignited by the deeply unpopular government support
for banks during the Great Financial Crisis. In spite of the attempts to stabilize the
financial sector, banks reduced lending to firms, and countries worldwide saw a sharp
decline in economic growth and employment in the wake of the crisis.
This thesis investigates the effect of banking crises on real economic outcomes. Es-
sentially, I examine the transmission of crises operating through the bank lending chan-
nel. Banking crises lead to funding shocks for banks who, in turn, transmit this shock
to borrowing firms through a reduction in loan supply. This lending reduction amplifies
financial constraints, which forces firms to adapt their business strategy and, thus, trans-
lating into real effects to the economy. However, the lending response to the crisis varies
substantially across countries and banks, depending on banks’ access to funding, business
model, exposure to the crisis or the availability of government support. It is therefore a
key objective for policy makers and academics to better understand the determinants of
this transmission in order to improve the resilience of the economy to financial shocks.
In three chapters, I investigate the role of banks’ business models and the political
economy setting in the transmission of banking crises. The first two chapters examine
the effects of banks’ portfolio concentration by geography and industry on loan supply
during crises. The third chapter examines the role of moral suasion by governments on
crisis transmission through banks receiving government support.
In chapter one, I classify a large sample of banks according to the geographic diversi-
fication of their international syndicated loan portfolio. The results show that diversified
banks maintain higher loan supply during banking crises in borrower countries. The
positive loan supply effects lead to higher investment and employment growth for firms.
Diversified banks are stabilizing due to their ability to raise additional funding during
times of distress, which also shields connected markets from spillovers. Further distin-
guishing banks by nationality reveals a pecking order: diversified domestic banks are the
4 Introduction
most stable source of funding, while foreign banks with little diversification are the most
fickle. The findings suggest that the decline in financial integration since the recent crisis
increases countries’ vulnerability to local shocks.
In chapter two, I show that banks’ industry specialization determines how banks
transmit funding shocks during banking crises to borrowers and how they spill over to
non-crisis countries. Using detailed bank-firm level data on cross-country syndicated
loans, I show that banks insulate their main industries from the banking crisis while they
reduce lending most to their non-main industries. I document a positive relationship be-
tween bank specialization and firm lending: Banks reduce lending strongest to firms from
their least specialized industries. Moreover, I find that banks protect their specialized
industries on aggregate, rather than cherry-pick firms within a specialized industry they
know well. When I look at industry level real effects, I find that increasing an industry’s
exposure to specialized banks by one standard deviation, undoes the negative effect of
the crisis on industry-wide employment. To analyze spillover effects, I investigate how
banking crises are transmitted through cross-border bank lending to non-crisis countries.
I provide evidence on spillover effects, as banks hit by a banking crisis in one borrower
country reduce lending to firms in non-crisis countries. However, this contagion effect
is significantly weaker for firms in banks’ main industries. I show that results are not
driven by bank characteristics, firm quality, or bank-firm specific information that banks
collected through previous interactions. The findings suggest that bank industry spe-
cialization plays a crucial role in the transmission of financial shocks within and across
countries.
In chapter three, I examine the effect of government support for banks, such as
recapitalizations on financial integration and firm outcomes. Using data on European
syndicated lending, results show that bailout banks increase their home bias in lending
by a quarter more than non-bailout banks. In turn, discriminated foreign firms can
only imperfectly substitute this fall in lending by switching banks or issuing corporate
bonds. Thus, the negative loan supply effect translates into lower sales and employment
growth for foreign firms. In addition, government support distorts credit allocation in
the home market by shifting lending to larger, safer and less innovative firms. Moreover,
I document that politicians gain influence over banks by transferring control rights to
the government as part of the support scheme. These results suggest that locating
bank resolution within the European Banking Union at the national level discourages
international economic activity, distorts credit towards less productive firms and harms
growth.
5Chapter I
Bank Loan Supply during Crises:
The Importance of Geographic
Diversification
Based on Doerr and Schaz (2019).
1 Introduction
The last decades saw a steady increase in the importance of globally active banks. Bank-
ing integration peaked around 2007, but declined sharply during the global financial crisis.
It has become a key objective for policy makers and academics to better understand the
effects of integrated banks on financial stability and the real economy (BCBS, 2013).
Several papers provide valuable evidence on the costs and benefits of lending by foreign
banks.1 However, an analysis of the consequences of banks’ portfolio diversification on
financial stability is largely absent from the literature.
In this paper we provide first cross-country evidence on how internationally diversified
banks adjust lending during banking crises in their borrower countries. We find that
diversified banks stabilize loan supply and smooth shocks. On the loan level, their loan
supply during crises is 3.9 % higher, compared to banks with a concentrated portfolio.
Higher loan supply has significant real effects on firm performance. Firms at the 75th
1For theoretical papers highlighting the importance of banks’ diversification and intra-bank capital
markets, see Morgan, Rime and Strahan (2004), Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011, 2012), Kalemli-Ozcan,
Papaioannou and Perri (2013a), Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou and Peydró (2013b). For empirical evi-
dence on the internal capital market, see De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2010); De Haas and van Lelyveld
(2014), Buch and Goldberg (2014), Kerl and Niepmann (2015), Fillat, Garetto and Götz (2015), and
Gilje, Loutskina and Strahan (2016). Claessens (2017) provides an excellent summary on cross-border
lending.
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percentile in terms of loan exposure to diversified banks have 1.5 % higher loan growth
during banking crises, relative to firms at the 25th percentile. This translates into stronger
investment (4.6 %) and employment (1.1 %) growth. As detailed loan-level data allow
us to rigorously control for credit demand effects, the positive effects of diversification
reflect banks’ loan supply. We also find that the positive loan supply effects of diversified
banks are persistent. In the aftermath of a banking crisis, there is a permanent shift
towards lending by diversified banks within and across firms.
To measure the degree of portfolio diversification of globally integrated banks, we
use disaggregated data on worldwide syndicated lending. For each bank we construct
a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of the geographic diversification of its international loan
portfolio, aggregated to the parent bank level. Banks with low portfolio concentration,
i.e. those that lend to multiple countries, are classified as diversified. Our classification of
banks builds on recent literature on banking integration that shows that geographically
diversified banks have lower risk in their portfolio and cheaper access to funding during
crises (Bord, Ivashina and Taliaferro, 2018; Levine, Lin and Xie, 2019). They use their
internal capital markets to reallocate funds towards regions with high loan demand,
thereby smoothing local economic shocks (Gilje, Loutskina and Strahan, 2016; Cortés and
Strahan, 2017).2 Our measure reflects the positive effects of diversification on obtaining
and reallocating funds.
We provide evidence that geographically diversified banks are stabilizing due to their
ability to raise new funds during times of distress. If banks are financially unconstrained
when hit by a local financial shock, they can raise and distribute new funds to sustain
loan supply in affected areas, but also connected non-crisis countries. Banks that face
financial constraints must trade off where to allocate existing funds, similar to Stein
(1997). Local shocks will then have spillover effects on connected countries. For example,
during a banking crisis in Canada unconstrained banks can maintain lending in Canada
and Mexico, while constrained banks cut lending in both countries. We show that, for
highly diversified banks, maintaining loan growth in a crisis country has no spillover
effects on unaffected non-crisis, countries that borrow from the same bank. However, for
banks with a concentrated portfolio loan growth also falls in connected, but unaffected
2Gilje, Loutskina and Strahan (2016) show that banks distribute windfall profits through their branch
network, Cortés and Strahan (2017) find that banks use internal capital markets to reallocate funds
towards regions with high loan demand. As in our setting, reallocation has negative effects on connected
areas of smaller and less diversified banks that cannot raise new funds. Bord, Ivashina and Taliaferro
(2018) provide additional evidence that large and healthy banks raise new deposits to smooth shocks.
Our measure reflects that diversified banks have better access to funds during distress and allocate them
through their intra-bank market.
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borrower countries. We interpret this as evidence that diversified banks have looser
‘financial constraints’ and can raise and distribute new funds to sustain loan supply. Non-
diversified banks are financially constrained and must cut back lending in affected and
unaffected areas when faced with a shock. To provide additional direct evidence on banks’
liabilities, we further match a subsample of US banks with Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) data on depository institutions. In line with the hypothesis that
diversified banks have better access to funding, we find that they raise new deposits at
home during banking crises in borrower countries.
We contrast our categorization by diversification with the common classification in
the literature by nationality into foreign and domestic banks. Diversified banks can
be foreign or domestic, and foreign banks diversified or non-diversified. We find that
classifying banks by diversification instead of nationality uncovers strikingly different
behavior. While diversified banks stabilize loan supply during banking crises in host
markets, foreign banks reduce their loan supply, relative to domestic banks. Our results
reveal the following pecking order: diversified domestic banks are the most stable source
of funding, while foreign banks with little diversification are the most fickle. Foreign, but
diversified banks occupy an intermediate position between both extremes. The ordering
speaks to findings on the flight home effect (Giannetti and Laeven, 2012) and behavior
of gross capital flows during crises (Broner, Didier, Erce and Schmukler, 2013).
For robustness, we address alternative explanations to the argument that diversified
banks smooth local shocks through better access to funding. We show that diversified
banks have lower portfolio risk in terms of volatility of borrower sales growth. While
a less risky portfolio could explain banks’ stabilizing effect, we show that the positive
effect of diversification remains stable once we control for portfolio risk. We then rule out
possibility that diversified banks extend a lower share of their total loans to countries
in crisis. Including the share of loans in crisis shows that, if anything, diversification
becomes more important when a larger share of loans is in distress. To further probe the
robustness of our results, we create an alternative measure of diversification that cap-
tures banks’ international orientation. We group banks by the share of loans extended
to foreign borrowers. Banks with a high share of international loans are categorized as
‘international’, those with primarily domestic loans as ‘national’.3 Our two classifications
are complementary and positively correlated, but capture different dimensions of banking
integration. We find that international banks are weakly stabilizing during host shocks.
3To exemplify the difference, think of a German bank that lends only to French firms. Under the
alternative metric (international portfolio) it is highly international, while in our baseline (diversification)
it is not.
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However, once we include banks’ diversification in the regression, the effect on interna-
tional banks turns insignificant. Instead, we still find that diversification is the relevant
factor for positive effects on loan supply. Similarly, we test geographic diversification
against an alternative measure of diversification according to banks diversification across
industries. We find that lending by geographically diversified banks cannot be explained
by bank diversification across industries.4 We also ensure that bank size is not driving
our results. Further, findings are robust to excluding the global financial crisis, control-
ling for correlated regional crises affecting several countries at once, or contemporaneous
shocks to home markets.
The key identification issue for cross-country studies using aggregate data is to con-
trol for loan demand. If diversified banks lend to different firms than banks with a
concentrated portfolio, any observed differential change in loan volume reflects both de-
mand and supply effects. Disaggregated data allow us to overcome this challenge. Our
loan level analysis employs firm∗bank and firm∗time fixed effects to absorb all time-
varying unobservable firm fundamentals.5 The combination of both fixed effects allows
shocks to affect each firm at each point in time heterogeneously and accounts for any
change in loan demand.6 For example, time-varying fixed effects on the firm level absorb
changes in firm sales, management, or productivity, while bank∗firm fixed effects control
for distance between borrowers and lenders. On the firm level, we combine firm with
country∗industry∗time fixed effects to control for time-varying industry demand. The
identifying assumption is that loan demand by all firms within the same industry and
country changes equally. While in principle firm demand could exhibit heterogeneity
within industries, we run loan level regressions to confirm that this is of second order
importance. The positive effect of diversification on credit hence reflects loan supply
factors.
Our paper contributes to the literature in three ways. First, and to the best of our
knowledge, we propose the first cross-country bank-level measure for banks’ portfolio
integration into the global financial system. Due to data limitations, so far most studies
4Boskovic, Doerr and Schaz (2019) provide evidence that bank lending during crises is more stable for
those industries in which banks have an informational advantage through lending specialization to this
industry.
5See Khwaja and Mian (2008); Jiménez, Atif, Peydro and Saurina Salas (2012); Jiménez, Ongena,
Peydró and Saurina (2014); Morais, Peydro and Ruiz Ortega (2019).
6A related problem is self-selection that arises if, for example, the best firms would pair with diversified
banks. To overcome this potential selection bias, we repeat our analysis on the restricted sample of firms
that borrowed from both diversified and concentrated banks in each year (Khwaja and Mian, 2008).
Coefficients for the reduced sample have the same sign and are of similar magnitude as for the full
sample.
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distinguish banks by headquarter location into foreign and domestic and look at cross-
border lending.7 While bank nationality has been shown to be an important determinant
of loan supply, our approach captures the related, but distinct dimension of banks’ inte-
gration into the financial system, captured by their portfolio allocation. This allows us to
shed new light on banks’ role during crises. Note that both categorizations need not be
mutually exclusive. Diversified banks can be foreign, but domestic banks also diversified,
depending on the country in which the shock originates. We find that grouping banks
by diversification instead of nationality uncovers new patterns that complement exist-
ing findings in the literature on banking integration. It also helps reconcile conflicting
findings on the effects of foreign banks during crises. The global scope of our detailed
loan-level data allows for clean identification, as well as external validity.
Second, we contribute to the growing literature that analyzes the real effects of fi-
nancial shocks and highlights the relevance of syndicated lending for firm performance.8
Our results show that the effects of banking crises are heterogeneous across bank types
and that firms’ composition of lenders matters. The negative effects we find on the firm
level suggest that firms cannot fully substitute syndicated loans across banks. If firms
could fully replace syndicated loans by non-integrated banks with loans by diversified
banks, exposure to either type would not affect loan growth differentially. However,
while substitution is imperfect, we show that in the years following a banking crisis there
is a persistent shift towards lending by diversified banks. Both within firms and within
industries, the share of loans extended by diversified banks increases. Geographic diversi-
fication allows banks to capture a larger share of the market when their local competitors
have to contract lending. Viewed from a different angle, this also implies that banking
crises persistently alter the composition of lenders.
Finally, while the effect of shocks to banks’ home markets and consequent spillovers
are well explored, few papers investigate the role of banks during distress in their host
markets.9 Many crises over the last two decades were shocks to borrower countries
and globally integrated banks were usually heavily involved. During the Asian crisis,
Japanese and European banks were exposed to markets in Thailand, the Philippines, or
South Korea; and during Argentina’s woes, American banks had a strong presence in
7See, for example, Peek and Rosengren (1997, 2000); Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011, 2012); Schnabl
(2012); Correa, Sapriza and Zlate (2013); De Haas and Van Horen (2013); De Haas and van Lelyveld
(2014); Ongena, Peydró and Van Horen (2015); Bremus and Neugebauer (2018a).
8See Giannetti and Laeven (2012); Correa, Sapriza and Zlate (2013); De Haas and Van Horen (2013);
Hale, Kapan and Minoiu (2016); Jiménez, Atif, Peydro and Saurina Salas (2012); Popov and Van Horen
(2015); Morais, Peydro and Ruiz Ortega (2019).
9For an exception, see De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2006).
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Latin America. As bank lending is a major source of firm financing, it is important to
understand how banks react to host country shocks. So far, the discussion has mainly
highlighted the costs and benefits of cross-border banking and how foreign banks spread
home market shocks to connected markets (Claessens, 2017).
Our results contribute to the discussion on retrenchment in financial integration since
the global financial crisis (Milesi-Ferretti and Tille, 2011; Claessens and Van Horen, 2015).
Since the financial crisis, there has been a significant decline in cross-border banking and
financial integration.10 In addition, we show that banks’ portfolio diversification declined.
The verdict on whether this is good or bad for financial stability is still out. While some
studies find that foreign banks adversely affect economic conditions in host markets, our
results show that integrated banks with a diversified portfolio smooth financial shocks.
Presence in several markets reduces banks’ exposure to local shocks and gives them better
access to new funds, which they can allocate towards countries in distress. This not only
stabilizes lending in affected countries, but also mitigates contagions. In light of our
results the recent decline in global banking is worrisome, as weaker integration into the
global financial system, and hence less portfolio diversification, has detrimental effects
on stability in host markets.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses data and empirical
strategy, Section 3 presents our main results. In Section 4 we check the robustness of
our findings to alternative explanations, Section 5 provides extensions and additional
robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
2 Data & Empirical Strategy
This section describes data and construction of main variables. We then discuss the
empirical strategy to identify changes in loan supply by banks during borrower-country
banking crises, as well as their real effects on firms.
2.1 Geographic Diversification
We categorize banks according to the geographic diversification of their international
syndicated loan portfolio. Building on recent literature, we argue that diversification
allows banks to access cheaper funding, which they allocate towards borrower countries
in crisis (Gilje, Loutskina and Strahan, 2016; Cortés and Strahan, 2017; Levine, Lin
10See also Cerutti and Claessens (2016); Bremus and Fratzscher (2015); Bussière, Schmidt and Valla
(2018); Emter, Schmitz and Tirpák (2016); European Central Bank (2017); Acharya and Steffen (2015);
Rose and Wieladek (2014).
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and Xie, 2019). The mechanism is especially important during episodes of financial
turmoil (Bord, Ivashina and Taliaferro, 2018). For each bank we construct a Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI), based on the share of outstanding loans to each borrower country
in each year. The index reflects the geographic dispersion of banks’ loan portfolios across
multiple countries. Based on the HHI, we then define diversification (DIV) for bank b in
year t as
DIVb,t = 1−
Jb∑︂
j=1
s2b,j,t ∈ [0,
Jb − 1
Jb
], (1)
where sb,j,t measures the share of a bank b’s outstanding loans to borrowers in country
j relative to its total outstanding loans in year t. Each bank is active in Jb distinct
countries, i.e. where it has at least one borrower. We invert the scale of the HHI for ease
of interpretation. A value of zero (DIV = 0) implies no diversification (all credit goes to
borrowers from one country, what we will call concentrated portfolio), while higher values
reflect increasing diversification of banks’ loan portfolios across countries. We reason
that banks with higher diversification have better access to funds during local financial
shocks.
2.2 Data
For our main analysis and to construct banks’ diversification, we use data on worldwide
syndicated lending. We additionally use country-specific data and further information on
borrowing firms’ balance sheets. Loan-level data with detailed bank-firm relations comes
from Thomson Reuters Dealscan and covers the universe of syndicated loans. Compustat
(Global and US) provides firms’ balance sheet information. Balance sheet data on banks
come from Bankscope. Macroeconomic variables come from the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators. Finally, we use U.S. bank balance sheet data from FDIC’s
Statistics on Depository Institutions.
The Systemic Banking Crises Database presented by Laeven and Valencia (2013)
provides country-year-level information on episodes of financial distress.11 From 1995 to
2012, it reports 189 banking crisis (BC) observations. The two conditions that define a
banking crisis are i) significant signs of financial distress in the banking system (such as
bank runs, losses in the banking system, and/or bank liquidations); and ii) significant
banking policy intervention measures in response to the losses in the banking system. In
11While there exist different databases on financial crises, Laeven and Valencia (2013) is the most
comprehensive for banking crises occurring after 1970 (Bonner, van Lelyveld and Zymek, 2014).
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our sample, there is a concentration of financial turmoil around the time of the Asian
crisis and from 2008 onward, during the Great Financial Crisis.
To construct main variables, we use Dealscan data on syndicated loans. Syndi-
cated lending constitutes a sizable share of total lending. Around one-third of total
international lending is done through the syndicated loan market (Gadanecz and von
Kleist, 2002) and it is an important source of financing in both developed and emerging
economies (Cerutti, Hale and Minoiu, 2015). Thus, the syndicated loan market makes up
for a significant share of total international lending and, hence, banks’ total international
loan portfolio. Syndicated loans are issued jointly by a group of banks to a single bor-
rower. The lending syndicate includes at least one lead bank (also called lead arranger)
and usually further participant banks. Lead banks negotiate terms and conditions of
deals, perform due diligence, and organize participants. Therefore, lead arrangers stand
in direct contact with the borrower and retain larger loan shares for signaling purposes
(Saleem Ramadan, 2013). Participants are usually not in direct contact with the bor-
rower, but merely supply credit. Compared to other types of bank loans, syndicated
loans are on average larger in volume and issued to bigger borrowers.
Dealscan provides extensive information on syndicated loans at origination, including
loan amount, maturity, and interest, as well as identity of lenders and borrowers. All data
are aggregated at banks’ and firms’ parent level, consistent with the literature (Saleem
Ramadan, 2013). The aggregation of banks at the parent level captures the ability of
banks to make use of their internal capital market to allocate capital across borders.12 We
restrict our analysis to loans by banks to non-financial firms and consider lending only by
commercial, savings, cooperative and investment banks.13 We keep both lead arrangers
and participants in our sample, and do so for two reasons. First, we are interested in
banks’ loan portfolio allocation across countries and not specific contractual frictions. As
the focal point of our analysis is total credit supply, including both lead arrangers and
participants provides a comprehensive picture of the syndicated loan market. Second,
excluding participants leads to sample-selection bias. Lead arrangers are large banks
operating on a global scale. We aim to compare banks along the dimension of their
international diversification. Hence, excluding smaller participant banks with a rather
concentrated portfolio will change the control group. Instead of comparing diversified
12Banks may choose to lend to a foreign firm either through direct cross-border lending or through a
subsidiary in the foreign market.
13In Dealscan, we use lender types Commercial Banks, Finance Companies, Investment Banks, Mort-
gage Banks, Thrift/S&L, and Trust Companies. Investment banks constitute 3 % of our sample and
excluding them does not change results. Borrower types included are Corporations, Insurance Compa-
nies, Law Firms, Leasing Companies and Other.
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with concentrated banks, focusing on lead arrangers only will lead to a selected group of
globally active banks in our sample. We would compare banks’ diversification within a
group of diversified and internationally integrated banks. To avoid this pitfall, we include
leaders and participants in our analysis.14
Table 1: Summary Statistics (loan-level sample)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max P50
∆ loan volume 1724073 .02 .35 -1.25 1.44 0
loan volume (m) 1724073 78.9 147.8 .01 974.96 28.33
loan spread (bp) 1365464 162.54 114.44 15 533.19 138.5
maturity (months) 1723449 73 41.75 12 252 60
Note: This table shows descriptive statistics on the bank-firm-year (loan) level. loan volume (in m USD) is the
outstanding loan volume of bank b to firm f at year t. ∆ loan volume is the log difference of loan volume by
year t. Loan spread is the All-in-Draw Spread (in bps) coming from Dealscan. Maturity is the maturity of the
loan at origination (in months). All data is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile of its distribution at the
bank-firm-year level; thus, maximum values may differ from Table 2. For detailed variable definitions see Table
23 and text.
Table 2: Summary Statistics (firm-level sample)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max P50
∆ loan volume 196446 .04 .39 -7.87 9.94 0
loan volume (m) 192617 446.09 860.44 .05 8310.12 126
loan spread (bp) 141777 201.34 121.28 15 855 188.64
maturity (months) 196815 71.72 46.6 12 370 60
∆ employment 52295 .03 .19 -.98 .99 .02
∆ investment 55377 .03 .62 -2.94 2.43 .06
∆ sales 57674 .08 .27 -7.49 9.22 .07
investment ratio 56714 .22 .97 -.27 175.87 .17
return on assets 59421 .06 .1 -.93 .34 .07
employment (th) 55216 11.1 27.71 0 583.83 2.66
log total assets 61508 7.44 2.4 1.81 15.27 7.19
market to book ratio 40532 1.6 1.08 .19 60.86 1.3
long-term debt ratio 62092 .25 .21 -.01 4.48 .21
Note: This table shows descriptive statistics on the firm-year (firm) level. The first four rows contain data on
the full sample coming from Dealscan. From row five onward, the sample shrinks after the match with firms in
Compustat. All data is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile of its distribution at the firm-year level; thus,
maximum values may differ from Table 1. For detailed variable definitions see Table 23 and text.
14For more information on the syndicated loan market’s institutional setting see Berg, Saunders and
Steffen (2016).
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Loan level We decompose syndicated loan deals into loan portions provided by each
lender to obtain granular credit level data. Whenever Dealscan provides information on
lending shares of each bank, we use this information to split loan volume accordingly
(available for 28 % of the deals).15 In cases where lending shares are missing we split
loan volume on a pro-rata basis among all banks in a syndicate.16 Transactions with
deal status ‘canceled’, ‘suspended’, or ‘rumor’ are removed and all loan nominations
transformed into million U.S. Dollars (USD) using the spot exchange rate at origination,
provided by Dealscan. If after this allocation procedure the loan portion is smaller
than 10,000 USD, we drop the observation to remove erroneously small loans (0.6 % of
observations). Overall, we split a total of 293,163 deals into 1,638,343 loan portions.
We next use the loan portions to construct each bank’s outstanding loan volume as a
stock variable to proxy the loan’s entry on the loan book (Morais, Peydro and Ruiz
Ortega, 2019). Each outstanding loan remains active until the end of its maturity. We
aggregate all outstanding loan portions between a bank-firm combination to obtain bank
b’s outstanding loan volume to firm f in year t, which we define as a loan observation.
Summary Statistics at the loan level are shown in Table 1.
To measure banks’ geographic diversification, we construct their distribution of cross-
border loans by destination country. Therefore, geographic diversification is based on
the nationality of the borrower at origination and not defined by the nationality of the
parent bank.17 For each year, we then aggregate all outstanding loans by each bank to
all borrowers from country j and divide by its total outstanding loans to obtain country
shares sb,j,t. We calculate diversification according to Equation (1).
We merge lending banks active in Dealscan with balance sheet data from Bankscope.
To link Dealscan with Bankscope, we match the ultimate parent of the parent institution
in Dealscan with the bank holding company in Bankscope by hand using name, address,
newspaper reports and bank websites as information. We are able to successfully merge
229 institutions. As the matched banks tend to be the largest banks in a highly concen-
trated market, this covers 631,143 observations or 37 % of the loan-level sample. Thus,
we obtain balance sheet data on banks’ total assets, share of wholesale deposits, tier 1
capital ratio, leverage ratio, and return on equity.
15See Giannetti and Laeven (2012); De Haas and Van Horen (2013)
16In the sub-case of partial information on loan shares, we first use the available information to allocate
loan shares. Then, we split the remaining amount equally among banks with missing information. If
the sum of the allocation rule is larger than 110 % we consider this an erroneous entry and treat it as if
lending share information was not available in the first place.
17In robustness checks, we use an alternative measure based on parent bank nationality.
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Figure 1: Firm level Sample Change
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Note: This figure shows the change in sample composition for our different specifications on the firm level. Left
bar: full sample with no fixed effects. Middle bar: sample once we use industry∗time fixed effects. Right bar:
sample limited to firms with balance sheet information.
Table 3: Geographic Distribution by Region (loan level sample)
loans firms banks DIV BC
East Asia and Pacific 386973 8767 1642 266 28
Europe and Central Asia 379177 6033 1118 269 128
Latin America and Caribbean 39622 626 126 21 24
Middle East and North Africa 30164 334 176 54 0
North America 860634 19176 3711 74 6
South Asia 20379 458 116 8 0
Sub-Saharan Africa 7124 116 73 14 3
Total 1724073 35510 6962 706 189
Note: This table shows the geographic distribution of our sample. loans denotes the number of firm-bank-year
observations, firms and banks the number of individual firms and banks. DIV stands for diversification and denotes
the number of banks with non-zero portfolio diversification. Finally, BC stands for banking crisis and denotes the
number of country-year observations with banking crises. For detailed variable definitions see Table 23 and text.
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Firm level To examine effects of credit supply on firm behavior, we merge our data set
with firm balance sheet information. We aggregate the firm-bank-year data to the firm-
year level and then match borrowers in Dealscan with firms in Compustat (Global & US).
For merging we use the file provided by Chava and Roberts (2008). Combining Dealscan
with Compustat reduces observations, since information for some firms, especially smaller
ones, are missing in Compustat. Overall, we are able to successfully match around 32 %
of our firm-year observations. This linking exercise gives rise to a selection bias into
larger firms that are less financially constrained. Figure 1 shows that the geographic
composition changes only slightly after matching firms with Compustat, while Table 3
gives a detailed geographic breakdown. Thus, we expect this selection bias to render
the estimates of the real effects to become more conservative. The reason being that
the effect of a negative loan supply shock on firm performance is found to be larger
for smaller firms with less financial leeway in previous studies (Cohen and Pascaline,
1997). We use information on firms’ syndicated loan volume, investment, employment,
total assets, sales and fixed assets, where we compute growth rates as log differences.
Summary statistics at the firm-level are shown in Table 2.
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Figure 2: Histogram of Banks’ Geographic Diversification (loan-
level sample)
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Figure 3: Histogram of Firms’ Exposure to Diversified Banks
(firm-level sample)
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Note: Figure 2 shows the loan-level distribution of banks’ diversification, Figure 3 the firm-level distribution of
firms’ exposure. The mass of observations shifts from the right tail towards the middle, indicating that most firms
borrow from both diversified and concentrated banks in each year. For detailed variable definitions see Table 23
and text.
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2.3 Descriptive Statistics
Figures 2 and 3 show the distribution of diversification on the loan level and exposure
on the firm level. About 8 % of all loans are extended by banks with no geographic
diversification. The remaining banks have at least some diversification, with a bunching
around 0.9. Figure 3 shows that more than 97 % of firms borrow from at least one
bank with non-zero geographic diversification. The median (mean) firm has 4 (8) bank
connections in a given year. This suggests that firms accessing the syndicated loan market
are potentially able to substitute across lenders during crises. The median (mean) number
of outstanding loans by banks per year is 2 (33).
Our sample covers the years 1995 to 2012 and includes information on 35,510 firms
and 6,962 banks forming a total of 1,724,073 firm-bank-year observations, and 194,726
firm-year observations (9,393 firms and 60,953 observations for the matched Compustat
sample). There are a total of 2,046 banks with some diversification and 4,916 banks
with zero geographic diversification. The median (mean) value of diversification for
banks with non-zero diversification is 0.41 (0.40). The group of diversified banks extends
around 93 % of all loans, which reflects that they are large lenders. Table 3 highlights
the geographical distribution of loans, firms, and banks by region. The majority of loans
are extended to borrowers located in Europe, East Asia and Pacific, and North Amer-
ica. Moreover, countries in Europe and Asia have the highest number of geographically
diversified banks.18 North American banks are less diversified as they lend mostly to
borrowers located in the U.S. or Canada. Finally, the highest incidence of banking crises
occurs in Europe, Asia, and, to a lesser extent, in Latin America.
18We split geographic diversification along the annual median and denote banks with an above median
value as diversified.
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Table 4: Summary Statistics − Diversified vs. Concentrated
Banks (full sample)
diversified concentrated mean diff.
mean sd mean sd t
∆ loan volume 0.02 (0.36) 0.01 (0.34) -17.00
loan volume (m) 101.67 (296.04) 75.53 (266.63) -60.94
loan spread (bp) 137.08 (107.52) 191.17 (131.07) 263.55
maturity (months) 76.12 (49.16) 71.39 (42.22) -67.76
Observations 854370 869703 1724073
Note: This table shows descriptive statistics on the firm-bank-year (loan) level. The sample is split by the yearly
median according to banks’ diversification. Highly diversified observations are denoted diversified, those with low
diversification as concentrated. mean denotes the mean, sd the standard deviation, and mean diff. the t-value for
the difference in means across both groups. For detailed variable definitions see Table 23 and text.
Table 5: Summary Statistics − Diversified vs. Concentrated
Banks (Bankscope sample)
diversified concentrated mean diff.
mean sd mean sd t
diversification (DIV) 0.74 (0.18) 0.20 (0.22) -64.94
log(assets) 12.14 (1.96) 11.09 (1.88) -12.24
tier 1 capital ratio 10.26 (5.27) 10.50 (3.55) -0.34
share wholesale deposits 0.29 (0.23) 0.26 (0.29) -3.13
leverage ratio 0.05 (0.03) 0.07 (0.03) 10.06
return on equity 7.60 (18.83) 8.92 (18.52) 1.41
Observations 863 873 1736
Note: This table shows descriptive statistics on the bank-year (loan) level for the Dealscan-Bankscope matched
sample. The sample is split by the yearly median according to banks’ diversification. Highly diversified banks
are denoted diversified, those with low diversification as concentrated. mean denotes the mean, sd the standard
deviation, and mean diff. the t-value for the difference in means across both groups. For detailed variable
definitions see Table 23 and text.
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Tables 4−7 provide summary statistics of main variables. We split the respective
samples by diversification or exposure.19 For the syndicated loan market, Table 4 shows
that loans by geographically diversified banks are larger, have lower interest rates, and
are issued at longer maturity than loans by banks with geographically more concentrated
portfolios. The large difference in loan volume suggests that geographically diversified
banks are on average larger than their less diversified counterparts.
Table 5 shows that diversified banks are significantly larger, have a higher share of
wholesale deposits, and a lower leverage ratio (for the sample of banks we succesfully
match to Bankscope). The difference in bank balance sheets highlights the need to
control for observable and unobservable bank characteristics. In Table 6 the average firm
with an above median exposure to diversified banks obtains loans with larger volume,
lower interest rates and longer maturity compared to firms with fewer relationships with
diversified banks. Table 7 restricts the sample to firms with balance sheet information.
Borrowers with high exposure to diversified banks tend to grow slower and are larger than
their peers borrowing from banks with a geographically concentrated portfolio. Long-
term debt as share of total assets is similar across both groups indicating that they are
on average comparable in terms of their need for external finance. Overall, the difference
in firm characteristics highlights the need to control for loan demand.
19Again, we split geographic diversification along the annual median and denote banks with an above
median value as diversified. Same goes for exposure.
2. Data & Empirical Strategy 21
Table 6: Summary Statistics −High Exposure vs. Low Exposure
Firms (full sample)
high exposure low exposure mean diff.
mean sd mean sd t
∆ loan volume 0.04 (0.39) 0.03 (0.39) -2.34
loan volume (m) 763.80 (1982.62) 323.47 (723.77) -65.52
loan spread (bp) 169.81 (130.74) 235.06 (137.16) 92.05
maturity (months) 83.62 (64.15) 64.91 (42.38) -76.95
Observations 99948 99986 199934
Note: This table shows descriptive statistics on the firm-year (firm) level for the full sample of Dealscan firms. The
sample is split by the yearly median according to firms’ exposure. High exposure firms are denoted high exposure,
those with low exposure as low exposure. mean denotes the mean, sd the standard deviation, and mean diff. the
t-value for the difference in means across both groups. For detailed variable definitions see Table 23 and text.
Table 7: Summary Statistics −High Exposure vs. Low Exposure
Firms (Compustat sample)
high exposure low exposure mean diff.
mean sd mean sd t
∆ employment 0.03 (0.17) 0.03 (0.20) 2.96
∆ investment 0.03 (0.59) 0.04 (0.64) 2.66
∆ sales 0.07 (0.32) 0.09 (0.22) 6.66
investment ratio 0.22 (1.39) 0.23 (0.26) 1.71
return on assets 0.06 (0.08) 0.06 (0.11) -4.76
employment (th) 17.04 (37.40) 6.48 (15.09) -45.22
log total assets 8.51 (2.30) 6.48 (2.06) -115.61
market to book ratio 1.58 (1.01) 1.61 (1.11) 2.06
long-term debt ratio 0.25 (0.20) 0.24 (0.22) -7.53
Observations 29613 33168 62781
Note: This table shows descriptive statistics on the firm-year (firm) level for the smaller sample of matched
Compustat firms. The sample is split by the yearly median according to firms’ exposure. High exposure firms
are denoted high exposure, those with low exposure as low exposure. mean denotes the mean, sd the standard
deviation, and mean diff. the t-value for the difference in means across both groups. For detailed variable
definitions see Table 23 and text.
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2.4 Empirical Strategy and Identification
To analyze lending behavior by geographically diversified banks and their effect on firms,
we use two aggregation levels. To isolate loan supply from loan demand, we begin on
the firm-bank-year level (loan level). Then, we aggregate the data to the firm-year level
(firm level) to examine substitution across loans, as well as real effects on firms.
Loan level: Our baseline specification tests how geographic diversification (DIV ) af-
fects loan volume for each firm-bank pair. To see whether diversification has a positive
effect on loan supply during financial turmoil in the borrower country, we interact diver-
sification with a banking crisis dummy (BC):
log(loan)f,b,t = β1 BCc,t + β2 DIVb,t−1 + β3 BCc,t ×DIVb,t−1 + ϕf,b + τt + εf,b,t. (2)
The dependent variable log(loan) denotes the log of outstanding loan volume of firm f
from bank b in year t. Banking crisis dummy BCc,t is at the country level and takes value
one during a crisis in firm country c in year t. DIVb,t−1 is the geographic diversification
index on the bank-year level. We lag DIV by one period to avoid contemporaneous effects
of the banking crisis on banks’ diversification.20 ϕf,b are firm∗bank fixed effects, and τt
are either firm∗year or country∗industry∗year fixed effects. We cluster standard errors on
the firm-country∗year level to account for correlation within the same borrower country
across firms. Regression (2) is similar in spirit to a difference-in-difference regression. The
coefficient of interest β3 reflects the change in loan supply by diversified banks minus the
change in loan supply by concentrated banks. If diversified banks have better access to
funds during crises, their loan supply is higher compared to less diversified banks. This
is, we expect β3 > 0.
The key identification challenge is to absorb changes in loan demand to isolate loan
supply. Firms borrowing from diversified banks are on average bigger, so loan demand is
likely to be correlated with banks’ geographic diversification. Due to the granularity of
our data, we can overcome this issue. First, firm∗bank fixed effects exploit the variation
within the same firm-bank combination over time and control for unobservable and time-
invariant bank and firm heterogeneity (such as industry, location or average size), as
well as for unobservable time-invariant characteristics at the bank-firm level, such as
relationship or distance. Second, firm∗time fixed effects allow shocks to affect each firm
at each point in time heterogeneously. Thereby we control for unobservable time-varying
20We assume that a firm’s bank relationship can be proxied by its previous year credit dependence.
This builds on the finding of Smith, Ongena and Smith (2016) and Cohen and Pascaline (1997) that
banking relationships are sticky over time.
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firm fundamentals (such as profitability, risk, and other balance sheet characteristics)
to identify credit supply.21 Essentially we are comparing the same firm borrowing from
different banks in a given year, while using only the within variation of each bank-
firm combination for estimation (Jiménez, Atif, Peydro and Saurina Salas, 2012). After
absorbing any changes in loan demand our estimates reflect loan supply effects.22
Since diversification (DIV) is a choice variable, it raises concerns about endogeneity
in Equation (2). We do not have a bank level instrument to directly solve the problem.
Instead, we make indirect attempts to address the issue. First, we include bank*year fixed
effects to control for unobservable time-varying bank characteristics, for example bank
size, risk taking, or capital ratios. With bank*year fixed effects, we hold all time-varying
unobservable bank characteristics constant and compare lending by the same bank to the
same firm (due to firm*time fixed effects) at different levels of diversification. Second,
we directly control for observable determinants of diversification at the bank-year level
(Xb,t), interacted with banking crisis (BCc,t). If the controls explain both banks’ level
of diversification and their lending during crises, then controlling for their interaction
allows us to isolate the direct effect of diversification on lending. For example, diversified
banks could be larger. If larger banks maintain relatively higher loan supply during local
crises, the coefficient on diversification would be biased. We match a sub-sample of banks
in Dealscan with bank balance sheet data in Bankscope. Bank characteristics we deem
important predictors of diversification are bank size (log assets), Tier 1 capital ratio, the
share of wholesale deposits over total deposits, leverage ratio, and return on equity. To
test how important these balance sheet items are in explaining bank diversification, we
estimate regressions with diversification as dependent variable and bank covariates as
explanatory variables.
Table 8 shows that bank size and share of wholesale deposits are statistically and
economically significant explanatory variables of diversification. We use two dependent
variables, diversification as continuous variable (defined in Equation (1)) and as a dummy
with value one for banks with diversification above the yearly median. Columns (1) and
21For each firm-year pair, firm∗time fixed effects require observations from at least two banks. On the
syndicated loan market, around 97 % of all loans satisfy this condition. The sample selection effect due
to this demanding specification is therefore negligible.
22Note that with granted loans, firm*year fixed effects may not fully address demand (Paravisini,
Rappoport and Schnabl, 2015), since they control for general changes in firm level characteristics, but
not differential demand by firms across banks. With this caveat in mind, generally the Khwaja-Mian
approach is a reasonable approximation to firms’ loan demand. To mitigate the problem of bank-firm
selection, we repeat our analysis on the restricted sample of firms that borrow from both diversified and
concentrated banks in each year (Khwaja and Mian, 2008). Coefficients for the reduced sample have the
similar sign, size and significance as for the full sample (unreported).
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Table 8: Determinants of bank diversification
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES DIV (cont) DIV (median) DIV (cont) DIV (median)
log(assets) 0.044*** 0.051*** 0.071*** 0.005
(0.011) (0.019) (0.023) (0.042)
tier 1 capital ratio 0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001
(0.003) (0.006) (0.001) (0.002)
share wholesale deposits 0.364*** 0.407*** -0.058 -0.255*
(0.091) (0.139) (0.049) (0.141)
leverage ratio -0.015 -0.025 0.010* -0.015
(0.010) (0.016) (0.005) (0.012)
return on equity 0.001** 0.001 0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Observations 1,045 1,045 1,038 1,038
R-squared 0.206 0.117 0.934 0.803
Bank FE - - Yes Yes
Cluster Bank Bank Bank Bank
Note: This table shows determinants of bank diversification, as defined in equation (1) at the bank-year level for
the Dealscan-Bankscope matched bank sample. Dependent variable is diversification or a dummy with value one
if diversification is above the yearly median, and zero if below. Bank balance sheet data are from Bankscope. For
detailed variable definitions see Table 23 and text. All standard errors are clustered at the bank level. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(2) compare levels of diversification across banks. log(assets) and share wholesale deposits
have positive coefficients, significant at the 1 % level, indicating that diversified banks
differ in terms of size and funding structure from concentrated banks. Since our baseline
regression (Equation (2)) includes bank*firm fixed effects, they are exploiting within-
bank variation. Hence, columns (3) and (4) replicate columns (1)-(2), but add bank
fixed effects. Only size remains a significant predictor for diversification. As we will
show below, both methods − including bank*year fixed effects and bank characteristics
interacted with the crisis dummy − leave main estimates similar in terms of sign and
significance, with only modest changes in magnitude. These findings alleviate concerns
about omitted variable bias, despite the lack of a proper instrument for diversification.
Firm level: On the loan level we observe whether credit at the firm-bank level changes
differentially during crises, depending on the type of lender. However, the analysis ne-
glects potential substitution effects and remains silent about the real effects of loan sup-
ply on firms. If firms can easily substitute syndicated loans from banks that reduce loan
supply with loans by banks that increase loan supply, the substitution offsets the credit
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contraction of individual banks. In this case, firm exposure to geographically diversified
banks becomes irrelevant for firms’ syndicated loan growth. Beyond the syndicated loan
market, firms may also be able to substitute a fall in syndicated lending through other
debt instruments, for example non-syndicated credit or corporate bonds. Such a substi-
tution would imply that we do not find any effect of bank diversification on firms’ total
debt or investment, even if we find an effect on firms’ syndicated loan growth. Loan
supply only has real effects on firm performance if firms can at most partially substitute
the fall in credit.
To test for substitution and real effects, we run the following firm-level regression:
∆yf,t = γ1 BCc,t + γ2 exposuref,t−1 + γ3 BCc,t × exposuref,t−1 + ϕf + τc,i,t + uf,t, (3)
In the baseline specification, the dependent variable ∆yf,t is the log difference of outstand-
ing syndicated loan volume of firm f to all its lenders in year t. In further regressions, we
use the log difference of total long-term debt to test for substitution into non-syndicated
debt instruments. To analyze real effects, we also use investment and employment growth
in log differences. Banking crisis dummy (BCc,t) varies at the country-level and equals
one during banking crisis years in the firm country c. exposuref,t−1 is the share of firms
f ’s outstanding credit from diversified banks, lagged by one period. ϕf denote firm fixed
effects, and τc,i,t denote time-varying country∗industry∗year fixed effects, where c and i
denote firm f ’s country and industry. For our Compustat sample we additionally control
for time-varying firm demand by including return on assets, leverage, and log of assets.
We cluster standard errors at the firm level in all estimations.
Our main coefficient of interest, γ3, is on the interaction term (BC×exposure). γ3 is
the firm level counterpart of β3, which is the estimated interaction coefficient (BC×DIV )
from loan level Equation (2). It shows the change in loan growth for high exposure firms
minus the change in loan growth for low exposure firms. If firms can perfectly substitute
a fall in lending by one bank with other forms of financing, then γ3 = 0 in the respective
regression. In turn, a non-zero estimate of γ3 suggests imperfect substitution. We expect
γ3 > 0, as higher exposure to diversified banks should lead to higher loan growth during
crises.
To identify loan supply, we employ country∗industry∗time fixed effects to absorb time-
varying demand changes for each industry in each country. The identifying assumption is
that all firms within one industry of one country change their loan demand equally. How
reasonable is it to assume no heterogeneity in firm demand within industries? If there is
differential loan demand within industries, our coefficient is biased and does not reflect
supply effects. We test the validity of this identifying assumption on the loan-level, where
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we compare estimates using country∗industry∗time fixed effects with estimates employing
the more rigorous firm∗time fixed effects.23 As we will show, coefficient are close, but
somewhat larger under country∗industry∗time fixed effects, so we interpret our firm-level
estimates as upper bounds of the true effect.
3 Results
In Section 3.1 we first establish on the loan level that diversified banks smooth local finan-
cial shocks, relative to non-diversified banks. Time-varying borrower-fixed effects control
for changes in firm demand to isolate supply effects. To examine real effects, we then
aggregate to the firm level and show that firms with higher exposure to diversified banks
have stronger loan, investment, and employment growth during banking crises. Section
3.2 sheds light on the underlying mechanism and shows that geographic diversification
improves banks’ access to funding.
Before moving to the regression analysis, Figure 4 shows the stabilizing effect of
diversified banks in a non-parametric way. Panel 4a plots log loan volume in the four
years prior, during, and after a banking crisis. We split loans into loans by diversified
(blue solid line) and non-diversified (dashed black line) banks according to the yearly
median of diversification. Loan volume follows a similar trend for diversified and non-
diversified banks in the years preceding a crisis. However, it diverges sharply during
the crisis. Both types of banks see a sharp and persistent contraction in loan volume,
but the decline is almost twice as strong for non-diversified banks. The divergence in
loan volume is because of banks’ portfolio diversification and we will estimate it as the
difference in the change in loan supply by diversified banks and the change in loan supply
by concentrated banks (coefficient β3 in regression (2)). We now confirm that the pattern
shown in Figure 4 holds in regression analysis.
23Our baseline sample requires each country-industry-year pair to have at least two firms. When we use
firm∗time fixed effects, we lose around 2 % of observations, as some firms only have one lender connection.
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Figure 4: Loan Volume during Crises
(a) Total loan volume
−
1
0
1
2
3
4
lo
g
 l
o
a
n
 v
o
lu
m
e
−4 −2 0 2 4
years before and after crisis
diversified banks
non−diversified banks
(b) Loan supply
−
.3
−
.2
−
.1
0
.1
.2
lo
g
 l
o
a
n
 v
o
lu
m
e
 (
s
u
p
p
ly
)
−4 −2 0 2 4
years before and after crisis
diversified banks
non−diversified banks
Note: Both panels show the evolution of log(loan volume) in the four years prior, during,
and the four years after a banking crisis. A value of 0 on the x-axis denotes the year of
the banking crisis. We split the sample by the yearly median for banks with high and
low values of diversification. Panel 4a shows the unconditional average across all banks.
Both diversified and concentrated banks see a decline in outstanding loan volume during
the crisis and the following years, but concentrated banks see a stronger fall. Panel
4b plots the residual of a regression of log(loan volume) on firm∗time fixed effects that
absorb unobservable change in loan demand. After absorbing demand effects, both
lines reflect changes in loan supply. Diversified banks do not reduce loan supply during
the crisis and increase it in the following years, while concentrated banks reduce loan
volume during and after the crisis. For detailed variable definitions see Table 23 and
text.
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3.1 Main Results
Loan level: Table 9 reports results for regression Equation (2) and shows that diversi-
fied banks maintain higher loan growth during banking crises, relative to non-diversified
banks. The dependent variable is log loan volume. Column (1) looks at variation within
each firm-bank connection by using fixed effects on the firm∗bank level. Diversified banks
extend loans with higher volume in general, as indicated by the positive coefficient on
diversification. The coefficient of interest (β3) on the interaction term (DIV × BC) is
highly significant and positive. During banking crises, increasing diversification by one
standard deviation increases loan volume by (0.31 × 0.135 =) 4.2 %. To ensure that
the positive effect is due to supply effects, column (2) adds firm∗time fixed effects to
absorb any time-varying changes in firm demand.24 Borrowing from a diversified bank is
now not statistically different to borrowing from a non-diversified bank during non-crisis
times. The positive effect of diversified banks during banking crises remains significant:
increasing diversification by one standard deviation during a banking crisis increases
firms’ loan volume by 1.2 %. Borrowing from a fully diversified bank (DIV = 1) in-
creases the positive effect to 3.9 %, compared to borrowing from banks with an entirely
concentrated portfolio (DIV = 0). Comparing columns (1) and (2), we see that absorb-
ing demand effects reduces the coefficient on the interaction term by around two-thirds.
The change in size suggests that diversified banks lend to borrowers of higher resilience
and better quality during crises.25 However, after controlling for loan demand, there
remains a positive and significant loan supply effect associated with higher geographic
diversification.
Figure 4, Panel 4b plots log loan volume after removing loan demand effects through
firm∗time fixed effects.26 Comparing it to Panel 4a, we see that demand effects explain
a large part of the overall decline in loan volume. Strikingly, after removing demand
effects, diversified banks maintain their loan supply during the crisis and increase it in
the following years. Non-diversified banks reduce loan volume persistently. The increase
in loans by diversified banks suggests that there is substitution in lending across banks −
a notion we will confirm in Section 5. As in Panel 4a, loan supply follows a similar trend
for both bank types prior to the crisis. By absorbing any changes in firms’ loan demand,
24The coefficient on banking crisis is now absorbed by firm∗year fixed effects.
25In Section 3.2 we show that firms with higher exposure to diversified banks are less risky and have
lower volatility in terms of sales and asset growth.
26We plot the residual of a regression of log(loan volume) on firm∗time fixed effects that absorb any
unobservable change in firms’ loan demand. After absorbing demand effects the residual reflects banks’
credit supply.
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Table 9: Loan Supply during Banking Crises (loan-level)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES log(loan vol) log(loan vol) log(loan vol) log(loan vol) log(loan vol) log(loan vol)
banking crisis (BC) 0.040
(0.029)
diversification (DIV) 0.309*** 0.005 0.013
(0.060) (0.018) (0.017)
DIV × BC 0.135*** 0.039*** 0.063*** 0.072** 0.127*** 0.103**
(0.026) (0.013) (0.013) (0.037) (0.049) (0.048)
log(assets) × BC 0.016**
(0.006)
WS deposits × BC 0.057*
(0.033)
Tier 1 capital ratio × BC 0.000
(0.000)
leverage ratio × BC 0.006*
(0.003)
return on equity × BC -0.000
(0.000)
Observations 1,724,073 1,691,064 1,724,073 1,621,124 474,784 474,784
R-squared 0.954 0.976 0.965 0.978 0.978 0.978
Firm*Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm*Year FE - Yes - Yes Yes Yes
Country*Industry*Year FE - - Yes - - -
Bank*Year FE - - - Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Country*Year Country*Year Country*Year Country*Year Country*Year Country*Year
Note: This table shows regressions on the bank-firm-year (loan) level. The dependent variable is log of total
outstanding loan volume; banking crisis (BC) is a dummy with value one during banking crises in the firm country,
as defined in Laeven and Valencia (2013); diversification (DIV) is banks’ portfolio diversification. Columns (1)-(4)
are on the full sample; Columns (5)-(6) are on the matched Dealscan-Bankscope sample. For detailed variable
definitions see Table 23 and text. All standard errors are clustered at the firm country-year level. full sample
denotes the full sample with all loan-level observations, while KM sample restricts the sample to firms that borrow
from diversified and concentrated banks in each year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Panel 4b provides a clean identification of the stabilizing effect of portfolio diversification
on loan supply.
When we move to the firm level, we can no longer control for credit demand through
firm∗time fixed effects. Instead, we use country∗industry∗year fixed effects, so we assume
that firms within the same country-industry-year pair change demand similarly. To ver-
ify this assumption, column (3) runs the loan level regression with country∗industry∗year
fixed effects. Comparing coefficients with column (2) indicates how appropriate we cap-
ture demand effects. The coefficient of interest has the same sign and significance, but is
larger in column (3). Controlling for time-varying industry demand leads to an overes-
timation of the effect by about one third. The increase in the coefficient on DIV ×BC
suggests that even within four-digit industries, there is variation in loan demand.27 We
therefore interpret our firm level results as an upper bound of the true effect.
27Note that the standard deviation of diversification is 0.089 for each firm-year pair, but 0.072 for each
country-industry-year pair. Adjusting for the difference in variation reduces the difference between both
columns to about 20 %.
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Firm*time fixed effects control for loan demand. However, it could still be that
diversified banks fundamentally differ from concentrated banks. For instance, Table 4
shows that diversified banks are larger in terms of total assets. To account for observ-
able and unobservable differences across banks that could be related to diversification,
columns (4)-(6) include bank*time fixed effects and bank balance sheet items. Includ-
ing bank*time fixed effects in addition to bank*firm and firm*time fixed effects controls
for unobservable time-varying bank characteristics, for example bank size, risk taking,
capital, or bank nationality. Column (4) thus compares lending by the same bank to
the same firm during a crisis at different levels of diversification − this is, we hold all
unobservable bank characteristics constant. Compared to column (2), the coefficient of
interest almost doubles in magnitude (the coefficient on diversification is now absorbed
by fixed effects), suggesting that the positive effect of diversification is not explained by
unobservable bank characteristics.
While the positive and significant coefficient on DIV × BC suggests that bank di-
versification has a positive effect on loan supply conditional on basic bank covariates,
it could still be that bank controls have a marginal effect during crises. We thus in-
clude bank balance sheet items, interacted with the banking crisis dummy, in column
(6). Since the matched Dealscan-Bankscope sample leads to a drastic fall in the num-
ber of observations, column (5) first shows that within the sample of banks for which
we obtain balance sheet information, diversification has a positive effect on loan supply
(after controlling for bank*firm, firm*time, and bank*time fixed effects). Relative to the
baseline specification in column (4), the coefficient of interest increases in size. However,
the standard deviation of DIV on the reduced sample is now 0.24, compared to 0.31 for
the full sample, yielding comparable magnitudes in terms of economic significance. Once
we include the interaction terms in column (6), the coefficient on DIV × BC remains
positive and significant, and close in magnitude to column (5). While large banks and
banks with a higher share of wholesale deposits also exhibit higher loan supply during
local crises, diversification still matters. All in all results in Table 9 show that diversified
banks sustain higher loan supply during crisis times, relative to banks with a concen-
trated loan portfolio; and that the effect is robust to bank size, bank funding structure,
as well as unobservable bank characteristics.
Firm level: Loan-level regressions identify changes in individual firm-bank connec-
tions. If firms can substitute between bank types during banking crises, changes in
individual loans need not affect firms. Suppose a firm borrowing from a non-diversified
bank sees a contraction in loan supply. Forming a new borrowing relationship with a
3. Results 31
Table 10: Loan Growth by Firm Exposure to Diversified Banks
(firm-level)
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES ∆ loan volume ∆ loan volume ∆ loan volume
banking crisis -0.142***
(0.006)
exposure -0.475*** -0.185*** -0.182***
(0.019) (0.021) (0.022)
exposure × BC 0.055*** 0.050*** 0.039**
(0.014) (0.017) (0.019)
Observations 196,337 196,337 196,038
R-squared 0.138 0.172 0.317
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Country*Year FE - Yes -
Country*Industry*Year FE - - Yes
Cluster Firm Firm Firm
Note: This table shows regressions on the firm-year (firm) level. The dependent variable is log difference of firms’
total outstanding loan volume; banking crisis (BC) is a dummy with value one during banking crises in the firm
country, as defined in Laeven and Valencia (2013); exposure is firms’ exposure to diversified banks. For detailed
variable definitions see Table 23 and text. All standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
diversified bank mitigates the negative credit supply shock. To examine whether credit
supply shocks have real effects, we aggregate to the firm-year level. Tables 10 and 11 show
results for estimating regression Equation (3). Firms with higher exposure to diversified
banks fare better during banking crises, relative to firms with low exposure.
In Table 10, column (1) controls for unobservable time-invariant firm characteristics
through firm fixed effects. The dependent variable is loan growth ∆loanf,b,t. In line
with expectations, the coefficient on exposure is negative, because diversified banks lend
predominately to larger firms in developed economies, which have lower average growth
rates. The negative coefficient on banking crisis implies that borrowers’ credit growth
declines by 14.2 % during banking crises when they have no connections to diversified
banks (exposure= 0). Higher exposure to diversified banks attenuates the negative effect.
The coefficient on the interaction term of exposure and banking crisis (exposure×BC)
is positive and statistically significant at the 1 % level. Increasing exposure from the
25th to 75th percentile increases loan growth during a crisis by (0.39 × 0.055 =) 2.1 %.
To remove time-varying demand shocks, column (2) absorbs shocks on the country∗year
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Table 11: Real Effects (firm-level)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES ∆ long-term debt ∆ long-term debt ∆ employment ∆ employment ∆ investment ∆ investment
banking crisis -0.084*** -0.064*** -0.131***
(0.023) (0.006) (0.017)
exposure -0.269*** -0.261*** -0.155*** -0.074*** -0.242*** -0.163***
(0.037) (0.049) (0.013) (0.014) (0.032) (0.038)
exposure × BC 0.131*** 0.105* 0.071*** 0.029** 0.123*** 0.119***
(0.043) (0.057) (0.012) (0.014) (0.034) (0.042)
Observations 53,574 49,340 51,445 47,496 54,638 51,845
R-squared 0.172 0.233 0.279 0.349 0.137 0.231
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country*Year FE - Yes - Yes - Yes
Controls - Yes - Yes - Yes
Cluster Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Note: This table shows regressions on the firm-year (firm) level. The dependent variables are log difference of firms’
long-term debt, employment, and investment; banking crisis (BC) is a dummy with value one during banking crises
in the firm country, as defined in Laeven and Valencia (2013); exposure is firms’ exposure to diversified banks. log
total assets, return on assets, and leverage are firm-level controls. For detailed variable definitions see Table 23
and text. All standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
level, column (3) on the more granular country∗industry∗year level.28 In both specifi-
cations, coefficients are of similar sign, magnitude, and significance. In our preferred
specification in column (3), moving a firm from the 25th to 75th percentile in terms of
exposure to diversified banks leads to 1.5 % higher loan growth. Average loan growth
equals 3.6 %, so the positive effect of borrowing from diversified banks is sizeable. The
effect on the firm level is similar in size to effects on the loan level. This suggests that
frictions hamper firms from switching across bank types during recessions, a common
finding in the literature (Smith, Ongena and Smith, 2016; Cohen and Pascaline, 1997).
In Table 11 we restrict our sample to firms for which we have balance sheet infor-
mation. To analyze real effects, we use long-term debt, employment, and investment as
dependent variables (all in log differences). For each dependent variable, we run a par-
simonious specification with firm fixed effects, as well as one enriched with time-varying
firm controls and time-varying fixed effects at the country∗year level.29 We consistently
find that firms borrowing from diversified banks have significantly higher growth rates
during crises. In the more stringent specification, moving borrowers from the 25th to 75th
percentile in terms of exposure to diversified banks leads to higher long-term debt (4.1
%, column (2)), employment (1.1 %, column (4)), and investment growth (4.6 %, column
28As banking crisis does not vary on the industry level, the coefficient is absorbed by fixed effects.
29Unfortunately, the low number of observations per industry leads to a large loss of observations when
we use country∗industry∗year fixed effects.
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(6)) during crises. Similar to loan growth in Table 10, growth rates are lower for high-
exposure borrowers in normal times and fall during banking crises. This reflects that
diversified banks lend to larger firms that have lower average growth rates (see Table 7).
Controlling for common time-varying shocks on the country level as well as time-varying
firm controls in general reduces the magnitude and significance of the effect.
Our loan- and firm-level findings show that firms can at most imperfectly substitute
declines in syndicated lending by other forms of funding. Credit supply by diversified
banks leads to real effects for firms. Results from Table 10 suggest that firms cannot
switch from concentrated to diversified banks in the syndicated loan market. Otherwise,
exposure in previous periods would not affect loan growth. The positive effects of expo-
sure in Table 11 on long-term debt, as well as investment and employment, additionally
indicate that firms cannot substitute from syndicated into non-syndicated lending. In
sum, Tables 9−11 establish that changes on the syndicated loan market have real eco-
nomic effects, which cannot be undone through other forms of credit. Borrowing from
diversified banks significantly increases firms’ loan growth during times of financial dis-
tress. In other words, diversified banks stabilize loan supply and smooth local financial
shocks. In the following sections, we provide evidence that banks’ diversification and
internal capital markets explain our results.
3.2 Mechanism
Recent studies argue that diversified banks have better access to funding during times
of financial distress and use their internal capital market to distribute resources among
affiliates to smooth local shocks.30 So far, our results do not tell us whether banks
reallocate existing funds across affiliates, or raise new funds to sustain credit supply. The
answer to the question has important implications, as the former implies spillover effects
to unaffected markets, while the latter does not. Suppose there is a negative financial
shock in Germany. Will a bank that is active in Germany and France move funds from
France to Germany and reduce lending in France to prop up German affiliates? Or can it
raise new funds, which allows it to stabilize lending in Germany while maintaining loan
supply in France?
If diversification improves banks’ access to funds in times of distress, it relaxes their
‘financial constraints’. The additional funds could be raised in the crisis country, but
also in unaffected borrower markets and transferred via the intra-bank capital market.
30See for example Morgan, Rime and Strahan (2004); Goldberg (2009); Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012);
Buch and Goldberg (2014); Bord, Ivashina and Taliaferro (2018); Coleman, Correa, Feler and Goldrosen
(2017); Cortés and Strahan (2017); Levine, Lin and Xie (2019).
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‘Constrained’ non-diversified banks cannot raise new funds when they face a negative
shock. Instead, they must trade off where to allocate existing liquidity within their bank
network. Any reallocation of funds towards crisis countries will then lead to negative
spillover effects to borrower markets that are connected to the bank. By analyzing
changes in loan supply in connected countries, we thus can provide indirect evidence on
banks’ internal capital markets.
To answer the question we aggregate to the bank-borrower country-year level and
define the variable connected. For each bank-country-year triplet, connected equals one
for all non-crisis countries k ( ̸= j) in year t if country j has a crisis (where k and j sum
up to all borrower countries from bank b in year t).31 In the spirit of Giroud and Mueller
(2015, 2017) the coefficient on connected shows how loan growth changes in all connected
countries that borrow from bank b, but do not experience a crisis. We run regressions of
the following form:
∆loanb,j,t = ϕb,j + τt + ρ1 BCj,t + ρ2 connectedb,k,t + ρ3 DIVb,t−1
+ ρ4 DIVb,t−1 ×BCj,t + ρ5 DIVb,t−1 × connectedb,k,t + ub,j,t,
(4)
where the dependent variable is loan growth by bank b to all borrowers in j at t in log
differences. DIV is our diversification metric on the bank level. We use bank-borrower
country (ϕb,j) and time (τt) fixed effects to analyze changes within a bank-borrower
country connection and absorb common trends. We expect banking crises to affect loan
growth negatively, so ρ1 < 0. If there are spillover effects, connected markets see a fall
in loan growth and ρ2 < 0. From our previous results, we expect that diversified banks
stabilize loan growth in host country j, so ρ4 > 0. If diversified banks are financially
unconstrained, they mitigate spillover effects and the coefficient on the interaction term
(DIV × connected) is positive (ρ5 > 0). In other words, if ρ5 > 0 we conclude that
diversified banks have better access to financing during host market shocks and transfer
resources through their intra-bank capital market. We cluster at the bank level to account
for serial and cross-sectional dependence across borrowers from the same bank. In all
regressions, we include borrower-country macroeconomic controls trade (in % of GDP),
inflation rate, log GDP per capita, and log population.
Table 12 shows that globally diversified banks have higher loan growth in crisis coun-
tries, and shield connected countries from spillovers. Column (1) shows that during
banking crises, and in line with our previous findings, countrywide loan growth drops
significantly by 3.0 %. Column (2) confirms for the aggregate level that diversified banks
31For example, for a bank that lends to Germany, France, and Italy, where Germany experiences a
crisis in 2005, connected takes on value one for France and Italy in 2005 and zero otherwise.
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are stabilizing, relative to banks with a concentrated portfolio. Similar to findings on
the loan and firm level, the coefficient on diversification, interacted with banking crisis,
is significant and positive. For banks with zero diversification, loan growth falls by 5.4
% during banking crises. Increasing diversification from the 25th to the 75th percentile
attenuates the effect by (0.63 × 0.164 =) 4.1 %. Note that the highly significant coeffi-
cient on DIV × BC is equal in magnitude to the negative coefficient on banking crisis.
This implies that banks with a fully diversified portfolio are able to completely offset the
negative effect of a banking crisis on countrywide loan growth.
In column (3) we introduce our new variable connected. The negative and significant
coefficient on connected implies that banks reduce lending by 2.9 % in unaffected countries
when another borrowing country experiences a banking crisis. Note that the spillover
effect is about two-thirds the size of the coefficient on banking crisis. Column (4) adds
interaction terms. The positive and highly significant coefficients on DIV × BC and
DIV × connected show that diversified banks stabilize loan supply in their host country,
and reduce contagion effects. Moving a bank from the 25th to the 75th percentile reduces
spillover effects from −6.3 % to zero. Fully diversified banks are thus able to offset the
crisis-induced decline in loan supply both in affected and connected countries.
We interpret our results as evidence that being geographically diversified allows banks
to tap new funds during crises, which reduces the need to withdraw capital from other
markets. The ability to raise new deposits stabilizes banks’ loan growth in the crisis
country, but also shields connected markets from negative spillovers. This finding is in
line with recent literature. Levine, Lin and Xie (2019) show that diversified banks have
lower risk in their portfolio, which allows them to access cheaper funding during times
of distress. Complementary, Cortés and Strahan (2017) find that banks use internal
capital markets to reallocate funds towards regions with high loan demand. Similar to
our findings, the reallocation has negative effects on connected areas for smaller and
less diversified banks that cannot raise new funds. Bord, Ivashina and Taliaferro (2018)
provide additional evidence that large and healthy banks raise new deposits to smooth
shocks and shield connected markets from spillovers.
So far, our analysis focuses on the asset side of banks’ balance sheets. We will now
present direct evidence on the liability side to test the relationship between diversification
and access to funding for a subsample of US banks. We merge 334 of our Dealscan banks
with bank data provided by the FDIC’s Statistics on Depository Institutions (SDI). For
US banks, we obtain quarterly information on deposits, assets, return on assets, net
interest margins, as well as Tier 1 capital, which results in a total of 6,446 bank-quarter
36
Chapter I. Bank Loan Supply during Crises: The Importance of Geographic
Diversification
Table 12: Spillover Effects (bank-level)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES ∆ loan vol. ∆ loan vol. ∆ loan vol. ∆ loan vol. ∆ loan vol.
banking crisis (BC) -0.030*** -0.054*** -0.049*** -0.068*** -0.022*
(0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.009) (0.012)
connected -0.029*** -0.063*** -0.039***
(0.006) (0.012) (0.014)
diversification (DIV) -0.018 -0.034* -0.042**
(0.019) (0.018) (0.019)
DIV × BC 0.053*** 0.052*** 0.027
(0.014) (0.014) (0.017)
DIV × connected 0.064*** 0.061***
(0.018) (0.018)
Observations 167,213 167,213 167,213 167,213 166,976
R-squared 0.212 0.212 0.212 0.213 0.237
Bank*Borrower Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes -
Bank Country*Year FE - - - - Yes
Controls macro macro macro macro macro
Cluster Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
Note: This table shows regressions on the bank-firm country-year (bank) level. The dependent variable is log of
total outstanding loan volume by bank b to all borrowers in country j; banking crisis (BC) is a dummy with value
one during banking crises in the firm country, as defined in Laeven and Valencia (2013); diversification (DIV) is
banks’ portfolio diversification. connected is a dummy with value one when BC = 1 for all countries connected
to bank b that are not country j and have no contemporaneous banking crisis. All regressions include borrower-
country macroeconomic controls trade (in % of GDP), inflation rate, log GDP per capita, and log population.
For detailed variable definitions see Table 23 and text. All standard errors are clustered at the bank level. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
observations.32 To see whether host country (non-US) shocks lead to an increase in
deposits for diversified banks, we regress banks’ log deposits on its diversification metric
(DIV ), interacted with the share of syndicated loans extended to crisis countries (loans
in crisis). We control for size, Tier 1 capital ratio, return on assets, and net interest
margin, as well as bank and quarter fixed effects. If diversified banks can tap new funds
during times of distress, we expect a positive effect of diversification on US deposits.
Table 13 shows that diversified banks increase their deposits in response to a host
country shock. Column (1) shows that for the average bank, deposits fall when it has a
higher share of loans in distress. This could reflect that depositors question liquidity or
solvency of the bank when parts of its loans are in distress. Once we add our interaction
terms and controls in columns (2) and (3), we find that diversified banks increase their
32Dealscan and FDIC classify banks’ parents by different criteria. With this caveat in mind, we match
on subsidiary names, but assign each bank its parent’s diversification value from Dealscan. SDI in general
cover FDIC-insured depository institutions, which constitute most of the U.S. retail banking market. This
leads to sample selection, as several banks in the syndicated loan market are not FDIC-insured.
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Table 13: FDIC SDI − Liability Side Mechanism
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES log deposits log deposits log deposits log time dep. log demand dep. log money market dep.
loans in crisis -0.640*** 0.085 0.089 0.106 -0.243** -0.138
(0.212) (0.058) (0.066) (0.099) (0.107) (0.268)
diversification (DIV) 0.240 0.228 0.016 0.255 0.435**
(0.156) (0.137) (0.331) (0.376) (0.176)
DIV × loans in crisis 6.290** 6.340** 0.747 24.402*** 11.786*
(2.734) (2.757) (7.667) (6.500) (6.716)
Observations 6,446 6,446 6,446 6,074 6,021 5,909
R-squared 0.930 0.991 0.991 0.949 0.962 0.983
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE - - Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster State State State State State State
Note: This table shows regressions on the bank-quarter level for FDIC SDI data (US banks only). The dependent
variables are log deposits; loans in crisis is banks’ share of loans extended to countries with a banking crisis, as
defined in Laeven and Valencia (2013); diversification (DIV) is banks’ portfolio diversification. All regressions
include log(assets), tier 1 capital ratio, net interest margin, and return on assets as bank-level controls. For
detailed variable definitions see Table 23 and text. All standard errors are clustered at the US state level. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
deposits during crises in borrower countries. Increasing diversification by one standard
deviation leads to an increase in deposits of around 0.5 % (evaluated at the mean of
share of loans in crisis). Thus, diversified banks raise new funds in their home market
when faced with a shock in their host country. When we look at different types of
deposits in columns (4)-(6), we see that the effect is driven by demand and money market
deposits. Both types of deposits are short term and readily available, so it is reasonable
to assume that banks cover their immediate needs following a crisis by raising short-term
funding. There is no effect on time deposits (column (4)). While the sample covers only
a limited number of US banks and has limited external validity, the strong positive effect
of diversification on deposit growth supports our hypothesis that diversified banks can
raise new funds during times of distress.33
4 Robustness
We argue that banks’ geographic diversification is the reason that they stabilize loan
supply. In this section we address potential alternative explanations. To ensure iden-
tification of supply effects, we run variants of loan-level regression Equation (2). In all
33Note that in columns (5)-(6) the coefficient on share of loans in crisis is negative. For concentrated
banks, deposits fall in the US during host country shocks. A possible explanation is that they have to
transfer existing funds to their affiliates in affected areas.
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Table 14: Foreign and International Banks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES log loan volume log loan volume log loan volume log loan volume log loan volume log loan volume log loan volume
diversification (DIV) -0.002 0.005 -0.024 -0.116*** -0.102***
(0.018) (0.017) (0.022) (0.027) (0.025)
DIV × BC 0.080*** 0.077*** 0.059*** 0.067*** 0.018
(0.015) (0.011) (0.017) (0.017) (0.034)
foreign bank × BC -0.016** -0.044*** -0.019**
(0.008) (0.011) (0.009)
DIV × foreign bank 0.006
(0.007)
DIV × foreign bank × BC -0.045***
(0.010)
int. portfolio (INT) 0.047*** 0.059*** 0.011 0.023
(0.013) (0.018) (0.022) (0.023)
INT × BC 0.023** -0.016 -0.026 -0.084***
(0.012) (0.017) (0.016) (0.024)
DIV × INT 0.158*** 0.132***
(0.036) (0.035)
DIV × INT × BC 0.120**
(0.059)
Observations 1,691,064 1,691,064 1,691,064 1,691,064 1,691,064 1,691,064 1,691,064
R-squared 0.976 0.976 0.976 0.976 0.976 0.976 0.976
Firm*Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Country*Year Country*Year Country*Year Country*Year Country*Year Country*Year Country*Year
Note: This table shows regressions on the bank-firm-year (loan) level. The dependent variable is log of total
outstanding loan volume; banking crisis (BC) is a dummy with value one during banking crises in the firm
country, as defined in Laeven and Valencia (2013); diversification (DIV) is banks’ portfolio diversification. foreign
bank is a dummy with value one if bank country and firm country differ. In column (3), DIV is a dummy with
value 1 if a bank has above median diversification in a given year. int. portfolio (INT) is banks’ portfolio share
that is extended to foreign borrowers. For detailed variable definitions see Table 23 and text. All standard errors
are clustered at the firm country-year level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
regressions, firm∗bank and firm∗time fixed effects absorb credit demand.
Foreign banks Diversified banks lend a significant share of their loans to foreign mar-
kets. A large literature finds that foreign and domestic banks differ during crisis episodes,
which raises the concern that our classification by portfolio allocation simply reflects
banks’ nationality.34 Table 14 shows that a categorization of banks by diversification is
different from a categorization by nationality. We include a foreign bank dummy that
takes on value 1 if a banks’ home country is not equal to its host country.35 Column (1)
shows that foreign banks reduce lending by 1.6 % during host banking crises. Once we
include our diversification metric in column (2), a non-diversified foreign bank reduces
loan supply by 4.4 %. Diversified banks, on the other hand, are still stabilizing. Com-
pared to baseline results in Table 9, the coefficient on DIV × BC increases in size to
8 % once we control for banks’ nationality. This suggests that domestic banks with a
diversified portfolio are the most stabilizing source of funding. We confirm this suspicion
34For a recent summary, see Claessens (2017).
35As nationality is constant within firm-bank connections, the coefficient on foreign bank is absorbed
by fixed effects.
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in column (3), where we interact the foreign dummy with diversification. For ease of
interpretation we redefine diversification as a dummy with value one if diversification is
above the yearly median. The interaction effect between diversification and foreign bank
during banking crisis is highly significant and negative. The coefficients on interaction
terms DIV ×BC (foreign bank×BC) remain positive (negative) and significant at the
1 % (5 %) level. In terms of economic significance, effects differ extensively across bank
types. During banking crises, non-diversified foreign banks reduce lending by 1.9 %. Do-
mestic diversified banks increase their relative loan supply by 8.2 %. The intermediate
group of diversified foreign banks increases loan supply by 2.4 %. Results in columns
(1)-(3) confirm the following pecking order: diversified domestic banks (DIV = 1, for-
eign bank = 0) are the most stable source of funding, while foreign banks with little
diversification (DIV = 0, foreign bank = 1) are the most fickle. Foreign diversified banks
lie in the middle. The ordering ties with findings on the flight home effect (Giannetti
and Laeven, 2012) and behavior of gross capital flows during crises (Broner, Didier, Erce
and Schmukler, 2013).
International loan portfolio The fact that banks extend international loans could
itself reflect a different business model, regardless of diversification, and be responsi-
ble for our main findings. To take into account the international allocation of banks’
loan portfolio, analogous to our diversification metric in Equation (1) we define banks’
international portfolio as the ratio of international loans to total loans:
INTb,t =
intl. syndicated loan volumeb,t
total syndicated loan volumeb,t
∈ [0, 1]. (5)
Intl. syndicated loan volumeb,t is the sum of all loans by bank b in year t to firms located
in a different country than the bank’s parent entity. Total syndicated loan volumeb,t is
total lending in year t to all firms, domestic and foreign. We call banks with a low value
of INT ‘national’, those with a high value ‘international’. Figure 5 plots both metrics
against each other, where international portfolio (INT) is on the x-axis, and banks’
geographic diversification (DIV) on the y-axis (the blue line represents the quadratic
fit). The humped shaped relationship that fans out for higher values of INT reflects
the conceptual differences underlying each metric: banks that only lend domestically are
in the bottom left corner (local on both metrics). Banks that lend exclusively to one
foreign country are in the bottom right corner. They are globally integrated by our second
definition (INT), but concentrated by our first (DIV), as they lend internationally but are
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Figure 5: Geographic Diversification and International Portfolio
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Note: This figure shows the relationship between banks’ portfolio diversification (DIV) and the international
allocation of their loan portfolio (INT) on the loan level. The blue dashed line is a quadratic fit. Higher values
denote more portfolio diversification, and a higher share of loans extended to foreign borrowers, respectively. For
detailed variable definitions see Table 23 and text.
not diversified.36 The dispersion in diversification for a given level of ‘internationality’
indicates that banks lending internationally differ widely in the geographic allocation of
their portfolio − being international does not automatically imply diversification. That
being said, the correlation between both metrics is high (0.81).
Columns (4)-(7) in Table 14 show that diversification, not internationality, leads to
positive loan supply effects. Column (4) shows that banks with a fully international
portfolio stabilize loan growth by 2.3 %, significant at the 5 % level. However, once we
include diversification in column (5), the positive effect disappears and turns negative,
albeit insignificant. The positive stabilizing role of diversified banks remains. When
we interact both metrics in columns (6) and (7), the following picture emerges. During
banking crises, banks with international loans are stabilizing only if they have a diversi-
fied portfolio (positive coefficients on DIV × INT and DIV × INT ×BC). Banks with
a concentrated, but international, portfolio have a significant negative impact on loan
36The lower bound of the arch reflects the minimum level of diversification for each bank, given that
it lends to more than one country. The upper bound, in turn, shows banks that lend to more than one
country, but have a diversified (read: not geographically concentrated) portfolio.
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Table 15: Crisis Loans and Portfolio Risk
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES log loan volume log loan volume log loan volume log loan volume log loan volume log loan volume
diversification (DIV) 0.001 0.002 -0.017 -0.025 -0.025 -0.024*
(0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.013)
DIV × BC 0.054*** -0.033 0.026** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.037***
(0.013) (0.033) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.010)
share of loans in crisis 0.010 0.011
(0.014) (0.014)
BC × share of loans in crisis 0.032 -0.030
(0.020) (0.033)
DIV × BC × share of loans in crisis 0.099**
(0.041)
portfolio risk (sales) × BC -0.021*** -0.021***
(0.003) (0.006)
DIV × portfolio risk (sales) × BC -0.002
(0.011)
Observations 1,691,064 1,691,064 1,596,872 1,596,872 1,596,872 1,691,064
R-squared 0.976 0.976 0.974 0.974 0.974 0.990
Firm*Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Size*Year FE - - - - - Yes
Cluster Country*Year Country*Year Country*Year Country*Year Country*Year Country*Year
Note: This table shows regressions on the bank-firm-year (loan) level. The dependent variable is log of total
outstanding loan volume; banking crisis (BC) is a dummy with value one during banking crises in the firm
country, as defined in Laeven and Valencia (2013); diversification (DIV) is banks’ portfolio diversification. share
of loans in crisis denotes banks’ share of total loans extended to countries that suffer a banking crisis. portfolio
risk (sales) is banks’ portfolio risk, measured as the average standard deviation of borrowers’ sales growth in
non-crisis times. Column (6) includes time-varying fixed effects for quintiles of loan size (Bank Size∗Year FE).
For detailed variable definitions see Table 23 and text. All standard errors are clustered at the firm country-year
level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
supply (coefficient of −0.084 on INT × BC in column (7)). We conclude that diversi-
fication, not banks’ nationality, or whether they lend to foreign borrowers, explains the
positive effects on loan supply during host country banking crises.
Share of loans in crisis An alternative explanation for our results is that diversified
banks extend a smaller share of their total loan portfolio to countries in crisis. Once a
banking crisis hits a borrower country, the asset side of a more diversified bank is less
exposed to adverse effects such as loan write-downs. To test whether asset diversification
is driving results we define for each bank share of loans in crisis as the share of total
loans in year t that are extended to all borrower countries in crisis.37 Diversified and
concentrated banks have a similar average share of loans in crisis (32 %), but diversified
banks’ median share of loans in crisis is significantly higher (6.5 % to 1%).
In Table 15, column (1), we control for the share of loans in crisis, as well as its
interaction with banking crisis. Our main coefficient of interest increases compared to
37For each bank b in year t, we define share of loans in crisist,b =
∑︁
c
BCt,cLt,b,c∑︁
c
Lt,b,c
, where c denotes all
countries borrowing from bank b in year t.
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Table 16: Firm Risk by Exposure to Diversified Banks (firm-
level sample)
high exposure low exposure mean diff.
mean sd mean sd t
investment growth sd 0.54 (0.32) 0.62 (0.37) 10.63
employment growth sd 0.14 (0.10) 0.16 (0.12) 7.20
assets growth sd 0.18 (0.14) 0.20 (0.16) 6.87
sales growth sd 0.18 (0.12) 0.19 (0.14) 2.94
Observations 3689 3893 7582
Note: This table shows descriptive statistics on the firm-year (firm) level for the smaller sample of matched
Compustat firms. Risk is defined as firms’ standard deviation of investment/employment/asset7sales growth in
non-crisis times. The sample is split by the yearly median according to firms’ exposure. High exposure firms are
denoted high exposure, those with low exposure as low exposure. mean denotes the mean, sd the standard deviation,
and mean diff. the t-value for the difference in means across both groups. For detailed variable definitions see
Table 23 and text.
our baseline loan-level regression (from 0.039 to 0.054). Hence the positive effect of
diversification is not driven by the share of loans in crisis. For a given share of loans in
distress, better diversification leads to higher loan supply. Once we introduce a triple
interaction term in column (2), we see that a higher share of loans in crisis reduces loan
volume for banks with no diversification. Instead, for a given share of loans in crisis
countries, diversified banks stabilize loan volume, as indicated by the significant positive
coefficient of DIV × share of loans×BC. The negative, but insignificant coefficient on
DIV × BC could suggest that banks reduce lending to countries where they only hold
a small share of loans. Diversification becomes more important for loan supply when a
high share of loans is in distress.
Portfolio risk Banks differ in terms of borrower risk (Neuhann and Saidi, 2018; Levine,
Lin and Xie, 2019). If diversified banks extend loans to less risky borrowers, they are
less exposed to the negative effects of a crisis. To address this issue, for each bank we
compute portfolio risk by taking the standard deviation of sales growth for each firm in
non-crisis years. We consider non-crisis years only, as the stabilizing role of diversified
banks during crises could lead to a downward bias in measured volatility. Table 16
shows that firms with low exposure to diversified banks are riskier in terms of volatility
of investment, employment, asset, and sales growth. Firms are assigned into top and
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bottom tercile according to their exposure for each year.38 In Table 15, column (3), we
ensure that our baseline finding survives for the smaller sample of loans to borrowers
with balance sheet information. Diversified banks still have significantly higher loan
supply. Once we include portfolio risk (interacted with banking crisis) in column (4), we
see that higher portfolio risk reduces loan supply during a banking crisis.39 However,
the main coefficient of interest on DIV × BC increases. Including a triple interaction
effect in column (5) keeps the main coefficient stable. We also see that higher portfolio
risk reduces loan supply for non-diversified banks. The positive triple interaction term
indicates that for a given level of portfolio risk, better diversification leads to higher loan
supply during crisis. We interpret this as evidence that portfolio risk is not responsible
for the stabilizing effect we find, but that banks’ diversification still leads to significantly
higher loan supply during crises − in the presence of portfolio risk, the positive effect of
diversification gains in importance.
Bank size Table 15, column (6) controls for bank size. As we have no direct data on
bank size for the full sample, we assume that bigger banks grant larger loans and use
loan size as proxy. To ensure that diversification has a positive effect on loan supply
above and beyond banks’ size, for each year we create quintiles by total loan volume. We
then include size-quintile∗year fixed effects in our regression. We thus compare lending
between each bank-firm pair within a given size class of banks in each year. We also
include firm∗time fixed effects to absorb any change in loan demand. The positive and
significant effect of diversification on loan supply survives once we control for banks’ size.
After including size∗year fixed effects, during a banking crisis fully diversified banks have
3.7 % higher loan volume compared to non-diversified banks within the same size-year
bin.
Industry Specialization It may be that geographic diversification can be explained
by alternative dimensions of banks’ business models. For instance, Boskovic, Doerr and
Schaz (2019) provide evidence that banks stabilize lending to those industries in which
they are specialized and thus have an informational advantage during banking crises.
Table 17 tests whether the stabilizing effect of geographic diversification on lending can
be explained by industry specialization. The last column in Table 17 shows that after
controlling for industry specialization during crises, diversification remains positive and
38We restrict the analysis to observations for which we have balance sheet data, which reduces the
number of loan-level observations by around 60 %.
39Portfolio risk is constant for banks and thus absorbed by fixed effects.
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Table 17: Geographic Diversification vs. Industry Specialization
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES log loan volume log loan volume log loan volume
DIV × BC 0.072*** 0.068**
(0.027) (0.028)
Industry spec. × BC -0.021 -0.014
(0.054) (0.056)
Industry spec. 1.742*** 1.740***
(0.047) (0.047)
Observations 1,621,124 1,621,124 1,621,124
R-squared 0.978 0.978 0.978
Firm*Bank FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm*Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Country*Industry*Year FE - - -
Bank*Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Country*Year Country*Year Country*Year
Note: This table shows regressions on the bank-firm-year (loan) level. The dependent variable is log of total
outstanding loan volume; banking crisis (BC) is a dummy with value one during banking crises in the firm
country, as defined in Laeven and Valencia (2013); diversification (DIV) is banks’ geographic diversification.
Industry specialization is measured as the ratio of loans granted by bank b to all borrowers in industry i in time
period t relative to bank b’s total lending granted in the same period. For detailed variable definitions see Table
23 and text. Standard errors are clustered on different level, as indicated by the last table row. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
statistically significant.40 This suggests that lending by geographically diversified banks
during banking crises cannot be explained by banks’ industry specialization.
Clustering Table 18 shows that our results are robust to clustering standard errors on
different levels. Column (1)-(4) cluster on the country*year, country, country and bank,
as well as firm*year and bank*year level. Across specifications, the effect of diversification
on loan supply during crises remains significant at the 5 % top 1 % level.
40Note, that the coefficient of the interaction term between industry specialization and banking crises
is not statistically different from zero while it is positive in Boskovic, Doerr and Schaz (2019). The reason
is that the sample of banks differs as we now include not only lead arrangers, as in Boskovic, Doerr and
Schaz (2019), but also participant banks of the syndicate. However, as participant banks are not in direct
contact with the borrower they are not able to gather soft information over the industry by issuing loans.
Hence, industry specialization on this sample does not capture informational advantage over industries.
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Table 18: Bank-firm level − cluster
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES log(loan vol) log(loan vol) log(loan vol) log(loan vol)
diversification (DIV) 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
(0.018) (0.051) (0.055) (0.016)
DIV × BC 0.039*** 0.039** 0.039** 0.039***
(0.013) (0.016) (0.018) (0.014)
Observations 1,691,064 1,691,064 1,691,064 1,691,064
R-squared 0.976 0.976 0.976 0.976
Firm*Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Country*Year Country Country & Bank Firm*Year & Bank*Year
Note: This table shows regressions on the bank-firm-year (loan) level. The dependent variable is log of total
outstanding loan volume; banking crisis (BC) is a dummy with value one during banking crises in the firm
country, as defined in Laeven and Valencia (2013); diversification (DIV) is banks’ geographic diversification. For
detailed variable definitions see Table 23 and text. Standard errors are clustered on different level, as indicated
by the last table row. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
5 Extensions
This section presents extensions and further robustness checks of our baseline findings.
We show that our diversification metric correlates with macro variables of financial in-
tegration; effects are stronger for financially constrained firms; diversified banks extend
loans at longer maturity, but higher interest during crises; and that, following a crisis,
there is a shift in firms’ portfolios towards lending by diversified banks.
Macro evidence We use syndicated loan market data to construct our bank diversifi-
cation metric. Syndicated lending represents a sizable share of firm debt and cross-border
loans (Gadanecz and von Kleist, 2002). We now show that our metric (aggregated to the
country level) correlates with aggregate country-level variables. Figure 6, Panel a) shows
a strong positive relationship between borrowing countries’ total syndicated lending (as
share of GDP) against total credit (as share of GDP). Countries with a high level of
overall credit also have a high level of syndicated loan volume.41 Panels b)−d) show the
relationship between our diversification metric and aggregate measures of banking inte-
gration. Diversification is positively correlated with the share of foreign bank assets (as
41A regression of total credit on syndicated credit with country fixed effects yields a coefficient of 0.29
with t-value 11.47.
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Figure 6: Macro Evidence
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Note: This figure shows the relationship between our sample data and aggregate data on total credit, as well as
our diversification metric and aggregate measures of financial integration. All scatter plots depict scatter points
as well as a linear fit, where the underlying data is aggregated to the country-year level. For detailed variable
definitions see Table 23 and text.
share of total bank assets), claims by foreign banks, as well as foreign liabilities (both as
share of GDP).42 Hence, countries with a high share of firms borrowing from diversified
banks are also better financially integrated. They have higher foreign bank presence in
their domestic market, as well as larger claims on foreign countries. Taken together, this
implies that syndicated lending in our data is positively correlated with total credit, and
our diversification metric captures financial integration.
42Data is provided by the Bank for International Settlements, the World Bank World Development
Indicators, as well as Global Financial Development Database. See Table 23 for details.
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Table 19: Financial Constraints (firm-level sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
uncons. cons. uncons. cons. uncons. cons. uncons. cons.
payout payout size size payout payout size size
VARIABLES ∆ employment ∆ employment ∆ employment ∆ employment ∆ investment ∆ investment ∆ investment ∆ investment
exposure -0.055* -0.103*** -0.033 -0.033 0.024 -0.265*** -0.075 -0.106
(0.029) (0.032) (0.024) (0.024) (0.080) (0.083) (0.067) (0.079)
exposure × BC -0.003 0.094*** 0.063 0.041* -0.058 0.277** -0.077 0.201**
(0.024) (0.033) (0.041) (0.025) (0.072) (0.109) (0.134) (0.084)
Observations 11,347 12,207 15,598 15,433 12,017 12,808 16,742 16,660
R-squared 0.336 0.472 0.333 0.413 0.272 0.317 0.249 0.260
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Note: This table shows regressions on the firm-year (firm) level. The dependent variables are log difference of
firms’ employment and investment; banking crisis (BC) is a dummy with value one during banking crises in the
firm country, as defined in Laeven and Valencia (2013); exposure is firms’ exposure to diversified banks. All
regressions include log total assets, return on assets, and leverage as firm-level controls. uncons. and cons. denote
constrained and unconstrained firms, split into bottom and top tercile of payout ratio or size for each year. For
detailed variable definitions see Table 23 and text. All standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Financial constraints We split firms into financially constrained and unconstrained.
As constrained firms rely more on external credit to finance employment and investment,
higher exposure to diversified banks should have stronger effects. For each year we
group firms into bottom and top tercile according to their payout ratio (payout) and
size (size). We classify firms as financially constrained if they are in the bottom tercile,
and unconstrained if they are in the top tercile (Almeida and Campello, 2007; Chaney,
Sraer and Thesmar, 2012). In Table 19, columns (1)-(4) use employment growth as
dependent variable, columns (5)-(8) investment growth. All regressions include baseline
controls, as well as firm and country∗year fixed effects. For both dependent variables,
the positive effect of exposure to diversified banks during crises is significantly stronger
for constrained (cons.) than unconstrained (uncons.) firms. Note that our Compustat
sample covers large and listed firms. The stronger effects for financially constrained firms
reassure us that effects would extend to a sample covering small firms as well. In general,
small firms are found to be more bank dependent and also more credit constrained and
therefore loan supply decisions matter more.
Maturity and interest rates Beside changes in loan amount, banks can alter ma-
turity or the interest rate of loans. To test whether banks use these margins to restrict
or expand loan supply, we rerun firm level regression Equation (3), but replace the de-
pendent variable by maturity (in months), and interest spread over LIBOR (in basis
points). Table 20 shows that borrowing from diversified banks leads to a higher spread
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Table 20: Maturity and Sample Selection (firm-level sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1995-2008 GFC regional crisis
VARIABLES loan spread maturity ∆ loan volume ∆ loan volume ∆ loan volume
exposure -35.486*** 6.392*** -0.249*** -0.186*** -0.182***
(6.932) (1.763) (0.027) (0.022) (0.022)
exposure × BC 30.816*** 2.636 0.070*** 0.057*** 0.054**
(6.288) (1.899) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022)
exposure × GFC 0.066**
(0.025)
exposure × GFC × BC -0.100***
(0.031)
exposure × regional BC -0.029*
(0.018)
Observations 139,505 199,799 133,542 196,038 196,038
R-squared 0.905 0.951 0.338 0.317 0.317
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country*Industry*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Note: This table shows regressions on the firm-year (firm) level. The dependent variable is firms’ average loan
spread over LIBOR (in basis points) and maturity (in months) in columns (1) and (2), and log difference of firms’
total outstanding loan volume in columns (3)-(5); banking crisis (BC) is a dummy with value one during banking
crises in the firm country, as defined in Laeven and Valencia (2013); exposure is firms’ exposure to diversified
banks. Great Financial Crisis (GFC) is a dummy with value one during banking crises from 2008-2010. regional
crisis is a dummy with value one during regional banking crises in Asia, Latin America, and Europe. For detailed
variable definitions see Table 23 and text. All standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
and longer maturity during crises. While the effect on maturity is quantitatively negligi-
ble and insignificant, a one standard deviation increase in exposure increases the spread
by around 7 basis points. We interpret this as evidence that diversified banks are willing
to extend loans during crises, but compensate higher risk through higher interest rates.
Columns (3)-(5) further examine the robustness of our results. The dependent variable
is loan growth. Column (3) excludes the global crisis and restricts the sample to years
1995−2008. Column (4) introduces a global financial crisis (GFC) dummy with value one
during banking crises in years 2008, 2009, and 2010. In both columns, our main effect
remains positive and significant. The recent financial crisis does not drive our results.
Finally, column (5) introduces a regional crisis dummy.43 The negative coefficient on
exposure × regional BC suggests that during crises affecting several countries at once,
the positive effect of diversification is weakened. Yet, our baseline effect remains stable.
43The regional BC dummy takes on value one for Asian countries during the Asian crisis (1997-1999),
South American countries during the Latin crisis (1995-1996), as well as the Great Financial Crisis in
Europe and the US.
5. Extensions 49
Table 21: Substitution Towards Diversified Lenders
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
firm firm firm firm industry industry industry industry
t t+1 t+2 t+3 t t+1 t+2 t+3
VARIABLES exposure exposure exposure exposure exposure exposure exposure exposure
banking crisis 0.007*** 0.006** 0.010*** 0.007** 0.003 0.005 0.012*** 0.011***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 192,495 155,610 123,045 98,076 192,495 159,703 127,892 101,469
R-squared 0.924 0.926 0.928 0.928 0.505 0.497 0.489 0.485
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes - - - -
Country*Industry FE - - - - Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Note: This table shows regressions on the firm-year (firm) level. The dependent variable is firms’ exposure to
diversified banks (the share of total loans extended by diversified banks), where we lead the dependent variable
by up to 3 periods. banking crisis (BC) is a dummy with value one during banking crises in the firm country, as
defined in Laeven and Valencia (2013). Columns (1)-(4) use firm fixed effects and look at within firm variation,
columns (5)-(8) use country-industry fixed effects and look at changes across firms within industries. For detailed
variable definitions see Table 23 and text. All standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
Credit Substitution Effects While we showed above that diversified banks sustain
higher loan supply and credit growth to firms during crises, we now investigate how
the differing behavior of diversified and concentrated banks changes the structure of the
economy. First, we look at substitution effects on the firm level. While firms cannot
perfectly offset changes in loan supply by switching across banks, Table 21 shows that
there is nonetheless an increase in reliance on diversified lenders. We run a regression of
firms’ exposure (i.e. the share of loans coming from diversified banks) on the banking
crisis dummy. Columns (1)-(4) use firm and region∗year fixed effects, and look at within
firm changes, while controlling for common regional shocks. All regressions include firm-
country controls trade, inflation, log GDP per capita, and log population. There is a
significant and positive effect of banking crisis on firms’ exposure. The average firm
sees an increase in its exposure to diversified lenders by 0.7 % during the year of the
crisis. Effects are highly persistent even three years after the crisis. Besides a shift in
exposure within firms, there could also be a shift across firms towards firms that borrow
more from diversified banks. Columns (5)-(8) use country∗industry instead of firm fixed
effects and compare how exposure changes across firms within a given country-industry
pair. Results show that during a banking crisis there is a shift towards borrowers from
diversified banks. The share of loans from diversified banks increases by 0.3 % in the
year of the crisis. It is still 1.1 % higher three years after the crisis. The stronger effect
on the industry level suggests that on top of a shift towards diversified lenders within
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firms, there is also a shift within industries across firms towards borrowers with higher
exposure.
The increase in firms’ reliance on diversified banks should be mirrored in banks’ loan
portfolios. We run the following regression on the bank (b) − borrower country (j) −
year (t) level:
shareb,j,t = γ1BCj,t + γ2diversificationb,t + γ3DIVb,t ×BCj,t +Xj,t + ϵb,j,t.
shareb,j,t denotes bank b’s share of total loans in country j in year t and X is a set of
controls for the borrower country. Based on our above findings, we expect that a banking
crisis leads to a decline in share (γ1 < 0), but the decline should be smaller or absent for
diversified banks (γ3 > 0), as they are a more stable source of funding. The coefficient
γ2 on DIV is expected to be negative, as diversified banks will have a lower average
loan share than concentrated banks. In each regression, we use bank∗borrower country
fixed effects and analyze variation in loan shares within a specific bank-borrower country
connection. We also employ time-varying fixed effects on the bank country level to
absorb changes in each banks’ home country. If, for example, there is a contemporaneous
negative shock in a banks’ home country that we do not account for, the stabilizing effect
of diversification is likely to be muted. Again, all regressions include borrower-country
controls trade, inflation, log GDP per capita, and log population.
Table 22, column (1), shows that a banking crisis in host country j reduces banks’
share of loans extended to j by 0.7 %. The effect is significant at the 1 % level and
economically meaningful. The median loan share is 2.2 %, so a banking crisis reduces
banks’ loan share by around 31 % relative to the median. Once we interact our crisis
dummy with our diversification metric in column (2), we see that i) in non-crisis times,
diversified banks have a lower loan share in host countries than concentrated banks; and
ii) their share falls by less during banking crises. Columns (2)-(5) lead the dependent
variable by subsequent periods. In each specification we find that diversified banks reduce
their loan share by less. For example, in column (2), fully diversified banks reduce their
loan share by 0 %, compared to 1.3 % for banks with no diversification. Combining
our evidence in Tables 21 and 22, we find that banking crises in host countries increase
borrowers’ reliance on lending by diversified banks. The long-run effects of the increase
in importance of diversified banks on financial stability and, for example, spillover effects,
is an interesting question for future research.
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Table 22: Dynamics: Diversified Banks Increase their Loan
Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
t t t+1 t+2 t+3
VARIABLES share share share share share
banking crisis (BC) -0.007*** -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.010*** -0.010***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
diversification (DIV) -0.310*** -0.198*** -0.125*** -0.067***
(0.013) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
DIV × BC 0.013*** 0.008* 0.005 0.003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Observations 199,427 173,368 149,664 127,568 109,366
R-squared 0.959 0.967 0.968 0.970 0.971
Bank*Borrower Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Country*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
Note: This table shows regressions on the bank-firm country-year (bank) level. The dependent variable is banks’
share of total outstanding loan volume extended to all borrowers in country j, up to a lead of three years; banking
crisis (BC) is a dummy with value one during banking crises in the firm country, as defined in Laeven and Valencia
(2013); diversification (DIV) is banks’ portfolio diversification. For detailed variable definitions see Table 23 and
text. All standard errors are clustered at the bank level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
6 Conclusion
We develop a novel metric to categorize banks according to the geographic diversification
of their international loan portfolio. For a large sample of international syndicated loans,
we find that diversified banks are a resilient source of financing for firms that experience a
countrywide financial crisis. Borrowing from diversified banks increases loan, investment,
and employment growth significantly. Detailed loan-level data ensures proper identifica-
tion of supply effects, as we absorb changes in firm demand through time-varying fixed
effects on the firm level. Our results provide evidence that diversification allows banks
to raise new funds during times of distress, which are then allocated towards affiliates
in distress. This not only stabilizes loan supply in affected countries, but also reduces
spillover effects to connected markets.
When we contrast our measure with the standard classification by nationality, we
find that domestic, diversified banks are the most resilient source of financing, while
foreign banks provide no insurance. The negative effect of foreign banks is increasing
in the concentration of their portfolio. We also exclude candidate explanations other
than diversification. Geographic diversification remains a significant factor contributing
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to higher stability in lending even after we control for banks’ international orientation,
share of loans in crisis, and portfolio risk.
This paper contributes to the debate on the costs and benefits of financial integra-
tion. Figure 7 shows that banks’ diversification declined during the global financial crisis
and remained depressed thereafter. Our results suggest that the recent retrenchment
in financial integration following the Great Financial Crisis is worrisome (Milesi-Ferretti
and Tille, 2011; Cerutti and Claessens, 2016; Claessens and Van Horen, 2015). While
cross-border lending constitutes a potential source of contagion, we show that interna-
tionally active and diversified banks have better access to funds during banking crises in
their borrower countries and increase resilience to local shocks.
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7 Appendix
Figure 7: Banks’ Geographic Diversification Over Time
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Note: This figure shows the change in banks’ diversification over time. Diversification is computed according to
Equation (1). It plots the mean, median, 25th, and 75th percentile from 1995 to 2012. Diversification increased
steadily until around 2006, but then decreased during the recent global financial crisis and remains depressed ever
since. Less-diversified banks drive the decline. For detailed variable definitions see Table 23 and text.
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Table 23: Variable Definitions
variable description/item unit/comment
loan volume outstanding syndicated loans million
loan spread interest spread over LIBOR basis points
maturity loan maturity months
banking crisis (BC) banking crisis in borrower country dummy
connected connected countries with no contemporaneous banking crisis dummy
diversification (DIV) diversification index [0,1-1/J], bank level
exposure firm exposure to diversified banks [0,1-1/J], firm level
investment ratio capx/ppentt−1 (CS) %
long-term debt ratio dltt/at (CS) %
employment emp (CS) thousand
sales sale (CS) million
assets at (CS) million
return on assets (ROA) (opid - depam)/at (CS) %
sales growth ln(salet) - ln(salet−1) (CS) %
payout ratio (dvt + prstkc)/oibdp (CS) %
fixed assets ppe (CS) million
capital-labor ratio ppe/emp (CS) %
foreign bank (FB) borrower country ̸= lender country dummy, bank level
international portfolio (INT) int. loan volume to total loan volume [0,1], bank level
great financial crisis (GFC) years 2008-2010 dummy
regional BC regional banking crisis for Asia, Latin America, Europe, and US dummy
home BC banking crisis in lender country dummy, bank level
share of loans in crisis share of syndicated loans extended to crisis countries in year t %
portfolio risk (sales) standard deviation of borrower sales growth in non-crisis times
credit to GDP FD.AST.PRVT.GD.ZS (WB WDI) %
BIS foreign claims total cross-border claims (BIS CBS) %
BIS foreign liabilities total cross-border liabilities (BIS CBS) %
foreign bank assets as share of total bank assets (WB GFDD) %
Note: CS stands for Compustat, WB for World Bank, GFDD for Global Financial Development Database, WDI
for World Development Indicators, BIS for Bank for International Settlements, CBS for Consolidated Banking
Statistics.
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Figure 8: Bank-Borrower Connections
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Figure 9: Firm−Lender Connections
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Note: This figures shows the number of distinct borrowers in each year for each bank (top panel) and the number
of distinct lenders in each year for each firm (bottom panel). For visibility, graphs are truncated at 60 connections.
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Figure 10: Loan Supply Over Time
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This figure shows the coefficient and corresponding confidence intervals (CI) of a regression of log
loan volume on diversification, which we interact with time dummies for the years before, during, and
after the crisis. While there is no significant difference in loan supply prior to the crisis, diversified
banks maintain significantly higher loan supply during and after the crisis.
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Table 24: Foreign Banks
(1) (2) (3)
concentrated diversified full sample
VARIABLES log loan volume log loan volume log loan volume
foreign bank × BC -0.031*** -0.087*** -0.015
(0.008) (0.011) (0.010)
diversification (d) -0.028***
(0.009)
DIV (d) × BC 0.087***
(0.012)
DIV (d) × foreign bank 0.034***
(0.012)
DIV (d) × foreign bank × BC -0.054***
(0.011)
Observations 807,188 801,124 1,691,064
R-squared 0.985 0.971 0.976
Firm*Bank FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm*Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Country*Year Country*Year Country*Year
Note: Table 24, columns (1)-(3) shed further light on the distinction between foreign and diversified banks.
Whether you are diversified or not, you want to have a domestic bank during a local crisis. Foreign banks reduce
their loan volume by significantly more. Interestingly, foreign banks with a diversified portfolio reduce their loan
volume by 8.7 % more than foreign banks with a concentrated portfolio. This is almost triple the difference
between foreign and domestic banks that have a concentrated portfolio. So if you can choose, you want to be
diversified, but domestic. Column (3) confirms this with an interaction regression of the foreign bank dummy and
a dummy for banks with high and low diversification. The most stably source of funding are domestic diversified
banks, the least stable source of funding foreign banks with no diversification. For detailed variable definitions see
Table 23 and text. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 11: Firm Exposure to Divsersified Banks (firm-level sam-
ple)
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Note: This figure shows the relationship between firms’ exposure to diversified banks (DIV) and international
banks (INT) on the firm level. The blue dashed line is a quadratic fit. Higher values denote higher exposure to
the respective bank type. For detailed variable definitions see Table 23 and text.
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Chapter II
Bank Industry Specialization and
Spillover Effects
Based on Boskovic, Doerr and Schaz (2019).
1 Introduction
The recent financial crisis led to a substantial rebalancing of banks’ international loan
portfolios. Some banks cut lending to crisis countries and moved their funds back home,
others shifted their loan portfolio towards other countries.1 While many researchers
have analyzed the role that geographical specialization plays for credit reallocation after a
funding shock during a banking crisis, very few have focused on the impact of other types
of bank portfolio concentration, such as concentration by industry. This is surprising,
given the important role that bank’s portfolio concentration plays in theoretical banking
models and given the severe consequences that credit reallocation after a banking crisis
might have for the real economy (De Jonghe et al., 2016).2
Previous literature established that banks specialize in certain industries to acquire
an informational advantage. Soft information about borrowers in their main industries
allow them to better gauge the quality of a firm during times of general economic distress.
When engaging in relationship lending, banks gather propriety information about their
customers through repeated interactions (Boot, 2000). Banks will typically have gathered
more sector-specific knowledge in sectors where they are specialized, improving their
screening abilities and reducing the need for costly monitoring in these sectors. As such,
1See (Giannetti and Laeven, 2012); (Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2011); (Giroud and Mueller, 2017);
(Popov and Van Horen, 2015) for evidence of domestic and international loan portfolio relocation of
banks.
2See (Beck et al., 2017); (Degryse and Ongena, 2007); (Jahn et al., 2016); (Giannetti and Saidi, 2019);
for evidence and implications of bank portfolio concentration.
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while banks that face a funding shock during a banking crisis are forced to reduce lending,
they have an incentive to shield sectors in which they are specialized and have relatively
superior screening and monitoring skills (De Jonghe et al., 2016). Yet, despite these
considerations, it remains an open question whether funding shocks lead to differential
reallocation effects in bank portfolios across industries, depending on banks’ ex-ante
specialization to these industries. Therefore, we address following questions: Do banks
protect borrowers in their main industries during banking crises in order to maintain this
valuable information for the post-crisis period? Or does industry specialization allow
banks to discriminate more easily between good and bad firms in their main industry,
which allows them to cut lending more strongly to main-industry-firms leading to a
stronger lending contraction during a crisis?
This paper looks at how banks’ industry specialization affects lending during a bank-
ing crisis in the borrower country. On the bank-firm (loan) level, we find that banks
mitigate the transmission of the banking crisis by reducing lending less to firms in their
specialized industries. Increasing bank’s industry specialization by one standard devia-
tion increases loan volume to firms in these industries by 6.3 % during banking crises. We
document a positive relationship between bank specialization and firm lending: Banks
reduce lending strongest to firms from their least specialized industries. Firms within the
bottom tercile of bank specialization experience a fall in loan supply that is 8 % stronger
than for firms from the middle tercile. On the bank-industry level, we find that banks
protect their specialized industries on aggregate, rather than cherry-pick firms within a
specialized industry they know well.
We find that the positive loan supply effect to firms in specialized industries com-
pared to firms in non-specialized industries during crises has real effects on industry wide
employment and growth. To test this, we construct a variable that measures exposure
of a particular industry to specialized banks. Industries that receive more lending from
banks that are specialized in this particular industry, have more stable economic out-
comes during banking crises. While industry level employment falls on average by 5 %
during a crisis, increasing industry exposure to specialized banks by one standard devia-
tion mutes this reduction by 2.8 %. Additionally, the reduction of industry specific value
added is muted by 1.7 % for a similar increase in industry exposure to specialized banks.
In a second step of our research, we analyze how banking crises spill over to other
non-crisis countries through cross-border bank lending, and the differential transmission
to specialized industries. To illustrate this spillover effect, suppose a bank operates in
both Poland and Spain while only Poland is experiencing a banking crisis. In order
to offset the capital shock in Poland, the bank may reduce lending to Spain in order
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to rechannel funds to borrowers in Poland through the banks’ internal capital market,
which gives rise to contagion. How will a bank lending to both Poland and Spain adjust
its loan supply in each country? And how does this lending response to a banking crisis
in one country depend on industry specialization of banks? We find that banking crises
spill over to other non-crisis countries through cross-border lending: Banks operating
in a country that experiences a banking crisis reduce loan supply to firms in non-crisis
countries by 7 %. Moreover, this spillover effect is strongest to those industries in which
the bank is not specialized in. Thus, increasing industry specialization by one standard
deviation mutes the spillover effect by 6.5 %, which is almost sufficient to entirely undo
the initial contagion. Therefore, industries with lower presence of specialized banks are
more prone to cross-border banking crisis contagion.
The main identification challenge in the literature that aims at measuring loan supply
effects in cross-country settings is to absorb loan demand. The concern is that changes in
firm’s demand for loans over time may bias the results on bank lending. Detailed lending
data on the international syndicated loan market allows us to address this issue. Follow-
ing the literature to separate out loan supply from loan demand, we start the analysis
on the most granular firm-bank-quarter level where we employ firm-time fixed effects
(Khwaja and Mian, 2008; Jiménez, Atif, Peydro and Saurina Salas, 2012; Jiménez, On-
gena, Peydró and Saurina, 2014; Morais, Peydro and Ruiz Ortega, 2019). By comparing
the lending behavior of specialized banks to unspecialized banks to the same borrower,
we address the concern that differences in loan demand biases the results on bank lend-
ing. Also, we employ a combination of bank-firm, bank-time and firm-time fixed effects
to address a number of alternative explanations. We absorb time-invariant unobservable
variables at the bank-firm level, such as distance, through bank-firm fixed effects. More-
over, we absorb unobservable time-varying heterogeneity across banks through bank-time
fixed effects, absorbing omitted bank-level variables such as bank size, bank profitability
or banks total loan supply. Additionally, we test whether industry specialization is robust
to an alternative measure of banks portfolio allocation. In particular, we test whether
bank lending by industry specialization can be explained by geographic diversification
of banks cross-country lending portfolio, as in Doerr and Schaz (2019). We find that
results on industry specialization are robust to banks’ geographic diversification, which
alleviates concerns on omitted variable bias. Thus, several robustness tests and a compre-
hensive set of fixed effects show that it is unlikely that the results are driven by individual
characteristics of the banks’, quality of the firms, or bank-firm specific information that
they have collected through previous interactions. Our regressions therefore estimate the
marginal propensity of a bank to lend to firms in specialized industries rather to firms
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in non-specialized industries during a crisis.
On the bank-industry level, we absorb loan demand through a combination of bank-
industry and country-industry-time fixed effects. Here, the identifying assumption is
that all firms within a country-industry group change their loan demand similarly during
a crisis. In order to test whether firms change their loan demand differentially within
industries, we compare this specification with the more demanding firm-time fixed effects
at the loan level. While we find that within-industry firm heterogeneity exists, it works
against the main finding of our empirical framework and, thus, indicating that the esti-
mation using country-industry-time effects provides lower bounds of coefficients. Taken
together, these findings indicate that the positive effect of bank specialization on lending
during crisis reflects loan supply.
Our paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, our paper
relates to the literature that explores the effects of banks’ loan concentration on liquidity
provision (Giannetti and Saidi, 2019). In their paper De Jonghe et al. (2016) use Belgium
credit register data estimate the effect of banks’ sector specialization, together with sector
presence and firm risk on banks’ lending decisions. In contrast, we use detailed cross-
country dataset which allows for assessment of international spillover effects. Moreover,
Paravisini et al. (2015) addresses the specialization of lending, but focusing on the export
market instead.
Second, our results contribute to the growing literature on bank funding shock trans-
mission and cross-border spillovers, following on methodology developed by Khwaja and
Mian (2008). Some authors have focused on the effect of funding shocks on lending (Puri
et al., 2011; Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2011), while others adressed cross-border shock
transmission from banks’ home countries into borrower countries Peek and Rosengren
(1997). Instead, we look at the lending response to banking crisis that originate in the
borrower country. The importance of geographical specialization has also been adressed
in several papers: Giannetti and Laeven (2012) show that the collapse of international
markets during financial crises can in part be explained by a flight home effect, while
De Haas and Van Horen (2013) show that geographical proximity of banks’ connected
markets plays a role in banks’ portfolio reallocation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First we provide the description
of the data and the construction of variables in Section 2. Next, we discuss the empirical
methodology that is used to address the research question, focusing on identification
challenges. We present the results of our main analysis in two steps: Lending to firms
at the bank-firm level and lending to industries at the bank-industry level (Section 4).
In Section 5 we investigate the implications of our findings, by estimating real effects,
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Figure 1: Number of Banking Crisis Years by Country
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Note: This figure shows the number of years with a banking crisis for each country. Banking crises are defined
in Laeven and Valencia (2013). Darker colors show countries with more banking crisis years, lighter colors those
with less.
focusing on industry specific value added and employment. Finally, results on cross-
border spillover effects are presented in Section 6.
2 Data
For our main analysis and the construction of bank industry specialization, we use data
on worldwide syndicated lending. We additionally use country-industry data and further
information on borrowing firms’ balance sheets. Loan-level data with detailed bank-firm
relations come from Thomson Reuters Dealscan and covers the universe of syndicated
loans. Macroeconomic variables come from the World Bank’s World Development Indica-
tors. Industry-level data are drawn from EU KLEMS Growth and Productivity Accounts
to provide data on productivity and employment for the analysis of real effects.
Data on banking crises are drawn from Laeven and Valencia (2013)’s Systemic Bank-
ing Crises Database, which provides country-year-level information on episodes of finan-
cial distress.3 From 1995 to 2012, it reports 189 banking crisis (BC) observations at the
bank-year level. The two conditions that define a banking crisis are i) significant signs of
financial distress in the banking system (such as bank runs, losses in the banking system,
3(Laeven and Valencia, 2013) is the most comprehensive database on financial crises occuring after
1970.
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and/or bank liquidations); and ii) significant banking policy intervention measures in
response to the losses in the banking system. Figure 1 plots the number of years with
a banking crisis for each country. In our sample, there is a concentration of financial
turmoil around the time of the Asian crisis and from 2008 onward, during the Great
Financial Crisis.
To construct main variables, we use Dealscan data on syndicated loans. Syndicated
lending constitutes a significant share of total lending. Around one-third of total inter-
national lending is done through the syndicated loan market and it is an important source
of financing in both developed and emerging economies (Cerutti et al., 2015). Syndicated
loans are issued jointly by a group of banks to a single borrower. The lending syndicate
includes at least one lead bank (also called lead arranger) and usually further participant
banks. Lead banks negotiate terms and conditions of deals, perform due diligence, and
organize participants. Therefore, lead arrangers stand in direct contact with the borrower
and retain larger loan shares for signaling purposes. Participants are usually not in direct
contact with the borrower, but merely supply credit. Compared to other types of bank
loans, syndicated loans are on average larger in volume and issued to bigger borrowers.
Dealscan provides extensive information on syndicated loans at origination, including
loan amount, maturity, and interest, as well as identity of lenders and borrowers. We
restrict our analysis to loans by banks to non-financial firms and consider lending only
by commercial, savings, cooperative and investment banks.4 All data are aggregated at
banks’ and firms’ parent company, consistent with the literature. We keep only lead
arrangers and drop participants from our sample as we are interested in loan supply
conditional on bank expertise in the specific industry. We expect banks to collect soft
information on an industry through repeated interaction with borrowers similar to Boot
(2000). As participants are usually not in direct contact with the borrower they are not
able to collect soft information on the specific industry upon supplying credit; hence,
participants are excluded from the sample.
Our full sample covers the years 1995 to 2010 and is composed of three separate
levels of aggregation. First, we construct data to the bank-firm-quarter level, containing
information on 37,666 firms and 2,001 banks forming a total of 899,098 observations.
Second, we aggregate this data to form 487,098 observations at the bank-industry-quarter
level. Third, we aggregte data to the country-industry-year level consisting of 11,852
4In Dealscan, we include only the lender types Commercial Banks, Finance Companies, Investment
Banks, Mortgage Banks, Thrift/S&L, and Trust Companies. Investment banks constitute 3 % of our
sample and excluding them does not change results. Borrower types included are Corporations, Insurance
Companies, Law Firms, Leasing Companies and Other. See Doerr and Schaz (2019) and Schaz (2019)
for further details on data construction using Dealscan data.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics (bank-firm-level sample)
VARIABLES mean sd min max N
Industry specialization ∈ [0,1] 0.03 0.09 0.00 1.00 899,098
Loan volume ($m) 181.91 313.30 0.07 2,000 899,098
Loan growth % 4.02 1.96 -3.08 7.94 899,098
Banking crisis ∈ {0,1} 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 899,098
Connected countries ∈ {0,1} 0.38 0.48 0.00 1.00 899,098
Note: This table shows summary statistics of variables at the bank-firm-quarter level. Industry specialization is
the relative importance of an industry for a bank (across all countries), defined as the ratio of all credit granted
by bank b to industry i in quarter q relative to bank b’s total credit granted in the same period. Loan volume (in
millions of USD) is the outstanding loan volume by bank b to firm f in quarter q. Loan growth is the quarterly
growth of Loan volume. Banking crisis (BC) is a dummy variable with value one during banking crises in the firm
country. Connected countries is a dummy variable which equals one for all non-crisis countries c′ ( ̸= c), to which
bank b is actively lending in t.
observations. Tables 1, 2 and 3 provide summary statistics of the main variables for all
three levels of data aggregation.
To measure industry specialization of a bank, we construct a variable based on the
relative importance of an industry for a bank by lending volume across all countries. We
define industry specialization as the ratio of all loans granted by bank b to all borrowers
from industry i relative to bank b’s total loans granted in quarter t:
Industry specializationb,i,t =
∑︁F
f=1 loansb,f,i,t∑︁I
i=1
∑︁F
f=1 loansb,f,i,t
, (1)
where F captures the total number of firms with outstanding loan volume from bank b
that belong to industry i at time t. Industries are defined as four-digit Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC) codes as reported in Dealscan. Similarly, I is the total number of
industries i to which bank b has outstanding loan volume at time t. Loansb,f,i,t measures
the total outstanding lending volume (in USD m) from bank b to borrowing firm f from
industry i in t. Industry specializationb,i,t takes values between 0 and 1, where 0 means
absence of lending to industry i, while 1 indicates that all recorded lending by a specific
bank goes industry i at time t. We use this variable both for analysis at the bank-firm-
quarter and at the bank-industry quarter level. Figure 2 plots the left-skewed distribution
of banks’ industry specialization around the mean value of 0.03 at the bank-firm-quarter
level; this distribution shows that banks are highly diversified across industries.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics (bank-industry-level sample)
VARIABLES mean sd min max N
Industry specialization ∈ [0,1] 0.04 0.11 0.00 1.00 487,098
Loan volume ($m) 266.98 490.18 0.07 5,810 487,098
Loan growth % 4.36 1.86 -2.70 8.67 487,098
Banking crisis ∈ {0,1} 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 487,098
Connected countries ∈ {0,1} 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00 487,098
Note: This table shows summary statistics of variables at the bank-industry-quarter level. Industry specialization
is the relative importance of an industry for a bank (across all countries), defined as the ratio of all credit granted
by bank b to industry i in quarter q relative to bank b’s total credit granted in the same period. Loan volume
(in millions of USD) is the outstanding loan volume by bank b to all borrowers of industry i in quarter q. Loan
growth is the quarterly growth of Loan volume. Banking crisis (BC) is a dummy variable with value one during
banking crises in the borrower country. Connected countries is a dummy variable which equals one for all non-crisis
countries c′ ( ̸= c), to which bank b is actively lending in t.
Table 3: Summary Statistics (country-industry-level sample)
VARIABLES mean sd min max N
Loan volume ($m) 4,003.10 17,853.30 0.02 309,260.91 11,852
Loan growth % 5.67 2.02 -0.69 11.41 11,416
Exposure ∈ [0,1] 0.06 0.11 0.00 1.00 11,852
Value added ($m) 87,824.52 214,611.06 0.00 2,080,330 4,773
Number of employees (m) 635.00 1,479.71 1.66 15,828 4,162
Value added growth % 9.93 1.70 5.29 14.33 4,693
Number of emplyees growth % 5.24 1.51 0.69 9.14 4,093
Banking crisis ∈ {0,1} 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00 11,852
Note: This table shows summary statistics of variables at country-industry-year level. Loan volume (in millions
of USD) is loan obtained by industry i in year y. Loan growth is the annual growth of Loan volume. Exposure is
exposure of an industry i to specialized banks in year y. Value added (in millions of $) is country-industry specific
value added. Number of employees (in millions) is country-industry specific number of employees. Value added
growth is annual growth of country-industry specific Value added. Number of employees growth is annual growth
of country-industry specific number of Number of employees. Banking crisis (BC) is a dummy with value one
during banking crises in the borrower country.
For the analysis of real effects we construct data varying at the country-industry-
quarter level for which Table 3 shows summary statistics. For this purpose, we match
aggregate bank lending with data on employment and value added at the industry level
for 31 countries covering around 85 % of our observations in the loan level sample. We
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Figure 2: Distribution of Banks’ Industry Specialization
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Note: This figure shows the histogram of banks’ industry specialization at the bank-firm-quarter level, measured
as the ratio of loans granted by bank b to all borrowers of industry i in time period t relative to bank b’s total
lending granted in the same period.
construct the variable Exposurec,i,t capturing the exposure of industry i in country c to
banks specialized to this industry in quarter t. That is, exposure captures the reliance
on lending from banks that are specialized in the respective industry. In particular,
we weigh the outstanding loan volume from bank b to all borrowers from industry i in
country c with the respective industry specialization value (Industry specializationb,i,y)
of bank b in year y. Then, we divide this weighted loan volume by the total outstanding
loan volume to all borrowers in industry i from country c:
Exposurec,i,y =
∑︁B
b=1 Industry specializationb,i,y · loanb,c,i,y∑︁B
b=1 loanb,c,i,y
, (2)
where B is the total number of banks with outstanding loans to firms in industry
i from country c at year y. Industry specializationb,i,y is defined as above in Equa-
tion (1) and then annualized; loanb,c,i,y measures the total outstanding lending vol-
ume (in USD m) from bank b to all borrowers in industry i from country c at year
y. Exposurec,i,y takes values between 0 and 1, where Exposure = 0 means that firms
from this industry borrow entirely from banks that do not specialize in this industry
(Industry specialization = 0 ∀ B). Higher values of exposure indicates stronger lending
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Figure 3: Distribution of Industries’ Exposure to Specialized
Banks
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Note: This figure shows the histogram of industries’ exposure to specialized bank at the country-industry-year
level. Exposure is measured as the ratio of all credit obtained by industry i from specialized banks in time period
t relative to industry i’s credit obtained from all banks in the same period.
from banks that are specialized to the respective industry. Figure 3 plots the distribution
of exposure across the sample. Most industries are lending from banks that are not very
much specialized in the respective industry, as the left-skewed distribution of exposure
around mean 0.06 suggests.
3 Empirical Methodology
We examine how banks’ industry specialization affects lending during banking crises
in four steps at three levels of aggregation. First, we isolate loan supply from loan
demand on the granular firm-bank-quarter level (loan level) to establish lending to firms.
Second, we analyze bank lending behavior to specialized industries on aggregate at bank-
industry-quarter level. Third, we further aggregate the data to the country-industry-year
level, in order to establish real effects effects on industry-level employment and value
added. Finally, we analyze whether banking crises spill over to other non-crisis countries
through cross-border lending and whether this contagion depends on banks’ industry
specialization.
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3.1 Lending to Firms
Our baseline specification tests how bank industry specialization affects loan volume for
each firm-bank pair. To assess the effect of specialization on loan supply during banking
crises in the borrower country, we interact industry specialization with a banking crisis
dummy:
log(loan)b,f,t = β1BCc,t + β2SPECb,i,t−1 + β3SPECb,i,t−1 ×BCc,t + ϕb,f + θb,t + τf,t + εb,f,t
(3)
The dependent variable is log of total outstanding loan volume by bank b to firm f
in quarter t; banking crisis (BC) is a dummy with value one during banking crises in
the firm country c in quarter t. SPECb,i,t−1 is defined as bank industry specialization
as defined in Equation (1). In order to avoid contemporaneous effects of the banking
crisis on industry specialization, we lag SPEC by one period. ϕb,f denote bank-firm fixed
effects, θb,t bank-time fixed effects and τf,t firm-time fixed effects. We cluster standard
errors on the bank level to account for correlation of firm lending relationships to the
same bank. The coefficients of interest is β3 captures loan supply to firms in specialized
industries compared to firms in non-specialized industries of the bank during crises. The
identifying assumption is that banking crises at the aggregate country level are exogenous
to the granular bank-firm lending decision. Banking crises are times of aggregate scarce
capital and thus β3 captures how this funding shock is transmitted to firms depending
on banks’ industry specialization.
The key identification challenge is to isolate loan supply by absorbing changes in loan
demand. It may well be that banks specialize in certain industries because firms in this
industry are more profitable or crisis resilient. Thus, loan demand by firms in specialized
industries may be higher during banking crises, which affects banks lending decision.
Due to the granularity of our data, we are able to address this challenge. First, firm-
bank fixed effects use the variation within the same firm-bank relationship over time
and thereby control for unobservable and time-invariant bank and firm heterogeneity
(such as location or legal form); firm-bank fixed effects also control for unobservable
time-invariant characteristics at the bank-firm level, such as distance and relationship.
Second, firm-time fixed effects allow shocks to affect each firm differentially at each point
in time. Doing so, we control for unobservable time-varying firm characteristics (for
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example firm profit, risk and managerial quality) to identify loan supply.5 Third, bank-
time fixed effects capture all time-varying unobserved heterogeneity at the bank level,
controlling for idiosyncratic shocks to banks’ total credit supply and other changes at
the bank-time level.
Essentially, we measure the marginal propensity of bank b to lend to firm f that
is part of their specialized industry i rather than to other firms from non-specialized
industries during a crisis. After absorbing any changes in loan demand our estimates
reflect loan supply effects according to the literature that followed Khwaja and Mian
(2008).6
3.2 Lending to Industries
While the previous section identifies loan supply for each bank-firm connection, it is
not clear whether banks shield their specialized industries on aggregate during a crisis.
Instead, banks may keep lending to specific firms within a specialized industry as they
know this industry particularly well. To analyze whether banks actually protect their
specialized industries on aggregate, rather than cherry-picking firms within a special-
ized industry they know best, we now move to the coarser bank-industry-quarter level
estimating following regression equation:
∆ loanb,i,t = γ1BCc,t + γ2SPECb,i,t−1 + γ3SPECb,i,t−1 ×BCc,t + θb,i + τc,i,t + ψb,t + εb,i,t
(4)
The dependent variable ∆ loanb,i,t denotes the log difference of outstanding syndi-
cated loan volume of all firms in industry i borrowing from bank b at quarter t. As
before, the banking crisis dummy BCc,t takes value one during a crisis in firm country c
in quarter t; SPECb,i,t−1 denotes bank b’s industry specialization in industry i at time t
as defined in Equation (1). We lag SPEC by one period in order to avoid contemporane-
ous effects of the banking crisis on industry specialization. We cluster standard errors on
the bank level to account for correlation of firm lending relationships to the same bank
across industries.
5For each firm-year pair, firm-time fixed effects require observations from at least two banks. On the
syndicated loan market, around 97 % of all loans satisfy this condition. The sample selection effect due
to this demanding specification is therefore negligible.
6Further studies identfying loan supply effects using firm-time fixed effects are Jiménez, Ongena,
Peydró and Saurina (2014) and Morais, Peydro and Ruiz Ortega (2019).
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Similar to the loan level, the key identification challenge is to absorb loan demand
in order to interpret results as loan supply. To do so, we estimate variants of regres-
sion Equation (4) employing different combinations of fixed effects. θb,i denote bank
and industry fixed effects to absorb time-invariant characteristics at the bank-industry
level. τc,i,t capture country-industry-time fixed effects in order to absorb time-varying
heterogeneity, such as loan demand, at the industry level. ψb,t are bank-time fixed effects
and capture all time-varying unobserved heterogeneity across banks. For instance, ψb,t
control for idiosyncratic shocks to banks’ total credit supply and other changes at the
bank-time level. The main coefficient of interest, γ3, captures the differential propensity
of bank b to lend to borrowers in their specialized industry i rather than to borrowers
from non-specialized industries during a crisis.
3.3 Real Effects
We investigate whether lending to firms in specialized industries compared to firms in
non-specialized industries during crises has real effects for the economy at the industry
level. The previous steps test whether banks prioritize firms within (bank-firm level)
and the specialized industry itself (bank-industry level). However, firms in industries
that receive less credit during a crisis may able to substitute this fall in lending by
switching banks or resorting to alternative forms of funding. Perfect credit substitution
would, hence, lead to a mere recomposition of firms’ funding side, leaving their effective
financial position untouched. To test for real effects at the industry level, we move the
analysis to the country-industry-year level to match aggregate bank lending with data
on employment and value added at the industry level by country. In order to examine
whether lending to specialized industries leads to real effects to the respective industries,
we estimate following regression:
log(employment)c,i,y = δ1BCc,y + δ2Exposurec,i,y−1
+ δ3BCc,y × Exposurec,i,y−1 + ϕc,i + θc,y + εc,i,y
(5)
The dependent variable is the log of employment (in million) of industry i in country
c at year y. In variants of the specification, we replace the dependent variable by the
log of value added (in million USD) of industry i in country c at year y. Exposurec,i,y−1
captures the reliance of industry i in country c on lending from banks that are specialized
in the respective industry as defined in Equation (2). We lag Exposure by one year in
order to avoid contemporaneous effects of the banking crisis on this metric. To account
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for heterogeneities both across industries and across countries, we exploit the within-
country and within-industry variation by adding industry, country and country-industry
fixed effects respectively (denoted by ϕc,i). Additionally, we address time-varying de-
mand shocks, for example through heterogeneous business cycle developments, by adding
country-year fixed effects (denoted by θc,y). The coefficient of interest is on the interaction
term (BC×Exposure) capturing the differential effect of banking crises on employment,
comparing industries with high reliance on specialized banks with those industries that
borrow instead more from unspecialized banks.
3.4 Spillover Effects
We now turn to the question how banking crises spillover to other countries through
cross-border bank lending and whether industry specialization mutes or amplifies this
effect. We define a spillover effect of a banking crisis country to a third country through
the reduction in lending of a bank that operates in both countries. Suppose a bank
operates both in Poland and Spain and only Poland experiences a banking crisis. To
offset the shock to capital in Poland, the bank may reduce lending to borrowers in Spain
in order to rechannel funds towards Poland, through the banks’ internal capital market,
in order to maintain lending. Therefore, banking crises may spill over to countries that
are themselves unaffected by a banking crisis via a connection to a banking crisis country
through a bank that operates in both markets.
To measure spillover effects we introduce the dummy variable connectedb,c′ ,t, which
equals one for all non-crisis countries c′ ( ̸= c), to which bank b is actively lending in t, iff
at least one other country c, to which bank b is actively lending, experiences a banking
crisis in t. In the spirit of Giroud and Mueller (2015, 2017) the coefficient on connected
shows how lending changes to all connected countries c′ that borrow from bank b, but
do not experience a crisis themselves. To test for spillover effects we run variants of
following regression equation at the bank-firm-quarter level:
Log(Loan)b,f,t = ρ1 BCc,t + ρ2 SPECb,i,t−1 + ρ3 connectedb,c′ ,t + ρ4 SPECb,i,t−1 ×BCc,t+
+ ρ5 connectedb,c′ ,t × SPECb,i,t−1 + ϕb,f + θb,t + τf,t + εf,b,t
(6)
where the dependent variable is the log outstanding loan volume of bank b to firm f
at quarter t as in Equation (3). Following the most demanding specification presented
in the last column of Table 4, we use bank-firm fixed effects to exploit the within-bank-
firm variation in the estimation; bank-time fixed effects are used to absorb bank-level
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loan supply and other time-varying unobservable such as bank b’s size or profitability;
to absorb loan demand, we employ country-industry-time or bank-time fixed effects.
The dummy variable connectedb,c′ ,t, which equals one for all non-crisis countries c′ ̸= c
in which bank b is actively lending to and that do not experience a contemporaneous
banking crisis (BCc′,t ̸= 1), if at least one other active lending country c of bank b
experiences a banking crisis at time t (BCc,t = 1). To analyze the differential impact of
bank specialization on crisis spillover effects, we interact connected with bank’s industry
specialization. The coefficient of interest, ρ5, measures the differential transmission of
lending cuts to specialized industries compared to non-specialized industries in connected
countries without crisis.
4 Main Results
We present the main results in two steps. First, we analyze the loan supply effect of bank’s
industry specialization during banking crises on firms at the bank-firm-year (loan) level.
This allows us to control for unobservable time-varying heterogeneities at the bank-level
and at the firm-level to absorb loan demand. Second, we analyze effects of industry
specialization on banks’ overall industry lending at the bank-industry-quarter level.
Before we move to the regression analysis, Figure 4 shows the stabilizing effect of
bank industry specialization on lending to their main industries during banking crises
using simple sample correlations. The figure plots average loan growth during crisis and
non-crisis times to all borrowers, comparing this effect to banks’ main industries and to
their non-main industries. We define main industries as those industries that make up
for more than 5 % of the lending share in a bank’s loan portfolio as defined in Equation
(1).7 The figure suggests that banks extend more loans to their main industries both
in times of crisis and no crisis. Furthermore, the right panel shows that banks reduce
lending to borrowers from their non-main industries during banking crises. However,
banks maintain lending to firms from their main industry that is similar during crisis
and no crisis times. We now show that this pattern holds in regression analysis.
4.1 Lending to Firms
Table 4 presents results for regression Equation (3) at the bank-firm-quarter (loan) level
and shows that banks maintain higher loan growth to firms in their specialized industries
7As can be seen from Table 1, the mean of banks industry specialization is 0.03 % and using cut-offs
between 3 % and 10 % yields similar graphs.
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Figure 4: Lending by Industry Specialization in Crisis vs. No-
Crisis Times
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Note: This figure shows the difference in loan volume extended to main industries versus non-main industries at
the bank-firm-quarter level; comparing banking crisis versus no banking crisis times. Main industries are defined
as industries that make up for more than 5 % of the lending share in a bank’s loan portfolio as defined in Equation
(1).
relative to firms in less represented industries in their loan portfolio. The dependent
variable is the log outstanding loan volume of bank b to firm f at quarter t. Column
(1) looks at variation within each bank-firm connection through firm-bank fixed effects.
Moreover, bank-time fixed effects absorb unobservable heterogeneity at the bank-level in
all specifications. Thereby, we measure the marginal propensity of bank b to lend to firm
f that is part of their specialized industry i rather than to other firms, which are part
of non-specialized industries. The positive and statistically significant main coefficient of
industry specialization implies that the lending volume to firms within their specialized
industries is larger than for firms in unspecialized industries. The coefficient of interest on
the interaction term (SPECb,i,t ∗ BCc,t) is statistically significant and positive. During
banking crises, increasing industry specialization by one standard deviation increases
loan volume to firms by (0.09× 0.4 =) 3.6 %.
In order to absorb loan demand, column (2) adds country-industry-time fixed effects
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Table 4: Effect of Bank Specialization on Loan Supply to Firms
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES log(loan) log(loan) log(loan)
BC × Industry spec. 0.40*** 0.23* 0.70**
(0.14) (0.13) (0.31)
Banking crisis (BC) -0.02
(0.02)
Industry spec. 1.84*** 1.92*** 2.74***
(0.17) (0.17) (0.32)
Observations 796,033 712,751 270,328
R-squared 0.95 0.96 0.97
Bank*Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Bank*Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Country*Industry*Time FE - Yes -
Firm*Time FE - - Yes
Clustered SE Bank Bank Bank
Note: This table shows regressions on the bank-firm-quarter (loan) level for different levels of cluster-robust
standard errors. The dependent variable is log of total outstanding loan volume by bank b to firm f in quarter
t; Banking crisis (BC) is a dummy with value one during banking crises in the firm country, as defined in
(Laeven2013); Industry specialization is measured as the ratio of loans granted by bank b to all borrowers of
industry i in time period t relative to bank b’s total lending granted in the same period, lagged by one period
(quarter). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
to the specification. The coefficient remains positive and statistically significant. To
ensure that the positive effect is due to marginal loan supply effect to the firm, column
(3) adds more demanding firm-time fixed effects holding the same borrower constant at
time t. The positive effect of lending to firms within the specialized industry compared
to firms outside that industry increases to (0.09 × 0.7 =) 6.3 % during banking crises.
Comparing column (1) with column (3) the coefficient increases after absorbing loan
demand, indicating that loan demand by firms in specialized industries is on average
weaker and less resilient during crises compared to firms from non-main industries.
The tendency of banks to protect their main industries during crises does not de-
pend on unobservable bank-level heterogeneity as we include bank-time fixed effects.
Therefore, any time-varying unobservable variable such as bank b’s average loan supply,
profitability or size will be absorbed. This identification, thus, captures the marginal
propensity of bank b to lend to firm f that lies in a specialized industry rather than to
a firm that is part of a non-specialized industry.
Do banks stabilize lending by increasing lending to firms belonging to specialized
industries or rather by decreasing lending to firms in non-specialized industries, when
capital is scarce during a crisis? To answer this question, we now repeat the estimation
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Table 5: Transmission of Banking Crisis to Main vs. Non-main
Industries
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES log(loan) log(loan) log(loan)
BC X Top ind. spec. -0.02 -0.01 0.05***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
BC X Low ind. spec. -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.07***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Banking crisis (BC) 0.01
(0.02)
Top ind. spec. 0.21*** 0.19*** 0.23***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Low ind. spec. -0.17*** -0.14*** -0.18***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 896,740 811,240 348,496
R-squared 0.95 0.96 0.96
Bank*Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Bank*Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Country*Industry*Time - Yes -
Firm*Time FE - - Yes
Clustered SE Bank Bank Bank
Note: This table shows different effects of lending to firms in main vs. non-main industries on the bank-firm-
quarter (loan) level. The dependent variable is the log of total outstanding loan volume by bank b to firm f
in quarter t; Main (Top) industry is defined as all firms within bank b’s top tercile of industry specialization as
defined in Equation (3), lagged by one period. Non-Main (Bottom) industry is defined as all firms within bank b’s
bottom tercile of industry specialization as defined in Equation (3), lagged by one period. Banking crisis (BC) is
a dummy with value one during banking crises in the borrower country. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
of regression Equation (3) while replacing industry specialization by a dummy for firms
belonging to either their top or bottom terciles of their specialized industries. Column
(1) of Table 5 shows that banks reduce lending to firms within their least specialized
industries by −8 % compared to firms in the middle tercile, during crises. However,
they do not significantly change their lending to firms belonging to their most important
industries during a banking crisis. However, this effect turns significant to 5 % higher
loan volume for firms in their top tercile of industry specialization, once we absorb loan
demand through firm-time fixed effects in column (3). Therefore, these results suggest
that banks reduce lending most to firms part of their least specialized industries; Firms
in their most specialized industries receive, if anything, more lending than firms in their
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Table 6: Effect of Bank Specialization on Lending to Industries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ∆ loan ∆ loan ∆ loan ∆ loan
Banking crisis (BC) -0.01*** -0.02***
(0.00) (0.00)
Industry spec. 0.05*** 0.15*** 0.16*** 0.34***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03)
BC × Industry spec. 0.02*** 0.04*** 0.02** 0.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Observations 422,076 421,213 413,162 412,010
R-squared 0.00 0.02 0.20 0.23
Bank FE Yes - - -
Industry FE Yes - - -
Bank*Industry FE - Yes Yes Yes
Country*Industry*Time FE - - Yes Yes
Bank*Time FE - - - Yes
Clustered SE Bank Bank Bank Bank
Note: This table shows regressions on the bank-industry-quarter level. The dependent variable is log difference
of total outstanding loan volume by bank b to all borrowers in industry i in quarter t; banking crisis (BC) is a
dummy with value one during banking crises in the firm country; Industry specialization is measured as the ratio
of loans granted by bank b to all borrowers of industry i in time period t relative to bank b’s total lending granted
in the same period, lagged by one period (quarter). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
middle tercile during a banking crisis.
To sum up, several robustness tests through a comprehensive set of fixed effects
provide evidence that it is unlikely that the results are driven by individual characteristics
of the banks’, quality of the firms, or bank-firm specific information that they have
collected through previous interactions. Therefore, this suggests that banks shield main-
industry firms from the negative loan supply shock of the banking crisis.
4.2 Lending to Industries
To analyze whether banks actually protect their specialized industries on aggregate,
rather than cherry-picking firms within a specialized industry they know best, we now
move to the coarser bank-industry-quarter level. While the previous section identifies
loan supply for each bank-firm connection, it is not clear whether banks shield their
specialized industries on aggregate during a crisis. Instead, banks may keep lending to
specific firms within a specialized industry as they know this industry particularly well.
Table 6 presents results for regression Equation (4) at the bank-industry-quarter
level highlighting that banks protect their main industries during crises. The dependent
variable is the log difference of bank b’s total lending to industry i at quarter t. For
estimation, column (1) uses the within-bank and within-industry variation through bank
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and industry fixed effects respectively; Column (2) uses the within-bank-firm variation
and thus absorbs variables at the bank-firm level, such as distance. Banks’ loan growth
to specialized industries is higher than to non-specialized industries in normal times,
as indicated by the positive coefficient on industry specialization. During a banking
crisis, banks reduce loan growth to all industries by −2 % on average. However, banks
increase overall lending to their specialized industries during a banking crisis. Inreasing
industry specialization by one standard deviation increases loan volume to industry i by
(0.11× 0.04 =) 0.4 %, during banking crises.
In order to rule out that the effects are not driven by loan demand by heterogeneous
developments of industries across countries, we add country-industry-time fixed effects
in column (3). Due to the aggregation from the bank-firm to the bank-industry level, the
inclusion of bank-time fixed effects is not possible any longer, which reduces the strength
of the loan supply identification. The identifying assumption is now that firms within each
country-industry group change their loan demand similarly during a banking crisis. After
including country-industry-time fixed effects, the coefficient of interest remains positive
and statistically significant. Taken together with results at the bank-firm-time level in
Table 4 it is, thus, unlikely that banks’ lending prioritization of their main industry is
driven by loan demand. In column (4), we control for time-varying heterogeneity at the
bank-level by adding bank-time fixed effects to the regression. The coefficient of interest
on the interaction (SPEC × BC) now remains positive at similar magnitude as in the
previous specifications, but becomes statistically insignificant. This implies that either
the power of the test decreases due to the high amount of variation reduced through
the three layers of fixed effects at this coarse level of aggregation, or, that bank-level
heterogeneity explains the coefficient. However, since the coefficient rises from column
(3) to column (4) in magnitude and, importantly, remains positive, we believe that the
insignificance is due to the reduction in the power of the test.
Overall, the results at both the bank-firm and bank-industry level suggest that banks
protect their main industries during crises. Banks shield both firms within and the
specialized industry itself from the negative loan supply ensuing due to the banking
crisis. Thus, banks transmit the banking crisis by reducing lending to firms that belong
to those industries in which the bank is not specialized in.
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Table 7: Impact of Bank Specialization on Industry Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Log(empl.) Log(empl.) Log(empl.) Log(empl.)
BC X Industry exp. 1.30*** 1.27*** 0.42*** 0.25***
(0.41) (0.41) (0.05) (0.06)
Banking crisis (BC) -0.17*** -0.10 -0.05***
(0.05) (0.08) (0.01)
Industry exposure 0.86*** 0.85*** -0.00 0.02
(0.14) (0.14) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 3,856 3,856 3,847 3,831
R-squared 0.56 0.56 0.99 1.00
Country FE Yes Yes - -
Year FE - Yes Yes -
Country*Industry FE - - Yes Yes
Country*Year FE - - - Yes
Note: This table shows regressions on the country-industry-year (country) level. The dependent variable is the log
employment of industry i in year y; banking crisis (BC) is a dummy with value one during banking crises in the
firm country. Industry exposure is the reliance of an industry i in lending from banks specialized in the respective
industry as defined in Equation (2), and is lagged by one period. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
5 Real Effects
We now analyze whether the positive loan supply effect to firms in specialized industries
compared to firms in non-specialized industries during crises has real effects for the econ-
omy at the industry-level. In the analysis presented in Section 4, we provided evidence
that banks prioritize both firms (bank-firm-level) within and the specialized industry
itself (bank-industry-level). Yet, firms in unspecialized industries may be able to switch
banks or resort to alternative forms of funding in order to mitigate the fall in credit
access. This credit substitution would lead to a mere recomposition of firms’ liability
side and, hence, undo the initial negative loan supply effect to firms in non-specialized
industries. In order to establish a link between lending to specialized industries and real
effects, we now move to the country-industry-year level. We find that industries with
higher exposure to specialized industries have more stable economic outcomes, both in
terms of employment and productivity, than industries with less exposure during crises.
Table 7 shows results for the estimation of regression Equation (5) at the country-
industry-year level. The dependent variable is the log of employment (in million) of
industry i in country c at year y. Column (1) uses the within-country variation through
country fixed effects. Industry wide employment is 17 % lower during banking crises than
in normal times, as the negative coefficient on banking crisis indicates. The coefficient of
interest on the interaction term (BC × Industry Exposure) is positive and statistically
significant across specifications. During banking crises, increasing industry exposure to
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specialized banks by one standard deviation increases employment in industry i by (0.11×
1.30 =) 14.3 %. However, effects may be driven by factors specific to a particular year; so
we add year fixed effects in column (2) to use only the within-year variation. As results
may be driven by heterogeneities both across industries and differently so across countries,
we then add country-industry fixed effects in column (3), to use the within variation of
an industry in a particular country over time. During banking crises, industry wide
employment is now 5 % lower than during normal times. Increasing industry exposure
to specialized banks by one standard deviation increases employment in industry i by
(0.11× 0.42 =) 4.6 % during banking crises.
To remove time-varying demand shocks as some country may experience more stable
economic development during crises than others, we then add country-year fixed effects
in column (4). This removes time-varying differences in economic development consump-
tion and loan demand that may drive employment due to business-cycle movements. We
find that the coefficient of interest becomes smaller but remains positive and statistically
significant. The effect remains economically significant as increasing industry exposure
by one standard deviation increases employment by (0.11× 0.25 =) 2.8 % during bank-
ing crises. Comparing columns (3) and (4), we find evidence that absorbing economic
development and loan demand reduces the coefficient of interest by 40 %. This suggests
that controlling for demand factors is important and not doing so may overestimate
the effect, but that the story cannot be fully explained by heterogeneous economic de-
velopment only. After controlling for loan demand, industries with higher exposure to
specialized banks experience more stable development in employment than industries
with lower exposure to specialized banks during crises.
In Table 8, we look at an additional real economic outcome by repeating the previous
regression for value added. The dependent variable is now the log of value added (in
million USD) of industry i in country c at year y. We repeat the same specifications
used in Table 7 and find that the coefficient of interest remains at similar magnitude and
statistical significance. In column (4), which is the specification that uses the within-
country-industry variation and absorbs business cycle factors at the country-year level we
find that stronger exposure to specialized banks increases industry-wide value added dur-
ing crises. Increasing industry exposure to specialized banks by one standard deviation
increases value added in industry i by (0.11× 0.15 =) 1.7 % during banking crises.
Overall, we provide evidence that a stronger exposure to industries with specialized
industries during crises, has real effects for the economy at the industry-level. Industries
that are borrowing more from banks that are specialized in this particular industry,
experience a more stable economic development, both in terms of employment and value
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Table 8: Impact of Bank Specialization on Industry Value Added
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Log(VA) Log(VA) Log(VA) Log(VA)
BC X Industry exp. 1.25*** 1.40*** 0.22*** 0.15**
(0.36) (0.35) (0.07) (0.07)
Banking crisis (BC) 0.01 -0.20*** -0.10***
(0.05) (0.07) (0.01)
Industry exposure 0.59*** 0.77*** 0.00 0.02
(0.12) (0.12) (0.03) (0.03)
Observations 4,353 4,353 4,347 4,323
R-squared 0.70 0.71 0.99 0.99
Country FE Yes Yes - -
Year FE - Yes Yes -
Country*Industry FE - - Yes Yes
Country*Year FE - - - Yes
Note: This table shows regressions on the country-industry-year (country) level. The dependent variable is log of
value added of industry i in year y; banking crisis (BC) is a dummy with value one during banking crises in the
firm country; Industry exposure is the reliance of an industry i in lending from banks specialized in the respective
industry as defined in Equation (2), and is lagged by one period. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
added, which cushions the negative real effects of the banking crisis on this industry.
6 Spillover Effects
We now turn to the question how banking crises spillover to other non-crisis countries
through cross-border lending and the differential impact of industry specialization on
this spillover effect. We define a spillover effect of a banking crisis country to a non-crisis
country through the reduction in lending of a bank that operates in both countries. To
offset the negative capital shock in the crisis country, a bank may reduce lending from
a non-crisis in order to rechannel funds within the internal bank capital market to the
crisis country, giving rise to contagion.8 We document evidence on spillover effects from
crisis to non-crisis countries through cross-border lending. Moreover, we find that banks
shield firms that belong to their specialized industries from this spillover effect.
Table 9 shows results of estimating regression Equation (6) at the bank-firm-quarter
level. The dependent variable is log outstanding loan volume of bank b to firm f at
8To illustrate the spillover effect, suppose a bank operates both in Poland and Spain where only Poland
is experiencing a banking crisis. To offset the capital shock in Poland, the bank may reduce lending to
Spain in order to rechannel funds towards Poland, through the banks’ internal capital market, in order
to maintain lending.
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Table 9: Spillover Effects to Firms by Bank Specialization
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES log(loan) log(loan) log(loan) log(loan)
CON × Industry spec. 1.63*** 0.72*** 1.50***
(0.23) (0.22) (0.28)
BC × Industry spec. 0.64*** 1.42***
(0.15) (0.31)
Industry spec. 2.64*** 4.35***
(0.18) (0.32)
Connected countries 0.00 -0.07* -0.03 -0.03
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06)
Observations 811,240 811,240 811,240 348,496
R-squared 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96
Bank*Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank*Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country*Industry*Time FE Yes Yes Yes -
Firm*Time FE - - - Yes
Clustered SE Bank Bank Bank Bank
Note: This table shows spillover effects on the bank-firm-quarter (loan) level for different levels of cluster-robust
standard errors. The dependent variable is log of total outstanding loan volume by bank b to firm f in quarter
t; Banking crisis (BC) is a dummy with value one during banking crises in the firm country, as defined in
(Laeven2013); Industry specialization is measured as the ratio of loans granted by bank b to all borrowers of
industry i in time period t relative to bank b’s total lending granted in the same period, lagged by one period
(quarter). Connected countries is a dummy variable which equals one for all non-crisis countries c′ ( ̸= c), to which
bank b is actively lending in t. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
quarter t. In columns (1)− (3) we employ bank-firm fixed effects to use the within-bank-
firm variation in the estimation. Moreover, we add bank-time fixed effects are used to
absorb time-varying unobservable factors at the bank level such as the bank’s total loan
supply, profitability or size. In order to absorb loan demand, we implement firm-time
fixed effects similar to column (2) in Table 4 similar to Khwaja and Mian (2008). In
column (2), we find evidence for spillover effects as banks that operate in a country that
experience a banking crisis reduce loan supply to firms in connected non-crisis countries
by 7 %. The coefficient of interest on the interaction term (connected×SPEC) is positive
and statistically significant. Increasing industry specialization by one standard deviation
increases loan volume to firms by (0.09×1.63) = 14.7 % and therefore mitigates spillover
effects to the connected country. After horse-racing this coefficient with the interaction
effect between banking crisis and industry specialization in column (3), this effect reduces
by half to (0.09 × 0.72) = 6.5 %. Results are robust to the absorption of loan demand
through firm-time fixed effects as reported in column (4).
Next, we examine whether banking crises spill over to entire industries and whether
banks transmit such a contagion differentially to their specialized industries. Table 10
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reports results of estimating the regression at the bank-industry-quarter level. The de-
pendent variable is the log difference of bank b’s total lending to industry i at quarter
t. Column (2) shows that banks reduce loan growth to all industries that are in a
borrower country that experiences a banking crisis by 2 %. Additionally, we find evi-
dence for contagion effects as banks reduce lending to industries that are in connected
non-crisis countries by 1 %. This suggests that banking crises spill over to industries in
non-crisis countries through banks operating in both countries. However, banks transmit
this spillover effect less to those industries in which they are specialized, as indicated by
the positive interaction term (connected × SPEC). For connected countries prone to
crisis contagion, increasing industry specialization by one standard deviation increases
loan growth to industry i by (0.11 × 0.14 =) 1.5 %. Thus, this is economically signifi-
cant as the increase in industry specialization by one standard deviation fully undoes the
spillover effect to the connected industry. Similar to the regression at the bank-firm level,
horse-racing this coefficient with the interaction effect between banking crisis and indus-
try specialization in column (3), the effect reduces to (0.11 × 0.07 =) 0.8 % remaining
positive and statistically significant.
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Table 10: Spillover Effects to Industries by Bank Specialization
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES ∆ loan ∆ loan ∆ loan
CON × Industry spec. 0.14*** 0.07***
(0.02) (0.02)
BC × Industry spec. 0.04*
(0.02)
Banking crisis (BC) -0.01*** -0.02*** -0.02***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Industry spec. 0.31***
(0.03)
Connected (CON) -0.01 -0.01** -0.01*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Observations 420,334 420,334 420,334
R-squared 0.05 0.05 0.05
Bank*Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Bank*Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE Bank Bank Bank
Note: This table shows regressions on the bank-industry-quarter level. The dependent variable is log of total
outstanding loan volume by bank b to firm f in quarter t; banking crisis (BC) is a dummy with value one during
banking crises in the firm country, as defined in (Laeven2013); Industry specialization is measured as the ratio of
loans granted by bank b to all borrowers of industry i in time period t relative to bank b’s total lending granted
in the same period, lagged by one period (quarter). Connected countries is a dummy variable which
uals one for all non-crisis countries c′ ( ̸= c), to which bank b is actively lending in t. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
To sum up, we find that banking crises spill over to other non-crisis countries through
cross-border lending. We document that banks reduce lending both to specific borrowers
and entire industries in non-crisis countries in response to a banking crisis in one of their
active countries. Moreover, banks shield their main industries from this spillover effect
as they reduce lending less to those connected industries in which they are specialized
in. As a result, industries with lower presence of specialized banks are more prone to
banking crisis contagion operating through cross-border lending.
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7 Robustness
Figure 5: Bank Industry Specialization vs. Geographic Diversi-
fication
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Note: This figure shows the relationship between bank industry specialization and bank geographic diversification,
by plotting their mean values on the bank level. The blue dashed line is a linear fit. Geographic diversification is
defined as banks loan portfolio diversification across borrower countries as in Doerr and Schaz (2019). Industry
specialization is defined as banks share of loans issued to borrowers of an industry.
A potential source of omitted variable bias arises from alternative measures of bank’s
portfolio that could potentially be related to industry specialization. For example, Doerr
and Schaz (2019) document that bank lending during crises can be explained by geo-
graphic diversification of banks, that is, their diversification of lending across multiple
borrower countries. It may be that industry specialization and geographic diversification
are correlated and that one dimension of a banks business model explains the other. Fig-
ure 5 illustrates the relatip between geographic diversification and industry specialization
in a scatter plot. The linear fit shows that there is a weak negative correlation between
industry specialization and geographic diversification of −0.11. However, this correlation
is not statistically different from zero. For illustration, this suggests that a bank may
be highly geographically diversified, that is, it lends to multiple borrower countries and
at the same time highly specialized in one industry, lending to borrowers of the same
industry in multiple countries; scoring high on geographic diversification and high on
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Table 11: Banks’ Industry Specialization vs. Geographic Diver-
sification
(1) (2)
VARIABLES log(loan) log(loan)
BC × Industry spec. 0.47***
(0.06)
Industry spec. 2.61***
(0.06)
BC × DIV 0.15*** 0.17***
(0.03) (0.03)
Banking crisis (BC) -0.06*** -0.08***
(0.02) (0.02)
Observations 795,352 795,352
R-squared 0.95 0.95
Bank*Firm FE Yes Yes
Bank*Time FE Yes Yes
Clustered SE Bank Bank
Note: This table shows regressions on the bank-firm-quarter (loan) level. The dependent variable is log of total
outstanding loan volume by bank b to firm f in quarter t; banking crisis (BC) is a dummy with value one during
banking crises in the firm country, as defined in (Laeven2013); Industry specialization is measured as the ratio of
loans granted by bank b to all borrowers of industry i in time period t relative to bank b’s total lending granted
in the same period, lagged by one period (quarter). Geographic diversification (DIV) is defined as banks loan
portfolio diversification across borrower countries as in Doerr and Schaz (2019), lagged by one period. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1
industry specialization. Contrastingly, a bank may be geographically diversified and at
the same time diversified across multiple industries, thereby scoring high on geographic
diversification and low on industry specialization. This is suggestive evidence that geo-
graphic diversification and industry specialization capture different dimensions of banks’
business model as they are uncorrelated.
Table 11 tests whether industry specialization can be explained by geographic diversi-
fication. In column (1), we find that geographic diversification is positive and significant
during banking crises. Moreover, column (2) compares the two coefficients of the interac-
tion terms between industry specialization with banking crises and geographic diversifica-
tion with banking crises. Results show that coefficients of both geographic diversification
and industry specialization remain positive and statistically significant during banking
crises. Overall, this provides evidence that lending behaviour by industry specialization
during crises cannot be explained by banks’ geographic diversification.
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8 Conclusion
We conduct a comprehensive analysis of banks industry-specific lending strategies when
faced with a banking crisis in a borrower country. We construct a metric to categorize
banks according to the industry specialization of their international loan portfolio. For
a large sample of cross-country syndicated loans, we find that banks that specialize in
certain industries are a resilient source of financing for firms in those industries that ex-
perience a countrywide financial crisis. Specialized banks not only stabilize loan supply
within affected countries, but also mute spillover effects of the crisis to non-crisis markets.
Banks mute the negative supply shock to their main industries by 6.3 % within crisis
countries, and by 2.8 % to their main industries in connected non-crisis countries. De-
tailed loan-level data ensure identification through time-varying fixed effects on the firm
level; Robustness tests show that it is unlikely that the results are driven by individual
characteristics of the banks’, quality of the firms, or bank-firm specific information that
they have collected through previous interactions.
Our results indicate the positive aspect of lending concentration during crisis times
and contribute to the debate on the costs and benefits of banks’ portfolio concentration,
by revealing the potentially beneficial impact of portfolio concentration, i.e. industry
specialization, on firm loan supply. Our results suggest that specialization of banks’
portfolio in one industry increases the resilience of those industries in times of domestic
financial crises as well as shields these specialized industries in times of foreign financial
crises from cross-border contagion.
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Chapter III
The Real Effects of Financial
Protectionism
Based on Schaz (2019).
1 Introduction
The collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 and the subsequent euro area crisis were followed
by a sharp decline in banking integration. Throughout Europe, national policy makers
stepped up to help their ailing banks with unprecedented government support. In spite
of these attempts to stabilize the banking sector in order to prop up the economy, Europe
is looking back on a decade of low growth, low investment, a slow recovery to jobs and
cross-border bank flows on the decline.1
In this paper, I provide novel evidence on financial protectionism and its real effects
on firms using data on almost the entire European banking sector. I define financial
protectionism as a change in the preferences of domestic banks, induced by government
support that leads them to discriminate against foreign firms.2 According to anecdotal
evidence on financial protectionism, the six French bailout banks committed to maintain
domestic lending at a growth rate of 3− 4 %, in return for receiving government support
(Woll, 2014, p. 117). To examine financial protectionism empirically, I extend the UK
setting in Rose and Wieladek (2014) to all 28 EU countries capturing more than 500
banks. Additionally, I observe changes in political connections, such as a transfer of
control rights to uncover the mechanism of financial protectionism. Moreover, I use
1For evidence on the decline of cross-border bank flows see Cerutti and Claessens (2016); Bremus and
Fratzscher (2015); Bussière, Schmidt and Valla (2018); Emter, Schmitz and Tirpák (2016); European
Central Bank (2017)
2This definition was proposed by Rose and Wieladek (2014).
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bank-firm relationships to identify loan supply and test for real effects at the firm level
working through a distortion of credit allocation.
I find that bailout banks increase home bias in lending more than non-bailout banks.
Moreover, this increase in home bias is primarily driven by a reduction in foreign lending.
In particular, banks increase their home bias by 24.6 % following a bailout from their
home government. On the intensive margin, bailout banks increase lending volume to
home relative to foreign borrowers by 30.4 % more than non-bailout banks. This lower
cross-border loan supply has significant real effects on the performance of foreign firms.
Firms at the 90th percentile in terms of dependence on foreign banks affected by a bailout
have 6.5 % lower loan growth, relative to firms at the 10th percentile. I find that firms
are not able to substitute this reduced access to cross-border lending by other forms
of funding, such as non-syndicated loans or corporate bonds. Hence, reduced access to
cross-border loans paired with imperfect credit substitution translates into weaker sales
(−3.5 %) and employment (−3 %) growth of firms with stronger dependence on foreign
bailout banks. In contrast, having a stronger relationship with home banks affected by a
bailout has no significant effect on average loan growth or firm performance. Moreover,
I document that government support for banks distorts credit allocation by providing
more lending to larger, safer and less innovative firms in the protected home market.
These findings suggest that government support for banks has discouraged international
economic activity, distorted credit towards less productive firms and was harmful to both
economic growth and employment.
I provide evidence that governments engage in financial protectionism and that the
mechanism operates through a transfer of control rights from bank to government. Re-
sults show that preferential lending for home borrowers is strongest when the recapi-
talization funds of the bailout come in conjunction with a shift of control rights from
bank to government. In contrast, bailout banks that receive a recapitalization without
a change in control rights do not significantly change their loan mix. This suggests that
politicians gain novel influence over bank lending through a transfer of control rights from
the bank to the government as part of the bailout.3 Thus, these findings suggest that
governments persuade banks to redirect loan supply towards the home market in return
for the bailout, in line with the financial protectionism hypothesis (Rose and Wieladek,
2014).
3The importance of political connections for bank bailouts has been shown in Duchin and Sosyura
(2012); Chavaz (2016), while Bertrand, Kramarz, Schoar and Thesmar (2018); Goldman, Rocholl and
So (2013, 2009); Cheung, Jing, Rau and Stouraitis (2017) highlight importance of political connections
more generally. For evidence on home bias and moral suasion in a different market, that is, the market
for government bonds see Acharya and Steffen (2015).
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The data spans the period from 2000 through 2015, capturing 66 banks that received
government support during the Great Financial Crisis. I consider three types of govern-
ment support for banks: nationalizations, recapitalizations and other (that is, unusual
access to liquidity) using data from the European Commission State aid Cases. More-
over, I apply a time-varying ownership correction of more than 2,100 bank subsidiaries
to aggregate lending at the bank holding level.4 This data captures reallocation of credit
across countries through subsidiaries using the internal capital market of the bank hold-
ing entity. Moreover, I add balance sheet data for both firms and banks, by merging the
firm-bank relationship data in Dealscan with Compustat and Bankscope. This informa-
tion in combination with the granular loan level data allows overcoming challenges to
identification common in the literature.5
The first identification challenge to establishing loan supply effects is to address firm
heterogeneity. The concern is that changes in firm’s demand for loans over time may
bias the results on bank lending. While this issue cannot be addressed with aggregated
data, disaggregated data allows to overcome this. To address the trade-off between
identification and external validity, I absorb loan demand at three distinct levels of
aggregation. First, I construct a bank-borrower country panel that allows for inclusion
of borrower-country-time fixed effects to absorb time-varying changes in loan demand in
each borrower country.6 Second, I move to the firm level where I include firm country-
industry-time fixed effects. I use firm fixed effects to base inference on the within firm
variation and additionally control for size, performance, leverage and liquidity to capture
time-varying firm heterogeneity. Third, I move to the granular bank-firm level to employ
firm-time fixed effects. By comparing the lending behavior of bailout and non-bailout
banks to the same borrower, I address the concern that differences in loan demand biases
the results on bank lending. The negative effect on foreign lending by bailout banks
hence reflects loan supply.
The second identification challenge is a likely selection bias into bailout and non-
bailout banks. Indeed, bailout and non-bailout banks differ ex-ante in terms of size, global
footprint and capitalization. Hence, I address selection bias into bailout and non-bailout
banks by implementing propensity score matching on bank observables. After matching
bailout and non-bailout banks along their home country, year, total assets, leverage,
tier 1 capital ratio, liquidity risk, non-performing loans, return on assets, globalness
4I hand-construct the time-varying ownership aggregation as in Schwert (2018).
5For a discussion on the common identification challenges on identifying loan supply see Khwaja and
Mian (2008); Jiménez, Atif, Peydro and Saurina Salas (2012); Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró and Saurina
(2014); Morais, Peydro and Ruiz Ortega (2019).
6This specification follows the research design in Giannetti and Laeven (2012)
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and political connections – bailouts continue to be associated with a sizable increase
in the home bias of lending. Moreover, I test whether bank business models are a
potential source of omitted variable bias for bailouts. In particular, both banks with
higher geographic diversification and higher industry specialization of their loan portfolio
are found to be more stable sources of lending during banking crises, which could in
turn affect governments’ bailout decisions ex-ante (Doerr and Schaz, 2019; Boskovic,
Doerr and Schaz, 2019). I find that neither banks’ geographic diversification nor banks’
industry specialization increase the bailout proability of banks. Hence, these findings
mitigate doubts on omitted variable bias stemming from banks business models.
An alternative explanation is that the reduction in foreign lending following a bailout
merely reflects a flight home effect common to all foreign banks (De Haas and Van
Horen, 2013). Indeed, I find evidence on a flight home effect across all foreign banks.
However, the cross-border loan retrenchment by foreign bailout banks is twice as strong
as for foreign non-bailout banks. While this supports the findings in Giannetti and
Laeven (2012), it also implies that the flight home effect cannot fully explain the observed
contraction in cross-border lending.
This paper contributes to the discussion on the drivers of financial disintegration and
the ongoing policy debate on designing the European Banking Union.7 The results point
to the importance of a consistent framework for bank resolution and bank supervision
within an economic union. Bank resolution at the national level leads to pro-cyclical
banking integration that harms financial stability. In this framework, national policy-
makers are incentivized to persuade their banks to protect the local economy causing
a welfare loss through the destruction of cross-border bank-firm relationships. Impor-
tantly, the cross-border bank retrenchment associated with financial protectionism leads
to a capital misallocation that harms both economic growth and employment in the
European Union.
2 Data & Empirical Strategy
2.1 Data
I capture lending of almost the entire European banking sector operating on Dealscan
during the period from 2000 to 2015. The sample consists of 529 bank holdings head-
quartered in 28 EU countries. I include all banks with a mean lending volume of larger
7For a discussion on retrenchment in financial integration since the Global Financial Crisis see
Claessens (2017); Bremus and Neugebauer (2018b).
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than 22m USD focusing on lending by commercial banks. Banks are then aggregated at
the parent level applying a time-varying ownership correction of each subsidiary during
the sample period. I hand-correct changes in the ownership from 2,199 subsidiaries using
information on ownership changes from company websites, Bankscope and newspaper
articles.8 Then, I merge the lending banks from Dealscan with Bankscope to add bal-
ance sheet information, accounting for time-varying ownership changes throughout the
sample.9
To construct lending relationships between banks and firms, I use data on syndicated
loans from Dealscan. The syndicated loan market accounts for a significant share of total
lending. Around one-third of total international lending is done through the syndicated
loan market (Gadanecz and von Kleist, 2002) and it is an important source of financing
in both developed and emerging economies (Cerutti, Hale and Minoiu, 2015). Syndi-
cated loans are issued jointly by a group of banks to a single borrower. The lending
syndicate includes at least one lead bank and usually further participant banks. Lead
banks negotiate terms and conditions of deals, perform due diligence, and organize par-
ticipants. Therefore, lead arrangers stand in direct contact with the borrower and retain
larger loan shares for signaling purposes (Saleem Ramadan, 2013). Participants are usu-
ally not in direct contact with the borrower, but merely supply credit. Compared to
other types of bank loans, syndicated loans are on average larger in volume and issued
to bigger borrowers. I restrict the sample to loans by banks to non-financial firms and
consider lending only by commercial, savings, cooperative and investment banks.10 I
consider both lending by lead arrangers and participants to capture total loan supply on
the syndicated loan market.
Bailout data is hand-collected using the State aid Cases provided by the European
Commission.11 I classify bailouts into three types: nationalization, recapitalization and
other (e.g. unusual access to liquidity). Each type is constructed as time-varying dum-
mies that take value one for periods in which the state intervention is active. Therefore,
the unit of variation is the bank-bailout country-year level. Start and end dates are
8For the time-varying ownership correction I follow Schwert (2018) who presented this correction for
the US and apply it to the European banking sector.
9For more information on the syndicated loan market’s institutional setting see Berg, Saunders and
Steffen (2016).
10In Dealscan, I include only the lender types Commercial Banks, Finance Companies, Investment
Banks, Mortgage Banks, Thrift/S&L, and Trust Companies. Investment banks constitute 3 % of our
sample and excluding them does not change results. Borrower types included are Corporations, Insurance
Companies, Law Firms, Leasing Companies and Other. See Doerr and Schaz (2019) for further details
on data construction using Dealscan data.
11The data can be downloaded here: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?
clear=1&policy_area_id=3
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drawn from the State aid Cases. In case of unknown end dates, the nationalizations will
take value one for the full sample period. In case of recapitalizations, I impute the end
dates using the average duration of recapitalizations in the sample with known end dates.
In addition, I construct the continuous variable ’recapitalization amount’ where the full
recapitalization amount is spread uniformly across all periods in which the bailout is
active. Consecutive interventions are aggregated.
Table 1: Summary Statistics (bank-level sample)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
ln(Total assets) 16.688 2.178 10.597 21.965 3395
Total lending in bn USD 8.196 32.91 0 625.198 5229
Leverage in % 91.962 7.744 5.073 100 3389
Tier 1 ratio in % 12.223 6.487 2.02 100 2240
Liquidity risk in % 1.197 3.107 0 90.031 3185
Non-performing loans in % 7.179 9.045 0 95.828 2216
Political Connections ∈ {0, 1} 0.4 0.49 0 1 5321
Home share in % 58.285 41.442 0 100 5321
Globalness ∈ [1,∞] 9.827 17.993 1 94 5321
Note: This table shows summary statistics of variables at the bank-year-level. Total lendingb,t (in bn
USD) is bank b’s total outstanding lending volume on the syndicated loan market in year t. Leverageb,t
is bank b’s leverage in year t. Tier 1 ratiob,t is bank b’s tier 1 capital ratio in year t. Liquidity riskb,t
is the ratio of total loans to deposits plus short-term liability claims. Non-performing loansb,t is the
ratio of non-performing loans (NPL) to total loans (including syndicated and non-syndicated lending).
Political Connectionsb,t is a dummy with value one if the home government has a positive ownership
share in bank b. Home shareb,t is bank b’s ratio of home loans to total loans on the syndicated loan
market. Globalnessb,t is defined as bank b’s number of active borrower countries on the syndicated loan
market in year t.
I obtain balance sheet data of banks by merging lenders active in Dealscan with
Bankscope. Overall, I am able to match 466 non-bailout banks and 66 bailout banks
in the sample. Summary statistics for the bank-level sample are displayed in Table
1. The average bank has an outstanding loan volume of 8.2 bn USD, a leverage of
92 % and is active in 10 borrower countries. Table 2 splits the sample into bailout and
non-bailout banks and shows that these two groups are quite heterogeneous. Bailout
banks are on average larger, are more leveraged, have more non-performing loans, more
political connections12 and a stronger global footprint. This highlights the importance
12Measured as government bank ownership compiled from Bankscope
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of addressing this heterogeneity in the identification strategy in order to reduce the
likelihood that results are driven by omitted factors that are specific to bailout banks
vis-a-vis non-bailout banks.
Table 2: Bailout vs. Non-Bailout Banks (bank-level sample)
Bailout Banks Non-Bailout Banks Mean Diff
mean sd mean sd t
ln(Total assets) 18.24 (1.70) 16.56 (2.16) -12.16
Total lending in bn USD 33.63 (63.29) 6.74 (29.61) -13.63
Leverage in % 93.77 (4.39) 91.81 (7.94) -3.90
Tier 1 ratio in % 11.96 (4.39) 12.25 (6.66) 0.60
Liquidity risk in % 0.96 (0.66) 1.22 (3.23) 1.29
Non-performing loans in % 12.81 (12.56) 6.54 (8.32) -10.10
Political Connections ∈ {0, 1} 0.58 (0.49) 0.39 (0.49) -6.37
Home share in % 46.24 (37.42) 58.98 (41.56) 5.11
Globalness ∈ [1,∞] 25.44 (27.81) 8.92 (16.82) -15.57
Note: This table shows summary statistics for bailout and non-bailout banks separately for variables at
the bank-year-level. There are a total of 66 bailout banks and 466 non-bailout banks. Total lendingb,t (in
bn USD) is bank b’s total outstanding lending volume on the syndicated loan market in year t. Leverageb,t
is bank b’s leverage in year t. Tier 1 ratiob,t is bank b’s tier 1 capital ratio in year t. Liquidity riskb,t
is the ratio of total loans to deposits plus short-term liability claims. Non-performing loansb,t is the
ratio of non-performing loans (NPL) to total loans (including syndicated and non-syndicated lending).
Political Connectionsb,t is a dummy with value one if the home government has a positive ownership
share in bank b. Home shareb,t is bank b’s ratio of home loans to total loans on the syndicated loan
market. Globalnessb,t is defined as bank b’s number of active borrower countries on the syndicated loan
market in year t.
Bank-borrower country level I construct the bank-borrower country level from data
on syndicated lending. First, I decompose syndicated loan deals into loan portions pro-
vided by each lender to obtain granular credit level data. Whenever Dealscan provides
information on lending shares of each bank, I use this information to split loan volume
accordingly (available for 28 % of the deals).13 In cases where lending shares are missing
I split loan volume on a pro-rata basis among all banks in a syndicate.14 Transactions
with deal status ‘canceled’, ‘suspended’, or ‘rumor’ are removed and all loan nominations
13See Giannetti and Laeven (2012); De Haas and Van Horen (2013)
14In the sub-case of partial information on loan shares, I first use the available information to allocate
loan shares. Then, I split the remaining amount equally among banks with missing information. If the
sum of the allocation rule is larger than 110 % I consider this an erroneous entry and treat it as if lending
share information was not available in the first place.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics (bank-borrower country-level sam-
ple)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
ln(Loan volume) 4.634 1.86 0.224 10.471 51272
Lending bias ∈ [−1, 1] 0.159 0.657 -0.986 0.999 51281
ln(Total assets) 18.928 1.858 12.354 21.965 33379
Leverage in % 94.281 4.943 16.029 100 33650
Tier 1 ratio in % 11.822 9.415 3.4 100 27558
Liquidity risk in % 1.172 3.191 0 90.031 30927
Non-performing loans in % 5.564 5.492 0.129 45.176 25607
Bailout ∈ {0, 1} 0.142 0.349 0 1 52289
Control Rights Transfer ∈ {0, 1} 0.036 0.187 0 1 52289
Political Connections ∈ {0, 1} 0.368 0.482 0 1 52289
Globalness ∈ [1,∞] 42.766 27.394 1 94 52289
Note: This table shows summary statistics of variables at the bank-borrower country-year-level.
ln(Loan volume)b,j,t is the log of bank b’s outstanding lending volume to all borrowers in country j
on the syndicated loan market in year t. Lending biasb,j,t is the lending bias of bank b to all borrowers
from country j at time t as defined in Section 2. Leverageb,t is bank b’s leverage in year t. Tier 1 ratiob,t
is bank b’s tier 1 capital ratio in year t. Liquidity riskb,t is the ratio of total loans to deposits plus
short-term liability claims. Non-performing loansb,t is the ratio of non-performing loans (NPL) to total
loans (including syndicated and non-syndicated lending). Bailoutb,t is a dummy with value one if bank
b receives a bailout in year t. Control Rights Transferb,t is a dummy with value one if the bailout of
bank b is a nationalization. Political Connectionsb,t is a dummy with value one if the home government
has a positive ownership share in bank b. Globalnessb,t is defined as bank b’s number of active borrower
countries on the syndicated loan market in year t.
transformed into million U.S. Dollars (USD) using the spot exchange rate at origination,
provided by Dealscan. If after this allocation procedure the loan portion is smaller than
10,000 USD, I drop the observation to remove erroneously small loans (0.6 % of observa-
tions). Next, I use the loan portions to construct each bank’s outstanding loan volume as
a stock variable to proxy the loan’s entry on the loan book (Morais, Peydro and Ruiz Or-
tega, 2019). Each outstanding loan remains active until the end of its maturity. Second, I
aggregate all outstanding loan portions between a bank-firm combination to obtain bank
b’s outstanding loan volume to firm f in year t, forming a bank-firm-year observation.
Third, I aggregate all bank-firm-year observations by firm (borrower) country to obtain
the bank-borrower country-year level as in Giannetti and Laeven (2012). Thus, I obtain
each bank b’s log outstanding lending volume to all borrowers of country j (volumeb,j,t).
Table 3 shows summary statistics at the bank-borrower country-level.
I construct a bias metric to take into account that time-varying differences in the
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borrower countries’ market sizes may drive changes in bank lending shares. This bias
metric captures the lending bias of bank b to all borrowers from country j at time t.
Following Bremus and Fratzscher (2015), I adopt the bilateral bias definition to the
bank-borrower country level:
biasb,j,t =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
sb,j,t−wj,t
wj,t
if sb,j,t ≤ wj,t
sb,j,t−wj,t
sb,j,t
if sb,j,t > wj,t,
(1)
bounding the bias between [−1, 1] as in Bremus and Fratzscher (2015) in order to
avoid outliers to drive results. Where sb,j,t denotes bank b’s lending share to all borrowers
of country j, and wj,t is the market share of country j in the global syndicated lending
market. All shares are time-varying at annual frequency denoted with t. Intuitively,
a bias value of larger than zero implies that bank b’s share in market j is larger than
market j’s share in the total syndicated loan market. Thus, positive (negative) values of
biasb,j,t imply a positive (negative) bias to borrowers in the respective country, relative
to the market size of this country.15
Firm level In order to analyze the effects of loan supply on firm (borrower) perfor-
mance, I add firm balance sheet information to the data constructing a firm-year level.
To do so, I first aggregate the firm-bank-year loan data to the firm-year level to obtain
firms’ lending relationships. Second, I match firms (borrowers) in Dealscan with firms
in Compustat (Global and US) using the linking file used in Chava and Roberts (2008)
and updated as of April 2018. Overall, I am able to match 8,205 firms (33 % of all firms)
borrowing from 463 banks (161,645 firm-year observations). Summary statistics at the
firm-level are shown in Table 4. This linking exercise gives rise to a selection bias into
larger firms that are less financially constrained. Thus, I expect this selection bias to
render the estimates of the real effects to become more conservative. The reason being
that the effect of a negative loan supply shock on firm performance is found to be larger
for smaller firms with less financial leeway in previous studies (Cohen and Pascaline,
1997).
To measure firms’ relationships with banks that differ in the two dimensions of in-
terest – nationality and bailout treatment – I construct three variables. These variables
capture the differential lending effects by the four bank types on firm outcomes. First,
foreign affected measures a firms relationship with foreign banks that are affected by a
15Note, that due to this normalization between [−1, 1], the mean bias is ̸= 0 in Table 3.
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Table 4: Summary Statistics (firm-level sample)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Foreign affected ∈ [0, 1] 0.151 0.295 0 1 161645
Foreign unaffected ∈ [0, 1] 0.631 0.413 0 1 161645
Home affected ∈ [0, 1] 0.037 0.142 0 1 161645
∆ loan volume 0.02 0.327 -1.535 5.109 132931
∆ long-term debt 0.075 0.554 -3.03 3.034 53146
∆ sales 0.07 0.201 -1.545 1.093 53311
∆ employment 0.031 0.168 -0.865 0.87 44844
ln(Total assets) 8.433 2.032 3.516 16.381 57394
Leverage in % 32.943 19.464 0 135.108 57648
ln(Sales) 7.993 2.235 -5.116 23.464 56449
Liquidity in % 0.001 2.968 -464.512 94.8 54925
ln(Common equity) 7.395 2.254 -4.51 22.548 55601
Note: This table shows summary statistics of variables at the firm-year-level. foreign affectedf,t−1 is
the share of firm f ’s outstanding loan volume coming from foreign banks affected by a bailout at t.
foreign unaffectedf,t−1 is the share of loans coming from banks unaffected by a bailout. home affectedf,t−1
is the share of firm f ’s outstanding loan volume coming from home banks that received by a bailout at
t. ∆loan volumef,t is the log difference of firm f ’s total borrowing on the syndicated loan market.
∆long-term debtf,t, ∆salesf,t and ∆employmentf,t is the log difference of firm f ’s long-term debt, sales
and employment respectively. ∆Liquidityf,t (in %) is the ratio of firm f ’s cash flows over total assets.
bailout. Intuitively, a high value of foreign affected implies that a firm borrows a lot from
foreign banks that receive a bailout. I construct this metric as the share of loans coming
from banks that are affected by a bailout at t (BOb,t = 1) and are foreign relative to the
firm’s nationality by headquarter (foreignb = 1):
foreign affectedf,t =
∑︁
∀b loanf,b,t ·BOb,t · foreignb∑︁
∀b loanf,b,t
(2)
Intuitively, foreign affected = 1 implies that a firm borrows exclusively from foreign
banks that are all affected by a bailout. While a firm with foreign affected = 0 has no
relationship with a bank that is affected by a bailout at time t. Therefore, higher values
of foreign affected imply a stronger relationship of a firm with foreign banks that are
affected by a bailout. The average firm has 15.1 % of loans outstanding from foreign
bailout banks, as can be seen from Table 4.
foreign unaffectedf,t =
∑︁
∀b loanf,b,t ·NOBOb,t · foreignb∑︁
∀b loanf,b,t
(3)
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Table 5: Summary Statistics (bank-firm-level sample)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
ln(Loan volume) 3.771 1.35 0.122 7.045
Foreign ∈ {0, 1} 0.768 0.422 0 1
Bailout ∈ {0, 1} 0.184 0.387 0 1
N 563199
Note: This table shows summary statistics of variables at the bank-firm-year-level (or loan-level).
ln(Loan volume)b,f,t is log of bank b’s outstanding lending volume to borrower f in year t. Foreignf,t is a
dummy with value one if firm f ’s nationality is different from bank b, by headquarter location. Bailoutb,t
is a dummy with value one if bank b receives a bailout in year t.
Second, foreign unaffected captures firms’ relationships with foreign banks that are
unaffected by a bailout. Third, home affected measures firms’ relationships with banks
from its home country that receive a bailout from the home government. Respectively, I
weigh a firm f ’s outstanding loan volume by the bank dummies foreign (foreignb = 1),
affected (BOb,t = 1) and unaffected (NOBOb,t = 1):
home affectedf,t =
∑︁
∀b loanf,b,t ·BOb,t · homeb∑︁
∀b loanf,b,t
(4)
The relationship between Equation (2) and (4) is that they split a firms’ relationships
with bailout banks into home and foreign. Table 4 shows that the average firm has 63.1 %
of loans outstanding from foreign non-bailout banks and 3.7 % from home bailout banks.
The remaining fourth variable capturing a firms’ relationship with home non-bailout
banks is omitted and will be the control group in the regression analysis.
2.2 Empirical Strategy
Bank-borrower country level According to the financial protectionism hypothesis,
banks are persuaded by the national government to shift lending towards the home market
in return for receiving a bailout (as in Rose and Wieladek (2014); Chavaz (2016)). To
test this hypothesis, I start by exploring how bank b’s propensity to lend borrowers in
country j at year t varies, depending on whether country j is the bank’s home country and
whether bank b receives a bailout or not. Therefore, the baseline regression specification
is:
yb,j,t = β1 homeb,j×BOb,t+β2 homeb,j+β3 BOb,t+Xb,t−1+µb,j+θb×t+ϕj×t+εb,j,t, (5)
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where the dependent variable, yb,j,t, is either the outstanding loan volume by bank b
to borrowers in country j at year t (volumeb,j,t), or the bias of bank b’s loan portfolio
to borrowers from country j at year t (biasb,j,t). The dependent variable volumeb,j,t
thus captures effects on the intensive lending margin; while biasb,j,t captures effects on
a banks’ lending bias by taking time-varying changes of borrower country market j’s
size into account. On the right hand side of the equation, homeb,j is a time-invariant
dummy taking value one if country j is bank b’s home country by headquarter location.
The bailout dummy variable BOb,t takes value one if bank b receives a bailout at time
t.16 Xb,t−1 denotes following bank-year control variables to capture omitted variables:
assets, leverage, tier 1 capital ratio, non-performing loans, liquidity risk and globalness
(number of bank b’s active countries j) lagged by one period. θb×t, ϕj×t, and µb,j denote
bank-time, borrower country-time and bank-borrower country fixed effects, respectively.
Standard errors are clustered at both the bank and time level.
The coefficient of interest is β1, which reflects to what extent a bailout increases the
bank’s propensity to grant new loans to home rather than to foreign borrowers. According
to the financial protectionism hypothesis, I expect β1 > 0. That is, a bank increases its
lending volume or lending bias at home more than abroad, following a bailout.
Central to the estimation of equation (5) is the definition of the control group. That
is, for which observations the bailout variable BOb,t takes value zero. It takes value zero
for all banks that do not receive a bailout, which assumes that all banks in the sample
not receiving a bailout are a reasonable counterfactual for the treatment variable bailout.
However, I draw solely on the within bank or within bank-borrower country variation
for estimation to avoid cross-sectional inference from different banks or different bank-
country combinations (through bank and bank-borrower country fixed effects).
The first identification challenge to testing the financial protectionism is to absorb
loan demand. The granular structure of the underlying loan-level data allows to address
this in three steps. First, ϕj×t capture all time-varying unobserved heterogeneity at the
borrower country level, including a borrower country’s demand for loans. Second, θb×t
capture all time-varying unobserved heterogeneity across banks. For instance, θb×t con-
trols for idiosyncratic shocks to banks’ credit supply and other changes at the bank-time
level. Third, adding µb,j controls for unobservable heterogeneity at the bank-borrower
country level such as distance.
16Note two things on the construction of the bailout variable. First, the bailout can come from any
country. Thus, the bailout country may be different from the bank’s home country in a few cases, for
example Dexia. Second, the bailout keeps value one for all years in which the bailout is active. It takes
value zero, after a bailout ends (for instance, after the scheduled payback of the recapitalization funds).
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The second identification challenge is that bailouts are endogenous to other unob-
servable variables such as political connections. This selection bias may lead to bi-
ased coefficients. In Section 3.2, I address concerns on selection bias using propensity
score matching on observable variables such as balance sheet characteristics and polit-
ical connections. Furthermore, I address firm heterogeneity by constructing a granular
bank-firm-year panel to employ firm-time fixed effects in the spirit of Khwaja and Mian
(2008).17
Overall, the employed fixed effects structure allows addressing a range of alternative
explanations, to rule out remaining concerns on a potentially spurious correlation between
bailouts and a bank’s propensity to prefer home over foreign borrowers. Central to the
identification is the absorption of any demand shock affecting country j and any supply
shock affecting bank b at time t. Thus, the empirical framework allows for identification
of the differential propensity of bank b to lend to their home country rather than to a
foreign country after receiving a bailout, using as controls other banks that are lending
to the same countries but were not bailed out.
Firm level To analyze the effects of credit supply on real effects, I will now move
to the firm-year level. I will test whether firms with exposure to foreign bailout banks
experience a credit crunch and whether this affects firm performance. To establish real
effects of financial protectionism I will proceed in three steps. First, I analyze whether
there is a credit crunch for foreign firms following the bailouts. Second, I test whether
firms are able to substitute this fall in credit with alternative funding sources. For
instance, some firms may be able to draw credit from a bailout bank in its home country.
Moreover, firms may also be able to substitute into alternative debt instruments such
as non-syndicated loans or corporate bonds. Third, I will test whether imperfect credit
substitution leads to real effects for firms.
The key challenge to the identification of financial protectionism is to disentangle two
forces intrinsically related to bailouts: financial protectionism and idiosyncratic bank
shocks. It may well be, that the discrimination against foreign borrowers is caused by
the banks idiosyncratic shock putting the bank into distress in the first place. The
comparison of firms’ dependence on foreign bailout banks (foreign affected) with their
dependence on home bailout banks (home affected) allows disentangling these two effects;
both variables capture firm dependence on bailout banks, while dividing the effect into
home bailout banks and foreign bailout banks. If the bailout banks’ initial problems
17Further studies identifying loan supply effects using firm-time fixed effects are Jiménez, Ongena,
Peydró and Saurina (2014) and Morais, Peydro and Ruiz Ortega (2019).
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are the cause of the fall in lending, then both foreign and home firms should be equally
affected by the negative loan supply effect. If, on the other hand, the reason behind the
reduction in lending is, indeed, protectionism associated with the bailout then foreign
firms should be stronger affected than home firms by the reduction in lending.
In order to test for a credit crunch, credit substitution and real effects I estimate
variants of following regression equation at the firm-year level:
∆ yf,t = δ1 foreign affectedf,t−1 + δ2 foreign unaffectedf,t−1
+ δ3 home affectedf,t−1 +Xf,t−1 + ϕf + ϕc,i,t + uf,t
(6)
The baseline specification tests for a foreign credit crunch associated with bailouts
on the syndicated loan market. Therefore, the dependent variable ∆ yf,t will be the loan
growth of total syndicated lending by firm f at year t. In the second specification, the
dependent variable will be loan growth of total long-term debt of firm f to capture credit
substitution into alternative debt instruments such as non-syndicated credit or corporate
bonds. To analyze real effects, I use sales and employment growth as dependent variables.
The variable foreign affectedf,t−1 is the share of firm f ’s outstanding credit from foreign
banks affected by a bailout as defined in equation (2), with lending relationships lagged by
one period. Moreover, foreign unaffectedf,t−1 captures a firm’s relationship with foreign
banks unaffected by a bailout and home affectedf,t−1 captures a firm’s relationship with
home banks affected by a bailout, as defined in equations (3) and (4). The redundant
variable is a firm’s relationship with home banks that are unaffected by a bailout and,
hence, forms the control group. Xf,t−1 denotes following firm-year control variables to
capture firm demand: log of total assets, leverage, sales, liquidity and common equity,
lagged by one period. ϕf denote firm fixed and ϕc,i,t denote country*industry*year fixed
effects, where c stands for country and i for industry of firm f .
The main coefficient of interest δ1 is on foreign affected and is the firm-level flip side
of β1, which is the estimated interaction coefficient (home×BO) from bank-country level
equation (5). It illustrates the change in loan growth for firms with high dependence on
foreign bailout banks capturing the credit crunch of foreign firms. To analyze whether
bailouts affect lending to home and foreign firms differently, I add the two control groups:
i) foreign unaffected to capture a firm’s dependence on foreign banks that are unaffected
by bailouts, and ii) home affected to capture a firm’s dependence on home banks that
are affected by bailouts. Additionally, this specification sheds light on whether banks
increase their home bias by cutting lending to foreign firms or rather by extending more
of the new capital to home firms. To avoid contemporaneous effects of bailouts on firms’
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bank relationships, I include these variables in lags.
In case of perfect substitution, δ1 = 0 in the regressions with total syndicated lending
and long-term debt as dependent variables as firms substitute the fall in lending by
switching banks or resorting to non-syndicated debt instruments. For instance, if bailout
banks in the home market retrench just as foreign banks shift their business into their own
domestic markets, firms switch to home banks leaving net credit unaffected. However,
this may not be possible as home banks are at an informational disadvantage relative to
foreign banks who had formed lending relationships with the firms. A common finding
in the literature is that it is difficult for firms to form new bank relationships in times of
banking crises (Smith, Ongena and Smith, 2016; Cohen and Pascaline, 1997). This gives
rise to imperfect credit substitution, implying δ1 < 0.
In order to interpret the estimated coefficients as a loan supply effect, I use firm
fixed effects and country*industry*time fixed effects to absorb time-varying loan demand
per country-industry bucket. This assumes that all firms in the same country-industry
bucket change their loan demand similarly. Alternatively, I will use country*time fixed
effects as a less demanding specification and show that results are similar across different
specifications. As loan demand may still vary for different firms in each country-industry
bucket, I will validate this assumption at the bank-firm-year level using firm*time fixed
effects in Section 3.2, as this specification is commonly interpreted as a loan supply effect
(Khwaja and Mian, 2008; Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró and Saurina, 2014; Morais, Peydro
and Ruiz Ortega, 2019). I will show that results are robust to this rigorous specification.
3 Main Results
I present the main results in four steps. First, I establish evidence on financial protec-
tionism by analyzing bank lending at the bank-borrower country level and show that
banks increase their home bias following a bailout (section 3.1). Thereafter, I examine
the robustness of the results (section 3.2). Then, I evaluate real effects by showing that
firms with higher dependence on foreign bailout banks have lower loan, long-term debt,
sales and employment growth (section 4). Finally, I examine the characteristics of the
protected home firms and illustrate that lending shifts towards larger, safer and less
innovative firms at home (section 5).
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3.1 Effect of Bailouts on Lending
Table 6 reports results for regression Equation (5) and shows that banks increase their
home bias following a bailout. The dependent variable is the bias of bank b’s lending
to borrowers from country j at time t as defined in Equation (1). Column (1) looks
at the within-bank and within-time variation by using bank and time fixed effects. To
control for bank heterogeneity I add size, leverage, capitalization, non-performing loans,
liquidity risk and globalness, which restricts the sample to observations with full data
coverage in Bankscope. In line with expectations, the coefficient on Home is positive,
reflecting the positive home bias in bank lending throughout the sample. The coefficient
of interest (β1) on the interaction term (Home × Bailout) is positive and statistically
significant. Following a bailout, banks increase the lending bias to their home market by
( 0.1770.656+0.177 =) 21.2 %.
To address concerns about omitted variables, column (2) adds bank-time fixed effects
to control for time-varying unobserved heterogeneity across banks. Thus, bank-time
fixed effects capture idiosyncratic shocks to banks’ credit supply and other changes at
the bank-time level. As bank-time fixed effects subsume the bank control variables used
in the first specification, this now allows for an analysis on the full sample. Thus, the
tendency of bailout banks to lend more to their home country does not depend on the fact
that certain banks lend more or less than others to all countries, as I include bank-time
fixed effects.
To address time-varying changes in loan demand across countries, I further add bor-
rower country-time fixed effects in column (3). That is, borrower country-time fixed
effects control for changes in loan demand at the borrower country level that is common
to all banks. Therefore, the tendency of bailout banks to increase their home bias is also
not driven by countries rolling out a bailout scheme to borrow more, as the estimates are
robust to including borrower country-time fixed effects. In this preferred specification,
banks increase the lending bias to their home market by ( 0.2530.773+0.253 =) 24.6 %, after
receiving a bailout.
The coefficient of interest on the interaction term Home × Bailout remains significant
even after controlling for bank-borrower country fixed effects in column (4). This spec-
ification relies on the within bank-borrower country variation and thereby controls for
further unobservable heterogeneity such as distance between bank and borrower country.
The estimated coefficient is now smaller but remains both economically and statistically
significant.
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Table 6: Effect of Bailouts on Home Bias in Lending
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Bias Bias Bias Bias
Home × Bailout 0.177** 0.214*** 0.253*** 0.144**
(0.0784) (0.0727) (0.0660) (0.0500)
Home 0.656*** 0.578*** 0.773***
(0.0470) (0.0339) (0.0338)
Bailout -0.0184
(0.0216)
Assets 0.0346
(0.0285)
Leverage -0.156
(0.531)
Capital ratio -0.000355
(0.00165)
NPL share -0.0596
(0.174)
Liquidty Risk 0.00321
(0.00530)
Globalness -0.00146
(0.00194)
Observations 21,775 48,526 48,526 48,526
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank x Time FE No Yes Yes Yes
Borrower country x Time FE No No Yes Yes
Bank x Borrower country FE No No No Yes
Cluster Bank + Time Bank + Time Bank + Time Bank + Time
Note: This table shows regressions on the bank-borrower country-year level. The dependent variable is lending
bias of bank b to country j at year t as defined in Section 2. Homeb,j is a dummy with value one for the banks
home country. Bailout is a time-varying dummy with value one during active bank bailouts as defined in Section
2. Leverageb,t−1 is bank b’s leverage in year t − 1. Tier 1 ratiob,t−1 is bank b’s tier 1 capital ratio in year
t− 1. Liquidity riskb,t−1 is the ratio of total loans to deposits plus short-term liability claims, lagged by one year.
Non-performing loansb,t−1 is the ratio of non-performing loans (NPL) to total loans (including syndicated and
non-syndicated lending), lagged by one year. Globalnessb,t−1 is defined as bank b’s number of active borrower
countries on the syndicated loan market in year t−1. For further details on the variables see Table 3. All standard
errors are clustered both at the bank and year level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
To explore the intensive margin of foreign bank lending following bailouts, I now re-
estimate Equation (5), after replacing the dependent variable by the log outstanding loan
volume issued by bank b to borrowers in country j at year t. Table 7 shows results on the
intensive margin by repeating the identification strategy of Table 6. The coefficient of
interest on the interaction term Home × Bailout is positive and statistically significant
across specifications. In the most conservative specification shown in column (4), banks
increase the lending volume to borrowers in their home country by 30.4 % relative to
foreign borrowers, after receiving a bailout.
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Table 7: Effect of Bailouts on Lending Volume
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES log loan volume log loan volume log loan volume log loan volume
Home × Bailout 0.630** 0.650** 0.579** 0.304*
(0.249) (0.282) (0.231) (0.163)
Home 2.814*** 2.509*** 2.061***
(0.139) (0.108) (0.0965)
Bailout -0.00623
(0.0708)
Assets 0.116
(0.0788)
Leverage 1.221
(1.261)
Capital ratio 0.00196
(0.00426)
NPL share -0.388
(0.459)
Liquidty Risk -0.00248
(0.00348)
Globalness 0.0102
(0.00593)
Observations 21,661 48,539 48,539 48,539
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank x Time FE No Yes Yes Yes
Borrower country x Time FE No No Yes Yes
Bank x Borrower country FE No No No Yes
Cluster Bank + Time Bank + Time Bank + Time Bank + Time
Note: This table shows regressions on the bank-borrower country-year level. The dependent variable is the log
outstanding loan volume of bank b to borrowers in country j at year t. Homeb,j is a dummy with value one for
the banks home country. Bailout is a time-varying dummy with value one during active bank bailouts as defined
in Section 2. Leverageb,t−1 is bank b’s leverage in year t − 1. Tier 1 ratiob,t−1 is bank b’s tier 1 capital ratio in
year t− 1. Liquidity riskb,t−1 is the ratio of total loans to deposits plus short-term liability claims, lagged by one
year. Non-performing loansb,t−1 is the ratio of non-performing loans (NPL) to total loans (including syndicated
and non-syndicated lending), lagged by one year. Globalnessb,t−1 is defined as bank b’s number of active borrower
countries on the syndicated loan market in year t−1. For further details on the variables see Table 3. All standard
errors are clustered both at the bank and year level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Overall, this suggests that banks are persuaded by the government to engage in
financial protectionism in return for receiving a bailout. Across specifications, I find that
banks increase their home bias following a bailout. Moreover, bailout banks increase
the lending volume more to home borrowers than to foreign borrowers, relative to non-
bailout banks. These results hold after controlling for loan demand, bank-borrower
country characteristics and time-varying bank heterogeneity.
3. Main Results 107
3.2 Robustness
In this section I address doubts on identification arising due to concerns that bailouts
are likely endogenous. First, I address the concern of firm heterogeneity between bailout
and non-bailout banks by employing firm-time fixed effects on the firm-bank-time level.
Second, I will turn to the issue of selection bias by applying propensity score matching
to make bailout and non-bailout banks comparable on observable variables.
The central identification challenge is to identify loan supply to foreign firms following
a bailout. It may be that bailout banks are cutting credit more to foreign firms because
the quality of their foreign loan portfolio is lower in comparison to non-bailout banks.
Hence, firm heterogeneity could explain the differences in lending between bailout and
non-bailout banks.
To address this concern, I will move the analysis to the bank-firm-year level in or-
der to absorb loan demand through firm-time fixed effects. By comparing the lending
behavior of bailout and non-bailout banks to the same borrower, I address the concern
that differences in loan demand biases the results on bank lending (Khwaja and Mian,
2008).
Table 8 shows that bailout banks reduce their lending to foreign firms, relative to
non-bailout banks after absorbing loan demand. The dependent variable is the log out-
standing loan volume between bank b and firm f at year t. Column (1), adds bank-firm
fixed effects to compare the lending of the same banks to the same firm over time.18
In general, bailout banks extend loans with higher volume, as indicated by the positive
coefficient on Bailout. The coefficient of interest on the interaction term (Foreign ×
Bailout), however, is highly significant and negative. This supports the previous finding
that bailout banks reduce their lending to foreign firms compared to non-bailout banks.
Firm Heterogeneity
To ensure that this negative effect on foreign lending reflects loan supply, column (2) and
column (3) add country-industry-time and firm-time fixed effects. Therefore, column (3)
supports that the negative effect of bailouts on foreign lending reflects loan supply, as it
absorbs any time-varying changes in loan demand at the firm level. Following a bailout,
banks reduce their lending volume to foreign firms by 7.2 % relative to non-bailout banks.
In order to control for time-varying differences across banks driven by factors at
the bank level, I add bank-time fixed effects in column (4) and (5).19 In the strictest
18The coefficient Foreignb,f is absorbed by bank-firm fixed effects.
19The coefficient on Bailoutb,t gets absorbed through bank-time fixed effects.
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Table 8: Firm Heterogeneity: Firm×Time Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES log loan volume log loan volume log loan volume log loan volume log loan volume
Foreign × Bailout -0.089** -0.079*** -0.072*** -0.073*** -0.030*
(0.038) (0.020) (0.020) (0.025) (0.017)
Bailout 0.252*** 0.060*** 0.060***
(0.041) (0.019) (0.019)
Observations 483,176 483,176 483,176 483,176 483,176
R-squared 0.875 0.925 0.948 0.888 0.951
Bank × Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank × Time FE No No No Yes Yes
Country × Industry × Time FE No Yes - No -
Firm × Time FE No No Yes No Yes
Cluster Country × Time Country × Time Country × Time Country × Time Country × Time
Note: This table shows regressions on the bank-firm-year level. The dependent variable is the log outstanding
loan volume of bank b to borrowers f at year t; Foreignb,f is a dummy with value one if firm f has a different
nationality than bank b; Bailout is a time-varying dummy with value one during active bank bailouts as defined
in Section 2. For further details on the variables see Table 5. All standard errors are clustered both at the bank
and year level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
specification reported in column (5), the magnitude of the coefficient is reduced but
remains both statistically and economically significant at 3 %.
Comparing column (2) and (3), both country-industry-time and firm-time fixed effects
yield similar coefficients. This similarity supports the identification strategy at the firm
level in section 4, where aggregation allows only the inclusion of country-industry-time
fixed effects.
Overall, these results confirm the previous finding on bailouts and foreign lending:
banks reduce their lending to foreign firms after receiving a bailout, which cannot be
explained by firm heterogeneity.
Selection Bias
In this section I apply propensity score matching in order to address potential concerns
of selection bias. The objective of this matching procedure is to make bailout and non-
bailout banks comparable across observable variables. The matching exercise mimics
a natural experiment in which treatment and control group are similar on bank level
observables, such as capitalization or size, but differ with respect to the treatment -
bailouts in this case. Moreover, I now compare bailout and non-bailout banks that are
similarly affected by the banking crisis itself, which provides an alternative way to address
bank heterogeneity discussed in Section 2. To implement propensity score matching I
proceed in three steps. First, I implement the kernel weighting density algorithm. Second,
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Figure 1: Propensity Score Distribution
Note: This Figure depicts the propensity score distribution before and after the implementation of the kernel
weighting, to assess the quality of the propensity score matching. The figure shows that before matching, bailout
and non-bailout banks are heterogenous across observable variables. After matching bailout and non-bailout banks
are now comparable across observables. For further details on observable variables and the matching procedure
see Section 3.2.
I assess the quality of the match. Third, I will repeat the regression of Equation (5) on
the matched sample.
I implement propensity score matching using the kernel weighting density algorithm
on following observable variables: home country, year, total assets, leverage, tier 1 capital
ratio, liquidity risk, non-performing loans, return on assets, globalness (defined as number
of active borrower countries on the syndicated loan market) and political connections
(defined as dummy with value one if the home government has a positive ownership
share in the bank).
To assess the quality of the match, Figure 1 depicts the propensity score distribution
before and after the implementation of the kernel weighting. The figure shows that before
matching, bailout and non-bailout banks are heterogeneous across observable variables.
However, the propensity score distribution of bailout and non-bailout banks looks similar
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after the match. This suggests that, after implementing the match, bailout and non-
bailout banks are now comparable across observables and only differ in terms of the
bailout treatment.
We can now proceed to the analysis of the treatment effect by repeating the regression
exercise of section 3.1 on the matched sample. Treatment and control group are now
matched in terms of observable variables; and differ only in terms of whether they receive
a bailout or not. Table 9 shows that regression results on the matched sample are similar
to the previous results without matching. Coefficients remain comparable both in terms
of statistical significance and economic magnitude. Intuitively, two banks that are now
similar in terms of a number of observable variables, such as capitalization or profitability,
but differ in whether they receive a bailout, change their home bias differentially. The
bank affected by a bailout increase its home bias substantially more than the unaffected
bank. This suggests, that the results discussed in Section 3.1 are unlikely driven by a
selection bias.
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Table 9: Matching: Effect of Bailouts on Home Bias in Lending
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Bias Bias Bias Bias
Home × Bailout 0.204** 0.209** 0.234*** 0.209***
(0.0845) (0.0817) (0.0832) (0.0776)
Home 0.617*** 0.611*** 0.835*** 0.838***
(0.0583) (0.0522) (0.0530) (0.0623)
Bailout -0.0291 -0.0358 -0.0147 -0.0344*
(0.0244) (0.0218) (0.0251) (0.0207)
Assets -0.00712 0.0648 0.0225 0.0492
(0.0308) (0.0421) (0.0307) (0.0455)
Leverage -0.0187 0.0667 -0.228 -0.289
(0.577) (0.460) (0.486) (0.343)
Capital ratio -0.00398*** -0.00194 0.000715 0.00127
(0.00142) (0.00141) (0.00140) (0.00130)
NPL share -0.198 -0.0550 0.0487 0.158
(0.186) (0.102) (0.175) (0.106)
Liquidty Risk 0.00233 0.0248** 0.000584 0.0222**
(0.00501) (0.0108) (0.00421) (0.0106)
Pol. Connect. = o, - - - -
Globalness 0.000423 0.000849 -0.00436** -0.00473**
(0.00190) (0.00192) (0.00217) (0.00213)
Observations 19,884 19,758 19,692 19,562
PS Matching No Yes No Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Borrower country x Time FE No No Yes Yes
Cluster Bank Bank Bank Bank
Note: This table shows regressions on the bank-borrower country-year level, after implementing propensity score
matching. The dependent variable is lending bias of bank b to country j at year t as defined in Section 2. Homeb,j
is a dummy with value one for the banks home country. Bailout is a time-varying dummy with value one during
active bank bailouts as defined in Section 2. Leverageb,t−1 is bank b’s leverage in year t− 1. Tier 1 ratiob,t−1 is
bank b’s tier 1 capital ratio in year t− 1. Liquidity riskb,t−1 is the ratio of total loans to deposits plus short-term
liability claims, lagged by one year. Non-performing loansb,t−1 is the ratio of non-performing loans (NPL) to total
loans (including syndicated and non-syndicated lending), lagged by one year. Globalnessb,t−1 is defined as bank
b’s number of active borrower countries on the syndicated loan market in year t − 1. For further details on the
variables see Table 3. All standard errors are clustered both at the bank and year level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1
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Geographic Diversification and Industry Specialization
It may be that bailouts are driven by banks business models giving rise to a potential
source of omitted variable bias. For instance, findings in Doerr and Schaz (2019) show
that bank lending during banking crises is more stable for banks with a higher geographic
diversification of their international loan portfolio. Moreover, Boskovic, Doerr and Schaz
(2019) present evidence that banks stabilize lending to firms in their specialized industry
during crises. As governments will likely take the ex-post lending performance of the
banks into account when deciding on a bank rescue, it could be that bailouts are driven
by banks’ geographic diversification or industry specialization.
Table 10 tests whether banks’ geographic diversification or industry specialization
increase the likelihood of banks to receive a bailout. Results show that neither industry
specialization nor geographic diversification of banks are associated with a higher bailout
probability of banks. This result holds across different specifications, using both simple
OLS and saturated fixed effects models. These findings suggest that bailouts are unlikely
to be affected by either banks’ geographic diversification or banks industry specialization
mitigating concerns on omitted variable bias arising from banks business models.
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Table 10: Effect of Banks’ Geographic Diversification and In-
dustry Specialization on Bailout Probability
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Bailout Bailout Bailout Bailout Bailout
Industry spec. -0.001 0.035 0.005 0.058 0.058
(0.041) (0.047) (0.045) (0.052) (0.052)
Geogr. diversification 0.047 -0.110 0.048 -0.116 -0.116
(0.042) (0.123) (0.083) (0.108) (0.109)
Assets -0.010* -0.040 -0.012 -0.182** -0.182**
(0.006) (0.064) (0.010) (0.080) (0.081)
Leverage 1.894*** 0.308 1.646** -0.503 -0.503
(0.328) (0.816) (0.741) (0.735) (0.742)
Capital ratio 0.007*** 0.010* 0.004 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
NPL share 1.297*** 0.856** 1.102*** 0.555* 0.555*
(0.124) (0.294) (0.328) (0.299) (0.302)
Interest rate home 0.000** 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Liquidty Risk 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.005
(0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Globalness 0.003*** -0.000 0.003** 0.002 0.002
(0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005)
Constant -1.734***
(0.308)
Observations 1,228 1,201 1,228 1,201 1,201
R-squared 0.180 0.701 0.205 0.734 0.734
Bank FE No Yes No Yes Yes
Time FE No No Yes Yes Yes
Country FE No No No No Yes
Cluster Bank + Time Bank + Time Bank + Time Bank + Time Bank + Time
Note: This table shows regressions on the bank-year level using a linear probability model. The dependent
variable is Bailoutb,t, a time-varying dummy with value one during active bank bailouts as defined in Section 2.
Industry specializationb,t is measured as the ratio of loans granted by bank b to all borrowers of industry i in time
period t relative to bank b’s total lending granted in the same period, as defined in Boskovic, Doerr and Schaz
(2019). Geographic diversificationb,t is defined as banks loan portfolio diversification across borrower countries
as in Doerr and Schaz (2019). Leverageb,t is bank b’s leverage. Tier 1 ratiob,t is bank b’s tier 1 capital ratio.
Liquidity riskb,t is the ratio of total loans to deposits plus short-term liability claims. Non-performing loansb,t
is the ratio of non-performing loans (NPL) to total loans (including syndicated and non-syndicated lending).
Interest Rate Homeb,t defines the average outstanding interest rate to home borrowers on the syndicated loan
market. Globalnessb,t is defined as bank b’s number of active borrower countries on the syndicated loan market
in year t. For further details on the variables see Table 1. All standard errors are clustered both at the bank and
year level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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4 Real Effects
To examine whether the negative loan supply to foreign firms has real effects, I will
now turn to the firm-year level. So far, bank-borrower country level regressions capture
changes in lending by a bank to all borrowers from a specific country. However, if firms
are able to switch banks or use alternative forms of funding, such as issuing corporate
bonds, changes in bank lending may not affect firm performance. Suppose a bailout bank
cuts lending to a foreign firm. If this firm then forms a new borrowing relationship with
a bailout bank at home, or issue a corporate bond, this will mitigate the negative loan
supply effect. To establish a link between the negative loan supply shock and real effects I
test for credit substitution by firms in two steps. I analyze firm’s credit substitution, first,
by switching banks on the syndicated loan market and, second, by issuing alternative
debt instruments. I find that firms with stronger relationships with foreign bailout banks
experience a larger drop in lending, which cannot be undone by credit substitution. This
imperfect credit substitution gives rise to real effects: Firms with stronger reliance on
foreign bailout banks perform worse.
4.1 Credit Substitution on the Syndicated Loan Market
I now analyze the impact of bailouts on firm lending and test for credit substitution on
the syndicated loan market. Table 11 shows results of estimating regression Equation
(6) and addresses firm heterogeneity through different combinations of fixed effects and
firm controls. Column (1) controls for unobservable time-invariant firm characteristics
through firm fixed effects and time-varying unobservable firm characteristics through
country*industry*year fixed effects. The dependent variable is loan growth (∆ loan vol-
umef,t). The coefficient on foreign affected banks is negative and statistically significant
at the 1 % level. Increasing dependence on foreign affected banks from the 10th to the
90th percentile decreases loan growth by 6.5 % ((0.71−0.0)×−0.092). The coefficient for
dependence on foreign unaffected banks is about half in size of the coefficient for foreign
affected banks. This suggests that the flight home effect documented in (Giannetti and
Laeven, 2012) cannot explain the documented increase in home lending fully. Although
all foreign banks are found to retrench in general in line with the flight home hypothesis,
the effect for foreign bailout banks is twice as strong. In contrast, firms that have rela-
tionships with home affected banks do not experience an increase in lending after these
banks are bailed out. Thus, firms can not undo the fall in credit by foreign bailout banks
by resorting to home bailout banks. Overall, this suggests that financial protectionism
leads to a negative loan supply effect on foreign firms.
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Table 11: Impact of Bailouts on Firm Lending
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ∆ loan volume ∆ loan volume ∆ loan volume ∆ loan volume
foreign affected banks -0.092*** -0.150*** -0.091*** -0.132***
(0.020) (0.039) (0.015) (0.026)
foreign unaffected banks -0.055*** -0.102*** -0.050*** -0.081***
(0.017) (0.030) (0.013) (0.021)
home affected banks 0.007 -0.035 -0.001 -0.021
(0.018) (0.061) (0.013) (0.035)
assets 0.041*** 0.026***
(0.010) (0.006)
leverage 0.131*** 0.116***
(0.036) (0.023)
sales 0.000 0.000*
(0.000) (0.000)
liquidity 0.031** 0.029**
(0.015) (0.012)
common equity -0.000 -0.000*
(0.000) (0.000)
Observations 87,354 25,667 130,107 43,244
R-squared 0.360 0.377 0.163 0.171
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country × Time FE - - Yes Yes
Country × Industry × Time FE Yes Yes - -
Controls - Yes - Yes
Cluster Firm Firm Firm Firm
Note: This table shows regressions on the firm-year level. The dependent variable is the log difference of the
loan volume of firm f received by all banks at year t; foreign affectedf,t−1 is the share of firm f ’s outstanding
loan volume coming from foreign banks affected by a bailout at t. foreign unaffectedf,t−1 is the share of loans
coming from banks unaffected by a bailout. home affectedf,t−1 is the share of firm f ’s outstanding loan volume
coming from home banks that received by a bailout at t. assetsf,t−1, leveragef,t−1, salesf,t−1, liquidityf,t−1 and
common equityf,t−1 is the respective balance sheet variable of firm f lagged by one year. For further details on
the definition of variables see Section 2 and for summary statistics see Table 4. All standard errors are clustered
at the firm level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The results in Table 11 highlight that firms are unable to undo a fall in credit from a
foreign bailout bank by switching banks on the syndicated loan market. The results are
robust to alternative specifications. Effects are similar when absorbing demand effects
instead with less demanding country*year fixed effects in column (3). In addition to the
time-varying fixed effects, I add firm-year controls to control for loan demand, restricting
the sample to firms for which I have balance sheet information in column (2) and (4). The
coefficient on foreign affected banks remains stronger than for foreign unaffected banks,
although the difference now becomes slightly smaller, suggesting that controlling for firm
demand is important but that the story cannot be explained by firm heterogeneity only.
The result on imperfect credit substitution of firms is a common finding in the literature
on banking crises (Smith, Ongena and Smith, 2016; Cohen and Pascaline, 1997).
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To disentangle financial protectionism from the idiosyncratic bank shock that are
both related to the bailout in the first place, I will compare foreign affected with the
control group home affected. Intuitively, both capture the exposure to banks that are
bailed out and are thus all subject to idiosyncratic bank shocks. The difference between
these two groups is now only the nationality of the borrower relative to the nationality of
the bailout bank. Table 11 illustrates that while exposure to foreign affected banks has
a negative effect on a firm’s loan growth, exposure to home affected banks has no effect
irrespective of the specification. This shows that while banks cut lending to foreign firms
they do not extend more loans to home firms following a bailout.
Overall, this documents a differential effect of bank bailouts on lending to firms, de-
pending on the relative nationality between firm and bank. These results provide evidence
that banks engage in financial protectionism, that cannot be explained by idiosyncratic
bank shocks and the flight home effect documented in the literature.
4.2 Credit Substitution into Alternative Debt Instruments and Firm
Performance
I now analyze the ability of firms to use alternative debt instruments and the impact
of bailouts on firm performance. To obtain data on the liability side of firms, I now
restrict the sample to firms with available balance sheet information. Table 12 shows
results of estimating regression Equation (6) using the growth rates of long-term debt,
employment and sales as dependent variables. In order to absorb loan demand, I add
firm controls, firm fixed effects as well as country*industry*year fixed effects to all spec-
ifications. Column (1) shows that firms can at most imperfectly substitute the decline
in syndicated lending by alternative sources of funding - including non-syndicated loans
and corporate bonds. Consistent with the fall in credit, I find that firms borrowing from
foreign affected banks perform worse than firms borrowing from foreign unaffected banks
and home affected banks. Moving firms from the 10th to the 90th percentile in terms of
dependence on foreign affected banks, leads to lower long-term debt (−6.7 %, column
(1)), sales (−3.5 %, column (2)) and employment growth (−3.0 %, column (3)). The
real effects of foreign unaffected banks are around three-quarters in size. Therefore, the
difference in performance between firms relying on foreign affected and foreign unaffected
banks is less pronounced when looking at real effects, compared to the nominal lending
effects.
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Table 12: Impact of Bailouts on Credit Substitution and Firm
Performance
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES ∆ long-term debt ∆ sales ∆ employment
foreign affected banks -0.094** -0.049*** -0.043***
(0.042) (0.015) (0.014)
foreign unaffected banks -0.075** -0.035*** -0.036***
(0.031) (0.012) (0.011)
home affected banks 0.020 0.048 -0.006
(0.112) (0.030) (0.033)
assets 0.250*** 0.078*** 0.052***
(0.016) (0.006) (0.005)
leverage 1.268*** -0.022 0.011
(0.060) (0.019) (0.017)
sales -0.000 0.000*** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
liquidity 0.317*** 0.071 0.057***
(0.050) (0.046) (0.021)
common equity -0.000** -0.000*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 24,568 25,531 22,170
R-squared 0.463 0.618 0.512
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Country × Industry × Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Firm Firm Firm
Note: This table shows regressions on the firm-year level. The dependent variables ∆long-term debtf,t, ∆salesf,t
and ∆employmentf,t are the log difference of firm f ’s long-term debt, sales and employment respectively.
foreign affectedf,t−1 is the share of firm f ’s outstanding loan volume coming from foreign banks affected by
a bailout at t. foreign unaffectedf,t−1 is the share of loans coming from banks unaffected by a bailout.
home affectedf,t−1 is the share of firm f ’s outstanding loan volume coming from home banks that received by a
bailout at t. assetsf,t−1, leveragef,t−1, salesf,t−1, liquidityf,t−1 and common equityf,t−1 is the respective balance
sheet variable of firm f lagged by one year. For further details on the definition of variables see Section 2 and
for summary statistics see Table 4. All standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
In sum, Tables 11 and 12 suggest that the foreign syndicated lending contraction has
real economic effects on the affected firms. As banks engage in financial protectionism
they cut lending to foreign firms. In turn, these firms cannot undo this negative loan
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supply effect. Neither by switching banks on the syndicated loan market nor by using
other forms of funding such as non-syndicated loans or corporate bonds. Thus, negative
loan supply to foreign firms paired with imperfect credit substitution gives rise to real
effects: Firms that depend more on foreign bailout banks experience lower loan, sales
and employment growth.
5 Credit Allocation
In this section, I examine whether bailouts distort credit allocation in the home market. If
government intervention shifted credit allocation towards larger, safer and less innovative
firms, this would lower productivity and growth in the home market. To test the effect
on credit allocation, I sort borrowers into the bottom and top halves according to their
distribution of size, R&D intensity and ROA volatility, fixing the distribution at t − 1.
Where size is defined by borrower f ’s total assets, R&D intensity is the ratio of R&D
expenditure over sales, and ROA volatility is an ex-ante volatility measure defined as the
five-year standard deviation of firm f ’s return on assets (ROA, using profit & loss before
tax) from year t − 5 to t − 1, following Heider et al. (2019). Within borrower types, I
then compare lending, holding the same borrower constant.
Table 13 examines the shift in credit allocation in the home market distinguishing
borrowers by size, risk and R&D intensity. Comparing effects at home and abroad,
bailout banks increase lending within large borrowers, while they do not increase lending
to small borrowers (columns 1 and 2). In columns 3 and 4, I instead split borrowers into
the top and bottom halves according to the distribution of R&D intensity. Within less
innovative borrowers, bailout banks increase their lending more at home than abroad.
Within more innovative borrowers, this coefficient is positive but of lower magnitude.
Moreover, comparing effects at home relative to abroad, bailout banks increase their loan
volume within safe borrowers, while they do not increase lending within risky borrowers
(if anything, they decrease lending, columns 5 and 6).
In sum, these results provide evidence that government intervention distorts the credit
allocation in the home market by protecting larger, safer and less innovative firms, which
could be harmful for the outlook of growth and productivity in the home market.
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Table 13: Impact of Bailouts on Banks’ Loan Portfolio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bottom-half Top-half Bottom-half Top-half Bottom-half Top-half
VARIABLES firm size firm size R&D intensity R&D intensity RoA volatility RoA volatility
Home × Bailout 0.010 0.069* 0.137*** 0.100** 0.066** -0.049
(0.027) (0.035) (0.043) (0.046) (0.028) (0.036)
Observations 57,339 62,493 21,531 22,371 56,421 54,678
Bank × Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank × Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm × Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Country × Time Country × Time Country × Time Country × Time Country × Time Country × Time
Note: This table shows regressions on the bank-firm-year level. The dependent variable is the log outstanding
loan volume of bank b to borrowers f at year t; The sample is split into the top and bottom half of the annual
median according to the distribution of firm size, firm R&D intensity and firm RoA volatility; Home is a dummy
with value one for the banks home country; Bailout is a time-varying dummy with value one during active bank
bailouts as defined in Section 2. For further details on the variables see Table 5. All standard errors are clustered
both at the country-year level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
6 Mechanism
This section provides evidence that governments engage in financial protectionism and
that the mechanism operates through a transfer of control rights from bank to govern-
ment. In particular, governments gain novel influence over a bank through a nationaliza-
tion that accompanies the bailout of the bank. In turn, the government gains influence
over the business model as part of the bailout and, thus, suades the bank to prefer home
borrowers in their lending. In contrast, bailout banks that only receive a recapitaliza-
tion but are not nationalized, and hence no transfer of control rights to the government
occurs, do not significantly change their loan mix.
The propensity of banks to prefer home over foreign borrowers is strongest in those
cases, where a transfer of control rights occurs for those banks that have no political
connections before the bailout. In those cases governments gain novel influence over a
bank to which it had no political connections, in the form of public ownership, before the
bailout. Thus, financial protectionism is strongest in those cases where bailouts brought
about a new increase in government control over a particular bank.20
To test the mechanism that operates through an increase in governments’ control
rights, I capture following two dimensions. First, whether the government already has
influence over the bank irrespective of the bailout. I distinguish banks into banks with
20The importance of political connections for bank bailouts has been shown in Duchin and Sosyura
(2012); Chavaz (2016), while Bertrand, Kramarz, Schoar and Thesmar (2018); Goldman, Rocholl and So
(2013) highlight importance of political connections more generally.
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Table 14: Transfer of Control Rights and Political Connections
(1) (2)
VARIABLES log loan volume Bias
Home × Control Rights × No Political Connection 2.538*** 0.589*
(0.750) (0.295)
Home × Control Rights -0.156 0.142
(0.673) (0.193)
Home × No Control Rights × No Political Connection 0.325 0.0972
(0.450) (0.157)
Home × No Control Rights 0.361 0.152
(0.389) (0.119)
Home × No Political Connection 0.0654 0.0433
(0.231) (0.0818)
Home 2.013*** 0.678***
(0.187) (0.0661)
Observations 48,539 47,850
Bank x Time FE Yes Yes
Borrower country x Time FE Yes Yes
Cluster Bank + Time Bank + Time
Note: This table shows regressions on the bank-borrower country-year level. In column 1, the dependent variable
is the log outstanding loan volume of bank b to borrowers in country j at year t; In column 2, the dependent
variable is lending bias of bank b to country j at year t as defined in Section 2; Home is a dummy with value
one for the banks home country. Control Rights Transferb,t is a dummy with value one if the bailout of bank b
is a nationalization. Political Connectionsb,t is a dummy with value one if the home government has a positive
ownership share in bank b. For further details on the variables see Table 3. All standard errors are clustered both
at the bank and year level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
and without political connections to capture the extent to which the government already
has influence over the bank before the bailout. A bank is defined as politically connected,
if either the home government is one of its shareholders or if the institution is publicly
owned. Second, whether a bailout comes with a transfer of control rights from bank to
the government. I distinguish bailouts into two categories: i) bailouts that come with a
transfer of control rights and ii) bailouts that come without a transfer of control rights
to the government. I define a bailout with a transfer of control rights to the government
as a bank nationalization as this gives the government direct influence over the banks’
management. A bailout with no transfer of control rights is defined as a pure capital
injection, either through a recapitalization or by providing unusual liquidity, but without
a change in public ownership of the bank.21
Table 14 provides evidence in support of the mechanism that works through a transfer
21I omit bank-borrower country fixed effects as both Political Connections and Home are invariant at
the bank-borrower country level.
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of control rights to the government. Column 1 tests the differential effect of a transfer
of control rights for politically unconnected banks on lending through triple interactions.
The strongest increase in home lending is associated with bailouts that transfer control
rights from ex-ante politically unconnected banks to the government. As can be seen
in row three, no significant effect on home lending can be found for those bailouts that
do not transfer control rights from politically unconnected banks to the government. I
do not find evidence for protectionism operating through bailouts without transfer of
control rights (i.e. pure capital injections) independent of a banks’ political connections.
Overall, these findings suggests that financial protectionism operates through a trans-
fer of control rights from ex-ante politically unconnected banks to the government, as
the government establishes direct influence over the banks’ business through the bailout.
In turn, governments make use of their newly gained control rights by persuading the
respective bank to redirect lending towards the home market in return for the bailout -
in line with the financial protectionism hypothesis (Rose and Wieladek, 2014).
7 Conclusion
When governments support their ailing banking sector, they have an incentive that the
home economy benefits from this controversial measure. This paper provides evidence
that governments engage in financial protectionism by persuading banks to redirect loan
supply towards the home market in return for the bailout. In particular, I find that
bailout banks change their loan mix in favor of home borrowers, while this is not the
case for non-bailout banks. I document that the mechanism of financial protectionism
operates through a transfer of control rights from government to bank. Additionally,
financial protectionism alters the structure of cross-border banking and thereby affects
the real economy. In the home market, government support for banks distorts credit
allocation towards larger, safer and less innovative firms. Abroad, financial protectionism
leads to a negative loan supply shock to foreign firms that translates into lower sales and
employment growth due to imperfect credit substitution.
This paper contributes to the debate on designing the international architecture of
bank resolution within the European Banking Union. I provide evidence that bank sup-
port located at the national government level discourages international economic activity,
reduces financial integration, distorts credit towards less productive firms and harms both
growth and employment.
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